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Thesis Summary 
This thesis takes up the challenge of Jacques Derrida's Glas 
from an Hegelian perspective and addresses the central question 
of Derrida's book: "quoi du reste [ ••• ] d'un Hegel?" - "what 
remain(s) of a Hegel?". Glas construes a Hegel whose system is 
'reappropriative' of all alterity and Derrida's efforts are 
devoted to disclosing the elements of Hegel's system that are 
not only incapable of reappropriation but which are, for that 
reason, the system's condition of possibility. Each chapter of 
the thesis addresses the construction of these 'remain(s), with 
regard to Hegel's text. The essay considers Derrida's 
reconstruction of Hegel's conception of Sophocles' Antigone, of 
the absolute religion and the construal of the Jews, whilst it 
also addresses the 'general fetishism' that is the method of 
Glas and is paricularly evident in the portion of the text 
devoted to Genet. In response, the thesis examines the Hegel 
of deconstruction and counters this construal with a rereading 
of the Hegel texts from which the 'remain(s), are collected. 
The fundamental argument of the thesis is that Glas presupposes 
and confronts the Hegel-reading of Alexandre Kojeve: a 
'reappropriative' Hegel whose system concludes with the self-
transparency of the bourgeois subject as citizen of the modern 
state. The 'remain(s)' represent all that refuses to be 
subsumed by the law or 'concept' of this state. In parallel, 
the argument focuses upon Derrida's construal of Hegel's 
thought as the 'metaphysics of the proper' and the essay 
thereby conceives of 'differance' as the alienation that 
constitutes formal identity or 'propriety'. Thus, the 
inadmissable 'remain(s), supply the formally-universal state 
and citizen of Kojeve with the moment of 'difference' that it 
must suppress: the 'remain(s)' collude with the sphere of 
production and exchange, with civil society and the proprietor. 
In contrast to the Kojevean Hegel of Glas, the thesis shows 
that Hegel's thought is not the narrative justification of 
modern, positive, property law but the determination of the 
latter's fixed and abstract oppositions. The response to Glas 
considers the 'remain(s)' to be the moment of alienation that 
is constitutive of the modern, universal right of private 
appropriation. Derrida, incapable of thinking otherwise than 
according to abstract law renders that moment transcendental. 
Thus, the thesis depicts Hegel as confronting the one-sided 
conceptuality of Kojevean 'right' and the one-sided emphasis 
upon non-identity and intuition in Derridean differance. The 
thesis asserts that Hegel's 'absolute' and the notion of 
'ethical life', far from being the justification of positive 
law, adumbrate the possibility of cognizing this law without 
imposing the abstract concept anew. In the name of precluding 
the domination of the concept, however, the 'remain(s), will 
simultaneously reassert positive law as 'unknowable' whilst 
maintaining the violence of the law's imposition and its 
undeterminable oppositions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Preparing the "remain(s)": Derrida, differance and the 
expropriation of an aigle 
This essay is an attempt to address the opening question 
of Jacques Derrida's book, Glas: "quoi du reste, 
aujourd'hui, pour nous, .!£!., maintenant, d'un Hegel?"[l]. 
It does not attempt to undertake an exhaustive reading of 
Glas (were such a course possible) and there is much in 
that text that I have left unattended. The treatment of 
Hegel, too, is far from encyclopaedic and it should be 
made clear from the start that the 'time' of the title 
does not indicate an account of Hegel's concept of 
temporality but rather bears on something like the 
'modernity' of Hegel - the question raised eliptically in 
Derrida's opening line. The thesis attends to the matter 
of the "reste", the "remain(s)"; to the construal of a 
Hegel who would leave such deposits, to the 
presuppositions of the thought which 'discovers' them, and 
to the validity of the former and its significance for the 
latter. Finally, it reconsiders Hegel in the light of 
that construal and its ends, to suggest not only that 
Hegel is misread but that deconstruction, forged from the 
claims of a certain Hegel-critique, is itself moulded by 
that misconstrual. Fundamentally, the thesis pursues a 
conception of Derrida's discourse that accords with its 
construction as "the sacrifice of mastery, the work of 
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self-dispossession" [2] and it convenes the "remain(s)" as 
those elements of a closed and appropriative system which 
are indigestible by 'speculative dialectics', which are 
absolutely expropriative, traces of differance. 
As appropriative, totalizing, and scattered across Glas in 
the metonymy of the imperial all-conquering "aigle", the 
Hegel of Glas is the philosopher of - at - the end of 
history. This is the Hegel of Kojeve. The thinker of the 
absolute is constructed as the one whose absolute 
knowledge is the comprehension of history's completion in 
the absolute state and in the full self-presence of the 
citizen of that state. The "remain(s)" of this Hegel, the 
expropriation of that identitarian subject and state, are 
excavated as the elements that refuse subsumption beneath 
its law. They are configurations 'unrelievable' inasmuch 
as they register the non-identity, the meaninglessness, 
that is constitutive of identity and meaning and are thus 
unrecuperable by the circuit of speculative dialectics' 
positing-negation. This essay, however, argues that the 
difference of the 'remaindered' element and the 
identitarian, circuitous whole is structured such that the 
"remain(s)" are nevertheless dependent upon that abstract 
identity and escape the latter's appropriation by way of 
the 'transcendentalizing' of Hegelian negation. This is 
not to return to absolute knowing as the apotheosis of 
formal identity, however, for this grasp of the 
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distinction of "remain(s)" and totality arises from the 
pursuit of 'differance' as a countering of 'absolute' 
(that is formal) identity. Identity is construed as 
total, dialectical difference its achievement: "negativity 
is always the underside and accomplice of positivity"[3]. 
My thesis rests on arguing that there is not a choice 
between a non-identity made transcendental - utterly 
unknowable except in its 'effects' - and an identity of 
total completion - either tautological or suppressive and 
occlusive. What is refused is to take up Hegelian 
antitheses in media res and to 'resolve' them by the 
transcendentalization of the (apparently) inferior term -
a move which, whilst preventing the concept from gaining a 
foothold, is accomplished at the expense of the 
recognition of the aporia. 
The question of the "remain(s)", therefore, is addressed 
by the thesis whilst attending to a Hegel who does not 
seek to carry through the imposition of concept over 
intuition, the imposition of 'identity' upon the non-
identical. Indeed, in reconstructing the origins of this 
identitarian Hegel in France, it is possible to reconvene 
the remainder of an all-incorporative system in its social 
and political aspect. The Hegel summoned by Glas is the 
thinker of the abstract state; the "remain(s)" appear as 
the substance and content of that formal identity - they 
appear as the concrete difference of civil society that is 
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the presupposition of the state. Pursuing the Derridean 
construction of "the metaphysics of the proper" and 
speech's 's'entendre parler' as the model of formal 
identity - as well as its differance in 'writing' -
through a reading of Hegel's grasp of legal personality, 
one comes to a recognition of the dependence of 
deconstruction upon the aspect of universal alienation 
that is inscribed in the legal right of appropriation. 
This view of the dissolution or differetiation of the 
identity of 'the proper' by way of the alienation, escape 
and 'mastery' of the object of property and the conception 
of this as the unappropriable - the 'left-over' - of Ie 
propre, is confirmed in its being situated as the 
alienating, disintegrating force of civil society upon the 
abstract state as one turns to the Kojevean account. In 
preparation for the "remain(s)", therefore, I shall - in 
this introduction - follow the course of deconstruction's 
repatterning of the 'dichotomy' of system and method 
whereby the former closes into the brittle totality of 
abstract identity, the latter into the movement and milieu 
of difference without which totality cannot be thought but 
which is, thereby, the anterior destruction of that 
closure. Pursuing the political and economic rhetoric of 
differance's explication, I shall then attend to the 
conception of state and society that the sitelessness, the 
'utopia', of differance bears with it: its refusal of the 
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state, its embrace of civil society and the dissolving, 
mobile and expropriative master, the commodity. 
i. Speech and private property: the differance of a 
bourgeois Hegel 
Throughout Derrida's text Hegel is construed always the 
same. The traditional distinction of a radical method and 
a conservative system is once more restated by 
deconstruction. This time, however, the dichotomy of 
systematic identity and methodological difference will be 
radicalized according to the grammatological schema 
wherein difference takes up the quasi-transcendental 
'site' of an arche-writing whilst identity is configured 
in the paradigm of speech as the self-completion of 
's'entendre parler'[4]. Deconstruction adjusts - and 
adjusts to - the traditional Hegel as, 'on the one hand', 
taking the identitarian repression of writing and 
elevation of self-sufficient speech to its conclusion, 
whilst, on the other, supplying the resources for the 
breaching of that self-enclosure in speech and, thereby, 
anticipating the rescue of writing. In what one must now 
regard as the locus classicus of Derrida's schematized 
Hegel, deconstruction presents the fork whereby, as "the 
last philosopher of the Book", Hegel 
"undoubtedly summed up the entire philosophy of the logos. 
He determined ontology as absolute logic; he assembled all 
the delimitations of philosophy as presence; he assigned 
to presence the eschatology of parousia, of the self-
proximity of infinite subjectivity. And for the same 
reason he had to debase or subordinate writing. [ ••• ] 
Writing is that forgetting of the self, that 
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exteriorization, the contrary of the interiorizing memory, 
of the Erinnerung that opens the history of spirit."[5] 
Yet, the denounced, repressed and introjected exteriority 
of the letter - offensive to the system - is nevertheless 
offered succour by the fact of Hegelian negativity: "all 
that Hegel thought within this horizon, all, that is, 
except eschatology, may be reread as a meditation on 
writing. Hegel is also the thinker of irreducible 
difference"[6]. Nevertheless, this negativity, this 
difference - in the construal of what would constitute 
'irreducibility' - undergoes transformation. 
Deconstruction radicalizes the dialectical method by 
dispensing with dialectics in the embrace of a 
'transcendental' difference (albeit one that would 
rigourously adhere to its literal sitelessness - it is 
nowhere 'present'). By convening writing as a 
"supplement", an aide-memoire to the speech that cannot do 
without it and to which it cannot be reduced, Derrida not 
only damages the perfection of the idealized voice that 
hears-itself-speak but also renders this 'writing' 
transcendental. This is prompted by the Saussurean 
"arbitrary difference"; it is the realization that meaning 
is constituted and perpetuated by (and within) an 
unpresentable 'non-meaning'. Thought comes upon an active 
'nothing'. Nevertheless, deconstruction rigourously 
invigilates this void - all nomination is, in general, 
rendered (im)possible. This is to say that meaning 
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(vou1oir-dire: wanting-to-say) is 'possible' on account of 
its constitution by non-meaning, 'impossible' inasmuch as 
that dependence renders it always incomplete - an 
admission in advance of the defeat of would-be se1f-
presence. As 'differance' this constitutive 
(im)possibi1ity of nomination is named and, although 
respecting that impossibility inasmuch as differance is 
"neither a word nor a concept"[7] , as a 'name' it 
therefore remains metaphysica1[8]. Thus, the irreducible 
difference of Hegel has been conducted beyond a 
dialectical re-opening of the systematic closure (a re-
opening that would remain within the control of a positing 
negation and so not depart the system) to the 
'apositiona1ity' of a transcendenta1ized difference (the 
ruin of the systematic drive of self-presence by virtue of 
its registration of that constitutive 'nothing' which 
would be 'anterior' to the position or negation). 
This reconstruction of the division of system and method 
is, then, the dissolution of its dichotomous configuration 
and the replacement, by way of that transcendental 
difference, of one term as the condition of 
(im)possibi1ity of the other. Parenthetically - but of 
significance in light of the filiation of Derrida's 
'Hegel' - one can note that this move also permits Hegel 
to be construed as never divorcing the system and the 
method: dialectics is positing by way of negation - it is 
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always already in identity with the fulfilled concept. 
Furthermore, still attending to the passage from dialectic 
to differance and, 'on the other hand', the systematic 
closure in the dream of self-presence, one notes that the 
deconstructive determination of Hegel takes a defining 
turn as that 'system' is configured as proprietorial. The 
Grammatology expands on its description of the 
'conservative' Hegel: 
"The horizon of absolute knowledge is the effacement of 
writing in the logos, the retrieval of the trace in 
parousia, the reappropriation of difference, the 
accomplishment of what I have elsewhere called the 
metaphysics of the proper [Ie propre - self-possession, 
propriety, property, cleanlinessJ."[9] 
Hegel's thought takes on a sharper delineation when it 
comes to be constructed as the metaphysical celebration 
and justification of private property: "History and 
knowledge, istoria and episteme, have always been 
determined (and not only etymologically or 
philosophically) as detours for the purpose of the 
reappropriation of presence"[lO]. As the condition of 
(im)possibility of this property-right, the constitutive 
'nothing' in the effect of differance will, therefore, 
enact an anterior alienation of this ownership. The self-
propriety provided by speech is possible only through the 
prior expropriation of that 'propriety': differance 
follows (as its ruin) the logic of private property just 
as deconstruction renders that logic paradigmatic for 
metaphysics. This structure of an alienation "anterior to 
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[ ••• ] discourse" is powerfully evident in Derrida's 
comments on Artaud - the condition of (im)possibility of 
speech described such that "speech is stolen: since it is 
stolen from language it is, thus, stolen from itself, that 
is, from the thief who has always already lost speech as 
property and initiative". [11] 
The Grammatology declares: "to make enigmatic what one 
thinks one understands by the words 'proximity', 
'immediacy', 'presence' (the proximate [proche], the own 
[propre] and the pre- of presence), is my final intention 
in this book"[12] and it is this work of 'enigmatizing' 
that serves to occlude the dependence of the work upon the 
law - the concept, the abstract universal - of private 
property. In the 'transcendentalization' of difference, 
the alienation associated with appropriation has been 
rendered both anterior and enigmatic, unknowable. This is 
to say that, as the condition of all linguistic systems, 
the movement of differance cannot itself be included 
within them[13]; moreover, as the condition of meaning's 
'presentation' it cannot be situated, presented, 
elsewhere. Differance is not a concept - it is not 
another law more fundamental than that of private property 
- and detached from a dialectical construal nor is it the 
negative of appropriation and thereby its accomplice. Yet 
the 'arrival' at differance by way of the Hegelian fork -
the repatterned 'radicalization' taking the route of a 
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transcendentalization of the negative that ruins synthesis 
- is evident in this 'anterior alienation' and serves to 
unsettle deconstruction's security in its construction of 
a sublime mastery of the letter whose mute, enigmatic 
power would expropriate cognition in advance. 
The transformed moment of difference in deconstruction is 
also the transcendentalized moment of alienation in 
Hegel's account of formal law - the alienation of the 
formal universality the law secures, an alienation 
effected by writing. In Hegel's account[14] , the 
dissolution of the ethical order (Sittlichkeit) of the 
polis occurs through the triumph of posited law (Gesetz). 
The "aesthetic" character of Greek life, where legality is 
customary and morality is not divided off from juristic 
right[15], is irretrievably sundered with the emergence of 
prior, codified, law - a law whose abstractness is 
necessitated by its task of securing individuals' right to 
private property. The ethical 'state' of Greek antiquity 
had not known the principle of subjectivity and so had 
found possible the immediate unity of individual and 
universal. 'Law' takes effect as concrete, lived 'lore', 
a second nature - not as extrinsic and the imposition of 
principles and definitions whose achievement is to 
structure social life and its resources in terms of strict 
antinomies subservient to the right of appropriation. 
This is the dissolution of ethical life, of 'True Spirit' 
- 11 -
- substantial freedom knowing no 'subject' - by 'Legal 
Status' - the abstract (that is, legally-defined) identity 
of the 'person'; the 'absolute' subjectivity of a "rigid 
unyielding self"[16] for whom the non-identical is the 
inessential matter of appropriation. Beneath the rubric 
of legal personality, therefore, stands the recognised 
right to assimilation and appropriation by a formal 
universality of that which is posited as the contingent 
manifold. Derrida nowhere makes reference to this 
'propriety' - at least not to lend it the significance 
afforded other figures and elements of Hegel's text - and 
yet it is this construal of Roman legality, of the formal 
universality of its positive law and the supreme principle 
of personality, that enables one to recognize the 
configuration of an ontotheological Hegel as 
'proprietorial' and the enrolement of writing as its 
'condition of (im)possibility'. 
The alienation of personality is effected by way of the 
abstractness of positive law - by virtue of its 
formalization, its encodedness, its inscription. Hegel 
writes that the definition of the individual as complete 
self-possession "is, in fact, merely the contradiction of 
a consciousness that is at once independent and 
dependent"[17]. The 'proper' - the absolute identity of 
the person - is 'independent' only formally: its 
abstractness, the fact of its definition in terms solely 
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of its right to property, means that any content it may 
have is the property of its object - and as such Ie propre 
is 'dependent', alienated by definition. In the sphere of 
legal status, however, this 'anterior' alienation of 
appropriative subjectivity is experienced as the flux of 
Scepticism: the 'absolute' 'I' experiences its vacuity, 
the expropriation of its substance, but returns resignedly 
to the irony of its knowing this loss. This is 
"a negative rambling which, lacking any stable form, 
strays fortuitously from one form to another, dissolving 
them, it is true, in (its) absolute independence but no 
less recreating them; it is, in fact merely the 
contradiction of a consciousness that is at once 
independent and dependent. Personal independence in the 
sphere of legal right is really a similar general 
confusion and reciprocal dissolution of this kind. For 
what counts as absolute, essential being is self-
consciousness as the sheer empty unit of the person."[18] 
Indeed, just as the substance of this formal universality 
lies in its 'inessential' object of property, so is it 
recognised as such. In the "soulless community"[19] of 
property-owners exchange is the medium of social 
recogntion and here the inessentiality of the subject is 
manifest - each is recognised as a bearer of property, a 
proprietor 'as such', on account of the object of 
property. The alienation of propriety takes the course of 
substitution: the absolute positing, the Setzen, of self-
identity in 'personality' is transformed into an Ersetzen 
as the proprietor gains recognition in his 'substance', 
the thing of property. This process Marx described as the 
reification of the person and the personification of the 
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thing [20], Hegel gives account of it by noting that 
"consciousness of right [ ••• ] in the very fact of being 
recognised as having validity, experiences the loss of its 
reality and its complete inessentiality; and to describe 
an individual as a person is an expression of 
contempt"[21]. To be a proprietor is to have already been 
expropriated. 
In addition, the substance of personality, the object of 
property, is also that of the community. The ethical 
totality of the polis was dissolved in the individualism 
of property-right - the movement from asubjective 
substantial freedom to abstract (encoded) subjective 
freedom - and just as the latter is convened only under 
the law of property, so is there no other positive form of 
recognition. As such, the object of property emerges as 
the unifying principle and substance of the community of 
private property. What this will achieve, therefore, is 
an effect of alienation upon the formally universal state 
mirroring that upon the person: the abstract totality of 
the state achieves its truth in the concrete community of 
persons. Yet that 'community' is nothing but the bond of 
persons in property-exchange and thus does the state find 
its truth in the sphere of exchange; the mutually-
excluding 'universal' persons, in "the rigid 
unyieldingness of their atomicity" [22] , are afforded 
mutual-recognition only by the object of property - a 
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recognition that is contemptuous - whilst this same 
object, as the 'principle' of community, is thereby the 
truth of the merely-abstract universality of the state. 
This is as much as to read the dissolution of ethical life 
into the divorced spheres of state and society[23]. This 
split and the appropriative, suppressive character of each 
half is evoked in the twin abstractions of formal, 
written, property law: "on the one side, Fate and the 
abstract universality of sovereignty; on the other, the 
individual abstraction [of legal personality]"[24]. 
Nevertheless, both abstract state and formal propriety 
find their substance in the posited non-identity, the 
object of property defined as secondary and subsumed. The 
universal right of appropriation breaches the ethical 
unity of the polis and gives rise to the difference of 
citizen and bourgeois - resident of the state, resident of 
civil society. The latter, defined by the law as a 
'person', is then conceived as the concrete individual of 
society. Nevertheless, by virtue of the very legality -
or abstractness - of that identity, the formal identity of 
the 'person' is breached in its recognition 'as such'. To 
be properly what he is, the person can only be a 
substitute of the thing of property - his content, the 
non-identical object. As such, then, the formal 
universality of Ie propre and of the state - the 
consequence of posited law, of the prior concept of a 
practical legislating reason - delivers them over to all 
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that they had defined as opposed: the inessential, the 
non-identical, the objects of intuition that are now to be 
re-cognised as the content the concept depends upon and 
suppresses. For Hegel, therefore, it is the very 
formality of property-law and personality that inverts the 
latter's appropriative designs. This formality resides in 
the encoding of law - it lies in its preceding of all 
deeds through its being written. 
How does this bear on Derrida's reading of an 
appropriative Hegel? In the differance of the metaphysics 
of the proper, in the construal of an "arche-writing", is 
contained the movement of the transcendentalization of the 
moment of alienation that is secreted in personality's 
universal right of appropriation and its formal identity. 
Through a posited law the difference - the non-identical -
is seen to emerge in its resistance to the intentions of 
that identifying law. Positive, formal law is writing and 
deconstruction identifies this inscription as the force 
that thereby breaches the absolute identity of speech. 
What differance carries out, therefore, is the alienation 
associated with civil society: the demonstration of the 
impossibility of the posited, legal universal - whether of 
individual right in 'personality' or in the constitution 
of the state. In short, deconstruction plays through the 
ruin of Ie propre as the abstract identical subject by 
attending to the suppression of its 'writtenness' - the 
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formalization that necessitates it occlude (that is, 
misrepresent) all that does not fall under the category of 
proprietor, the manifold of intuition which will 
nevertheless return to thwart the self-definition of the 
person. In 'writing', therefore, Derrida recognises the 
positing of absolute identity but at the same time, in the 
structure of opposition and dependency that this brings 
with it (the priority of personality depends for meaning 
on its 'secondary' object), deconstruction tacitly 
acknowledges that dependency and so can conceive of that 
formalized - written, anterior - law as the 
'inessentializing' of the essence it posits. Derrida 
takes the moment of non-identity - of alienation, the 
moment of the 'reemergence' of the suppressed object as it 
is recognized as the content of personality, the supressed 
thing of intuition - and renders it the transcendental 
condition of the abstract conceptual propriety it 
frustrates. 
ii~ The filiation of Derrida's Hegel: Kojeve, state and 
society 
Derrida would construe a Hegel of Ie propre, one whose 
'system' justifies the positive law of bourgeois 
personality and the modern state. This is a Hegel of 
"restricted economy", the Hegel addressed by Bataille and 
passed into the Derridean reading. Indeed, in the essay 
on Bataille this appropriative Hegel is clear to view. 
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One searches in vain for an admission of loss 
unrecuperated: the Hegelian system is one whose telos is 
to utterly exhaust meaning, positing by absolutely 
subsuming - by consuming - all non-meaning or negativity. 
Bataille reads a Hegel for whom death as absolute, 
unthinkable loss is not an issue; everything is 
recyclable, everything reaps a profit. Deconstruction 
derives a Hegel for whom loss is gain and who never 
'extends' negativity far enough to sense the 'nothing' 
that constitutes the meaning of negation - the Aufhebung, 
Derrida writes, 
"reappropriates all negativity for itself, as it works the 
'putting at stake' [of life in the dialectic of lordship 
and bondage] into an investment, as it amortizes absolute 
expenditure; and as it gives meaning to death, thereby 
simultaneously blinding itself to the baselessness of the 
nonmeaning from which the basis of meaning is drawn and in 
which this basis of meaning is exhausted."[25] 
The Aufhebung is a ruse of reason which enables 
speculation always to secure a profit - the risk is 
insured. However, whilst Derrida is at great proximity to 
Bataille's reading, the latter's "general economy" of 
unlimited loss - the baselessness of meaning, the 
absolutely irrecuperable expropriation in sacrifice, etc -
although ambivalent in its construction as a simulacrum of 
death, thereby takes this 'play' (what is unthinkable by 
the Hegelian system as the history of meaning as negating 
'work') too closely towards incorporation within the 
dialectic of work. The Derridean reading renders this 
baseless nonmeaning constitutive as the condition of 
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(im)possibility of dialectics. Nevertheless, what is of 
most concern in this explication of Bataille on Hegel is 
the Hegel of Bataille which Derrida absorbs - this is to 
say, where the question of the "remain(s)" of Hegel and 
the possibility of absolute loss originates. In a 
footnote to the essay, Derrida writes of the influence 
upon Bataille of "above all, Kojeve, whose mark dominates 
visibly" and talks of "Kojeve's reading of Hegel to which 
he openly subscribed almost totally"[26]. It is in a 
consideration of Kojeve's reading that the appropriative 
Hegel of deconstruction most surely gains definition and 
it is through the filiation of Bataille's Hegel that one 
gains a perspective on the differance of the Hegelian 
propre as the dissolution of the absolute state and (as 
its justification) absolute knowing. 
Bataille, setting up the antithesis of 'play' and the work 
that constitutes meaning - the antithesis that permits 
differance to transcribe playas the very milieu and 
movement that makes possible work - recounts this 
antithesis as the suppression of difference by identity: 
"Hegel, elaborating the philosophy of work (it is the 
Knecht, the freed bondsman, the worker who, in the 
Phenomenology, becomes God) suppressed chance and 
laughter"[27]. The Hegel of Kojeve coalesces as the 
absolute identity whose condition of (im)possibility is 
registered in differance: the Hegel of Ie propre is the 
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one unfolded in Kojeve's lectures and, most importantly, 
it is this statist Hegel who permits the reconstruction of 
its differance to take the route of addressing the social 
and political 'situation' presupposed by the rhetoric of 
propriety, ownership and economy. The Kojevean 
reconstruction of Hegel starts out from the propriety of 
an integral human subject and completes itself with the 
assimilation by that subject of alterity, recognised as 
its 'own' creation. The original integrity springs from 
speech: "Man becomes conscious of himself at the moment 
when - for the 'first' time - he says '1'"[28]. It is 
speech which distinguishes man 'as such', elevating him 
above animality, corporeality and brute nature for it is 
speech which grants and performs the secure unity of self-
consciousness. In a passage which cannot but site arche-
writing as the differance of this integrity, Kojeve 
asserts that the animal has no self-consciousness because 
"it cannot speak of itself, it cannot say 'I ... ' And this 
is so because the Animal does not really transcend itself 
as given - ie as body; it does not rise above itself in 
order to come back toward itself; it has not distance with 
respect to itself in order to contemplate itself"[29]. The 
animal and man are at one inasmuch as they evince desire, 
but man is distinguished by the fact that in his desire 
for transcendence he desires not a given but non-Being -
namely, another's desire "another greedy emptiness, 
another 1"[30]. My desire is for transcendence, for 
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freedom and autonomy and it finds this in recognition by 
other humans, through the other's desire of my own desire. 
Yet this opens out onto a scene of considerable violence 
as desire and recognition can only be sought and satisfied 
through conquest, can only be conceived in terms 
approaching the anthropophagic: man fills himself, 
satisfies his desire through devouring and ingesting 
alterity (Derrida never forgets this image and it remains 
fundamental to Hegelian 'appropriation'). Most 
importantly, however, whilst this account permits no 
inclusion of 'economics', it nevertheless demonstrates the 
easy elision of anthropological 'desire' with 
appropriation and ownership: Kojeve affirms, 
"To be human, man must act not for the sake of subjugating 
a thing, but for the sake of subjugating another Desire 
(for the thing). The man who desires a thing humanly acts 
not so much to possess the thing as to make another 
recognize his right - as will be said later - to make 
another recognize him as the owner of that thing. And he 
does this - in the final analysis - in order to make the 
other realize his superiority over the other. It is only 
Desire of such a Recognition (Anerkennung), it is only 
Action that flows from such a Desire, that creates, 
realizes, and reveals a human non-biological 1"[31]. 
Maintaining a silence on matters concerning the difference 
of state and society, providing implicitly a narrative of 
the state's consumption of society, Kojeve enables a 
formal universality to take precedence over the concrete 
differences involved in 'ownership'. Nevertheless, there 
is an attendance to the institutionalization of 
'appropriation' - a tacit mention of positive law - but 
the Kojevean account assimilates this to the 
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anthropological exegesis of desire in its generality. In 
this way, therefore, will it serve not only to generalize 
a Hegel of 'appropriation' but also to obscure the 
question of law as basic to Hegel's system. Kojeve serves 
to elide the legal right of appropriation with the 
anthropological 'facts'. Here are items left to Derrida: 
the deconstruction of Ie propre serves to elide bourgeois 
right with a Hegel whose system (concerned not with the 
determination of the fixed oppositions of right, not with 
the attempt to think a law other than 'positive') 
justifies and generalizes that right as 'truth itself'. 
The pivot of Kojeve's narrative is, of course, the 
dialectic of lordship and bondage. What is significant in 
the light of its education of deconstruction is that the 
Kojevean lecture construes the surrender of the slave-to-
be as the result of the fear of death but goes on -
against the grain of a Hegel for whom death is the 
difference that demands cognition, that which effects the 
demand of complete re-cognition of individual and 
universal, death as determinate negation, the "speculative 
Good Friday", "the hard saying that God is dead", etc -
the anthropological account goes on to assert that death 
is "something which is no longer anything more than an 
unconscious thing from which the living man turns away in 
indifference, since he can no longer expect anything from 
it himself"[32]. This is to return to a 'restricted 
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economy' for which death is not profitable yet, 
simultaneously, is evidence of that which as unprofitable, 
a matter of 'indifference', is unthought and unthinkable 
within the terms of appropriation. Derrida takes from the 
Kojevean Hegel that indifference to death that stems from 
the latter's unprofitability for speculation and asks 
after this aversion to absolute negation. The 
unappropriable loss becomes the constitutive 'nothing' -
the differance of Ie propre - whilst, across the Hegelian 
text, it will be traced in the figures or elements that 
betray that 'indifference' in their intimations of 
absolute loss and unconsciousness. For Kojeve, then, 
death is not 'demanding' but is rather a matter of profit 
('what can I expect from it myself?') as death is mastered 
and put to work in the negating labour of the slave; the 
work which concludes - as Bataille notes - in the worker's 
becoming God, the state. The slave begins to work from 
fear of the master, the master supplies an ideal of 
autonomy, the slave finally grasps that the world against 
which he is pitted and which enslaves him is his own 
creation: this is work as the path to "perfection"[33], it 
is a process of positing negation which is time as it is 
synonymous with history - "it is only by work that man is 
a supernatural being that is conscious of its reality; by 
working he is 'incarnated' Spirit, he is historical 
'World', he is 'objectivised' History"[34]. Through the 
labour of the negative - "forced labour"[35], at that -
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through the desire of autonomy which is necessarily 
achieved only through annihilation of alterity, "at the 
expense of Being"[36], history can be completed as the 
human worker looks at a humanly-created world. Kojeve 
transfers Hegel wholesale into the domain of practical 
reason: the 'ought' of autonomy, embodied in the master, 
is realized through the technological conquest of the non-
identical, the telos of Spirit is to assimilate and 
"humanize"[37] hostile nature. Finally, with the 
realization of "the ideal of autonomy, of Being-for-
self"[38], the slave completes history in the dissolution 
of the distinction of mastery and servitude in the 
worker's attainment of self-mastery. The initial 
integrity of the speaking subject, therefore, has been 
expanded to incorporate the world in its appropriation-
through-negation by consciousness. This end is 
objectively achieved in the specific historical instance 
of the Napoleonic victory which, made understandable by 
Hegel, thereby becomes subjective, self-conscious. 
"History will be completed at the moment when the 
synthesis of the Master and Slave is realized, that 
synthesis that is the whole Man, the Citizen of the 
universal and homogeneous state created by Napoleon"[39]: 
the division of labour in the collaboration of Hegel and 
Napoleon is such that it is Hegel's task to affirm this 
completion and it is because Hegel knows that here the 
dialectic of master and slave is to end in the self-
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mastery of citizenship, ie. the universal state, "his 
conception of the World is a total conception, [ ••• ] his 
knowledge is an absolute knowledge"[40]. As such, this 
knowledge sets forth the self-mastery of the former-slave 
as the fulfillment of Christianity - the bright 
transparency of the Napoleonic state burns away the misty 
residues of religious representation; the fully-satisfied 
citizen himself realizes "the myth of Jesus Christ, of the 
God-Man"[41]. 
For Kojeve this is revolutionary (and Bataille, as Derrida 
notes, saw no "fundamental rupture" between a Kojevean 
Hegel and Marx[42]). Yet what is embraced in this account 
of Hegel - and what serves to join the 'metaphysical' and 
'political' aspects of the notion of 'Ie propre' applied 
critically to Hegel - is the generalization of the legal 
right of appropriation (the pressuposition of private 
property) through an anthropologized 'desire' (supposedly 
justified philosophically by Hegel's text) and the 
recuperation of this right in such a way that its 
universality is acknowledged without recognition of its 
formality. That is to say, Kojeve conceives of 'identity' 
and 'cognition' always in accordance with the formal 
universality of concept of legality of the bourgeois 
state: desire's end is the self-realization, the autonomy, 
provided by that state - self-mastery in citizenship. 
Equally, the universality of the right of appropriation is 
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never questioned in its formality. Judith Butler is 
correct to identify the Kojevean Hegel as one always 
within the orbit of natural law[43] for that securing of 
absolute self-identity in opposition to the manifold 
echoes the criticisms contained in Hegel's 'Natural Law'. 
Recalling that essay's account of Fichte serves to focus 
on the fixity of the Kojevean opposition of worker-ego and 
'alterity' - one is returned to the abstract oppositions 
of practical reason whereby unity may subsist but only as 
domination and subsumption, in the "formal Ideal of the 
identity of the real and ideal"[44]. The opposition 
persists and its violence can go unnoticed only if the 
adherence to its formal universality - the acceptance of 
its law - is maintained. Kojeve passes down to his pupils 
a Hegel who is indifferent to legal form inasmuch as he 
presupposes and justifies always one form alone -
bourgeois private property law; the abstract, formal 
universal which subsumes alterity or intuition beneath its 
concept. Nevertheless - and herein lies the 'solution' to 
the paradox of a 'revolutionary' Kojeve - the fragility of 
this world-conquering imperial concept is its formality as 
registered in Kojeve's attitude towards Rome: there is 
suppressed in the Kojevean account a re-cognition of 
Napoleonic 'right' inasmuch as the lectures, whilst 
embracing the bourgeois state (never qualified as such), 
reject - on account of its 'difference', its mobile and 
ununifiable structure - bourgeois (civil) society. 
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Napoleon is perceived as Hellenic: Kojeve maintains a 
strict division between the self-mastery of the citizen 
and that of the person, the bourgeois, for whereas the 
former is the slave only of himself, the latter is the 
slave of his capital. The bourgeois is offensive to 
Hegelianism on this account for he does not work "by being 
supported by the idea of the Community, of the State: one 
can - and one must - work for the State"[45]. The 
Kojevean diktat is chilling for one recognises here the 
abstract legal state that disqualifies, in the suppression 
of its contradiction, the 'non-identity' of civil society. 
Here, the state and propriety have been allied in their 
formal universality and the substance of personality -
money - has been acknowledged as their dissolution and for 
that reason suppressed. 
One finds here, therefore, the filiation of Derrida's 
Hegel and the imperative of the differance of Ie propre. 
History comes to an end in the assimilation of alterity 
under the law of the absolute state, a self-transparency 
identical to that of the voice that says 'I'. The 
Cartesian self-consciousness is augmented by the Hegelian 
absolute knowledge of its own world-historical becoming 
and conclusion in "the one who perfects the ideal of the 
French Revolution by completing it"[46]. Yet this is half 
the story - Kojeve has contrived to reconstruct a Hegel of 
practical reason (the 'identity' is relative - the concept 
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must suppress the non-identical) wherein 'closure' is 
achieved through the constitution of the bourgeois-
revolutionary state but which remains implacably opposed 
to private property. This is to say that under the formal 
concept of 'citizenship' (posited a second time: Kojeve's 
legislation being as abstract and 'unHellenic' as that of 
the revolution) the atomised world of civil society is 
occluded. In the celebration of the 'droits du citoyen' 
the 'other' aspect of the bourgeois revolution, the one 
that opens the formal universal to the unleashed force of 
concrete difference, the institution of the 'droits de 
I 'homme', goes unmentioned., The question of Kojeve (which 
is to say, that of the French Hegel) and of his position 
left or right is resolved in the anachrony of his status 
as propagandist of the bourgeois political revolution. 
The one-sidedness is never more apparent than when 
reflected by that singular account of the Janus-face of 
bourgeois revolution, Marx's 'On the Jewish Question'. 
"The perfection of the idealism of the state was at the 
same time the perfection of the materialism of civil 
society. The shaking off of the political yoke was at the 
same time the shaking off of the bonds which had held in 
check the egoistic spirit of civil society. Political 
emancipation was at the same time the emancipation of 
civil society from politics, from even the appearance of 
universal content."[47] 
Kojeve's account shifts location from Athens to Rome, 
then, as the necessity of its maintaining the idealism of 
the state means the ever-more forceful suppression of the 
'differentiation' of money. Despotic and abstract, this 
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'universal' is far from Hegelian ethical life, whilst its 
antipathy to the mobility and incoherence of a society 
organized by commodity exchange, means that it opposes the 
bourgeois by more loudly heralding the absolute knowledge 
of the citizen in his 'own' state. 
This, then, is the Hegel that Derrida confronts. The 
"remain(s) of a Hegel" is the interrogation of that which 
escapes the law of the absolute state. Moreover, the 
Kojevean heritage of Derrida means that the multiple forms 
of 'law' (and thus of 'subjectivity') contained in the 
Phenomenology necessarily go unnoticed so that the 
prejudices of private property law - and that ready-made 
structure of opposition - renders the text uniform and 
continuous~ In addition, the proximity of the Kojevean 
reading to natural law - its presupposition and 
generalization of the model of private property - is 
maintained and obscured by its one-sided adherence to the 
abstract, modern state that is manifested in its 
hostility to the 'effect' of private property. Kojeve 
knows that legal personalilty is the dissolution of 
ethical life. The lesson that Glas will derive is to 
concur with Kojeve in the construction of Sittlichkeit as 
the modern state and to embrace as its presupposition and 
dissolution - its condition of (im)possibility - the realm 
of commodity-production and exchange. The "remain(s)" of 
Hegel, therefore, are the elements which are convened as 
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inadmissable, unrelievable - unsubsumable. In the course 
of this essay I attempt to trace the construal of these 
'elements', to demonstrate the 'statist' construction of 
Hegel that they depend upon and to determine them as the 
differance - the transcendentalised aporia of that 
'universal'. I attempt to show that Hegel does not pursue 
a course of 'legislating', of positing, and that he is not 
to be construed according to a strictly linear narrative 
of alienation and appropriation, concluding in a 
panoptical presence. The thesis, nevertheless, seeks to 
accomplish this immanently rather than counterpose (and 
thereby confirm) the system as 'Hegel-as-a-whole'. It 
seeks to reconstruct the 'difference' of Hegel from within 
the text of its trascendentalisation, to reanimate the 
"remain(s)" in the determination of their 'non-meaning' 
whilst not subscribing to the Hegel that necessitated 
their 'de-positing'. Equally, I have tried to respect the 
rhetoric and metonymy of Derrida's book - a work 
impossible to leave with a sense of having been adequate 
to the task of its reading - without, at the same time, 
remaining fixed in its glare. 
Antigone, Genet, religion and the Jews - these are the 
figures of the "remain(s) of a Hegel" and this essay 
pursues their extraction and deployment as it does the 
Hegel for whom they are indigestible. In the second 
chapter I shall interrogate the deconstructive restaging 
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of Hegel's reading of Antigone - attending to the Kojevean 
directions that determine Glas's production - and confront 
the perspicuous focus on Antigone with its erroneous 
schema. In chapter three, the thesis addresses Glas's 
interpretation of 'Spirit' and the 'absolute religion' 
with particular reference to Hegel's essay on 'The Spirit 
of Christianity and its Fate'. Contrary to Derrida's 
reading - conducted in the light of 'Spirit' construed as 
the identity of Father and Son with its itinerary 
conceived as one of self-filiation - I seek to reread the 
essay and the question of 'Hegel's Christianity' through 
the notion of 'fate' and its eschewal of positive law, 
underscoring Hegel's reading of Jesus' attempt to found a 
conception of ethical life beyond the fixed abstractions 
of (Jewish) law and the failure of this attempt. Whilst 
Glas conceives of Hegel's Jesus as an absolute positing -
and thereby the 'fulfillment' of the Jewish law - the 
thesis argues that this is indicative of deconstruction's 
inability to conceive of law except as posited. For the 
reason of their 'insufficiency' in the light of the law of 
the absolute religion and their adherence to a nonmanifest 
God, Glas determines the Jews as a remainder and the 
second part of chapter three follows the 'relapse' of 
Christianity into Judaism as the impossibility of parousia 
is apparent. Replying to this, the thesis finds that this 
failure of identity of presence and re-presentation 
betrays once more the trace of Kojeve: the distinction of 
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state and civil society - the formal self-identity of the 
citizen in the state and the concrete difference of the 
individual in the realm of needs - is also that of state 
and religion. Through a reading of Marx's 'On the Jewish 
Question' the significance of the Jews in this context and 
the 'return' of the absolute religion to that of the 
Unhappy Consciousness is explicated. The final chapter 
concludes with the reading of Glas's repatterning of the 
Phenomenology's 'Absolute Knowing', contesting the reading 
of that 'conclusion' as 'signification fulfilled'. 
The reading of the remains is embarked upon, however, by 
addressing the question of a "general fetishism", what I 
take to be the 'method' of Glas and what enacts the 
sitelessness and 'undecidability' of the elements 
inadmissable to the system. By way of Freud's account of 
fetishism, this method 'sexualizes' the transcendental 
difference: what Glas will pursue in its construal of 
Antigone and the law of woman, family and the unconscious, 
is borne in differance as the 'trace' of maternal 
castration which the fetish both disavows and affirms. 
Glas thereby 'sexualizes' the aporia that is unrelievable 
by Hegel, simultaneously convening Hegel as the 
justification of the masculine law. The two columns of 
Glas with their indents, jalousies and judases, are the 
enactment of this method and Genet - whose text is read as 
affirmatively-fetishistic - is read as expropriative of 
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Hegel, as unsubsumable by Hegelian law in his refusal of 
position. Whilst refusing to accept the reading of Hegel 
propounded, I also seek to determine the communication of 
this general fetishism with the commodity-fetish. The 
argument that establishes Derrida as expropriative of the 
formal universality identified with property-right 
necessarily notices that the fetishism of the commodity is 
unmentioned by Glas as it attends solely to the religious 
analogy in Marx's account~ Derrida identifies the 
determination of the fetish with a reduction to presence 
and the power of the fetishised commodity in its capacity 
of alienation and dissolution, its ability to render all 
'persons' Ersatzen, elides it with the sublime power of 
the letter in written law. The radical self-dispossession 
of deconstruction is carried out in Glas under the name of 
a general fetishism; Glas would thereby 'situate' its 
alienation beyond any possibility of determination. 
Nevertheless, through the return to the elements of the 
works of Hegel that Glas 'remainders' and by way of the 
lineage of the deconstructive Hegel-critique, this essay 
shall try to bear witness to that 'erased' law of Glas as 
a transcendentalised alienation which depends on and 
remains within - just as it disowns - positive private 
property law. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Fetishism strict and general: Hegel, Genet and the two 
columns of Glas 
i., The "remain(s)" of castration: Hegel-critique by way of 
the Ersatz 
For all its obscurity, ambivalence and duplicity, Glas 
asks its central question with a programmatic clarity. 
Its opening sentence inquires: "what after all, of the 
remain(s), today, tor us, here, now, of a Hegel?"[l], 
whilst over the page and across the divide, in the right-
hand column of the text, this "remain(s)" - 'reste' -
gains greater definition as "indescribable, or almost so: 
not by virtue of an empiric approximation, but rigorously 
undecidable"[2]. The end of the textual exertions of Glas 
is the tracing of this remainder of Hegel and the method 
through which it comes to be si(gh)ted is that of the 
"remain(s)" as "undecidable". Enigmatic as this talk of 
remains is, it nevertheless harmonizes with the 
traditional Hegel-critique that maintains the assimilation 
of all alterity and the recuperation of all difference in 
identity by means of a dialectics cut short. The 
isolation of the "remain(s)" is to afford the possibility 
of gaining a critical purchase upon the Hegelian system 
which is, so Glas maintains, impossible so long as it is 
confronted on its own terms - that is, confronted: with 
its implication of opposition and, therefore, of 
identification-in-difference, confrontation with Hegel 
- 36 -
will always be 'on his terms'. The "remain(s)" will, 
therefore, be the remains of the absolute identity 
constructed by the system, will be that which is useless 
to the structure or can only be included with the greatest 
of effort. 
At first, then, this seems to be in complete continuity 
with the orthodoxy of anti-Hegelianism. indeed, it appears 
to restate that attempt at Hegel-critique which has, for 
example, been reiterated by a recent work - and in an 
essay whose subject, too, largely chimes with that of 
Glas. In 'On Hegel, Woman and Irony', Seyla Benhabib 
asserts "what remains of the dialectic is what Hegel 
precisely thought he could dispense with: irony, tragedy 
and contingency"[3]: the radical method of difference is 
what remains and does so still adhering to 'dialectic'. 
Yet the remains of Glas seeks to pursue that 'difference' 
to the point where it can no longer be included in any 
structure of opposition: to a point where - prepared by 
the tradition's methodological-dialectical difference -
its status is transcendental. This is the difference that 
permits identification and which, literally 'no-thing' 
itself, refuses identity even as it is named: the 
difference which, in accordance with the tradition's 
knowledge of the transcendental, is unknowable and 
therefore excused from any structure of opposition. Thus, 
the "remain(s)" which is the radicalised method (the 
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dialectic which cannot be bound by the terms of the 
system) comes to be transcendentalised as it is afforded 
methodological priority. Whence it escapes even its 
oppositional structure, emerging as that which is no 
longer determinately negative Call determinacy is drained 
from the thing - its condition of possibility is the no-
thing of absolute difference) and so, constituted by an 
organising nothingness which, as such, cannot be known, 
the method of difference assumes the form of the "economy 
of the undecidable"[41. 
The traditional dialectical remainder - of which Benhabib 
would be simply the most recent excavator - is, thus, 
utterly refused. Identified with the same presupposition 
of knowledge as assimilation, clarification, reduction to 
the self-same as that ascribed to the system, this 
dialecical remainder would, for instance, be an earnest 
definition of the meaning of irony, a reconciliation 
through explanation of the oppositions of tragedy, an 
account of the very necessity of the contingent - and all 
undertaken in the name of that which the system represses. 
The method and telos of Glas is the remainder maintained: 
the 'Other' of the Hegelian text is only just explicable -
and then only as "undecidable". Like the tradition of the 
radical method it seeks to attend to what has been 
repressed, interiorised, coerced into reconciliation and 
does so - again in contintuity with the orthodoxy - by way 
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of an account of the very impossibility of that 
reconciliation. Yet the radicals of the method viewed 
this impossibility as the result of an unreconciled socio-
political world: Hegelian integrity was reconciliation 
under the duress of an antagonistic civil society, a 
substitute revolution. A most important and significant 
distinguishing mark of the Derridean critique - and one 
intimately bound up with its departure from 'dialectics' -
is that, like the radical method, it attends to the 
substitutive character of the system, it continues to 
consider the latter's integrity as an Ersatz, yet its 
"remain(s)" - for all its contemporaneity ("here, now, 
today, for us") - abandons the social and political 
dimension almost entirely. Or rather, the Prussian Hegel, 
aristocratic apologist of the bourgeois state, is in 
evidence - indeed is the certified author of the system: 
the "aigle"[5] carrying higher the aquiline-imperial 
concept and emblematic of its apotheosis in the Kriegstaat 
- yet this is not what the substitute-system covers. 
At the risk of anticipating the development of the 
"remain(s)" and the finer delineation of the method of the 
undecidable, this concern with the state could be sited 
within Derrida's construction by reference to a quotation 
from Freud's essay on 'Fetishism' - a citation absent from 
Glas yet, as will be seen, crucial to it. The Prusso-
Roman Hegel of the imperium of the Concept is organised 
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according to a structure of substitution. In concord with 
the 'dialectical remains' of the radical method, the 
integrity of the Hegelian subject is regarded by Glas as a 
substitute for the unreconciled actuality of the social 
substance, however, in departure from this, the 'proper 
ground of critique' - the Hegelian concern to mask the 
contradictions of the state - Derrida indicates that the 
systematic need of integrity springs from a deeper well. 
When Freud discusses the child's discovery of the mother's 
lack of a penis he describes the consequent (unconscious) 
fear of castration and the defence against this loss: a 
fundamental difference - coming to light in the event of 
an attempt at union - is conceived as a threat to identity 
and in response this integrity is asserted, great 
attention is devoted to that which is under threat and 
this 'counter-assertion' spreads to other elements in the 
subject's life. The substitute that Hegel supplies is, 
then, an Ersatz for castration: the concern for the 
integrity of the state is not the result and mask of 
divided social interests so much as a response to the 
anxiety provoked by the cut that threatens to divide the 
boy-child from itself. Provisionally stated and in 
anticipation of the detail of this fetishism and its role 
in Glas, the significance of the social and political in 
that text - metonymically implied, the importance of 
sexual politics, the emergence of a phallocratic Hegel, 
etc - can be drawn from Freud's account. The conservative 
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system is configured as the sign of panic whose 
'similarity' is the source of the "remain(s)", the realm 
constructed by "aigle" and to whose defence he rushes is 
then constructed within the context of castration anxiety. 
Freud writes: 
"What happened, therefore, was that the boy refused to 
take cognizance of the fact of his having percieved that a 
woman does not possess a penis. No, that could not be 
true: for if a woman had been castrated, then his own 
possession of a penis was in danger; and against that 
there rose in rebellion a portion of his narcissism which 
Nature has, as a precaution, attached to that particular 
organ. In later life a grown man may perhaps experience a 
similar panic when the cry goes up that Throne and Altar 
are in danger[.]"[6] 
Before returning to the interpretation of the system as 
erected against this fundamental threat and to the details 
of the discussion of fetishism, it is worthwhile to pursue 
the metaphor of the "remain(s)" insofar as it underscores 
the text's presupposition of the Hegelian subject. As has 
been noted, the dialectical method transmutes into the 
transcendental difference - the former's structure of 
determinate negation flattens into an "economy of the 
undecidable". This is the route and consequence of a 
difference rendered constitutive and the notion of the 
"remain(s)" carries this through by virtue of its allusion 
to the carcase or the droppings which are the traces of an 
animal. The remain(s) thereby reiterate what has fallen 
from the self-identical and cannot be reabsorbed, indeed -
and most importantly - there is the unmistakable sense 
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that this excreta is the guarantee of vitality and 
simultaneously repellent to it. What is being deposited, 
then, is the 'inessential' shell or the waste-product as 
the sign of life or spirit that has fled: the remains 
indicate what was the condition of possibility of life -
death, absolute difference - and they 'are' not, do not 
live, even as they were expelled as a vital self-positing. 
This is to rehearse in the language of Glas the 
grammatological schema already familiar from elsewhere in 
Derrida's oeuvre. Which is to say that this is to attend 
to differance as the condition of (im)possibility of self-
presence; the necessarily anterior structure of 
iterability for the possibility of 'proper names', the 
transcendental alienation that is the possibility of 
appropriation. Iterability as the possibility of naming: 
this is to assert that in order that the Setzung of self-
identity, "metaphysics of the proper [Ie propre]",the 
proper name, be possible there must be a transcendental 
ground of the Ersatz, or - as unnameable except 
metaphysically - an Ersatz 'transcendental ground'. The 
'dehiscence' construed as the sine qua ~ of meaning -
to which the remains point, is then the transcendental 
Ersatz/Ersatz transcendental: the structure of iterability 
is what removes, as it grants, the stability and 
completeness of identity which the Setzung would seek. 
Named this structure is one of transcendental alienation , 
- in Glas it figures as theft and flight (vol) and, 
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registered in the complicity of castration-anxiety and 
pha110gocentrism, it organizes around the no-place/no-
thing of a certain hole. This context Derrida has already 
remarked upon in 'La parole souff1ee': 
"Speech is stolen, since it is stolen from language it is, 
then, stolen from itself, that is from the thief who has 
always already lost speech as property and initiative. 
Because its forethought cannot be predicted, the act of 
reading perforates the act of speaking or writing. And 
through this perforation, this hole, I escape myse1f."[7] 
"The form of the hole", Derrida adds,"communicates with a 
scatological thematic": out of it comes the remains as 
excrement - the escape of the work from the author, the 
expropriation of the proprietor - whilst it is also a 
transcendental hole - anterior to the proprietor. 
Differance as theft, differance as this hole: one arrives 
at G1as and the structure of transcendental iteration, the 
constitutive Ersetzung as fetishism, for the "remain(s)" 
will be configured as the effects and the registration of 
the hole; the 'hole' that reinscribes the Freudian 
maternal 'castration' - the self-identical Setzung 
reconstructed as the response to the threat of that 
differance of the phallus. 
"Remain(s) is always said of the mother"[8]: differance is 
a matrix, for its 'no-place' is aligned with the construal 
of the mother's absent penis - a transcendenta1ized 
difference, sited only in its effects. This is, then, the 
complicity of signification and metaphysics in the 
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structure that Freud describes in 'Fetishism' - the 
'castrated' mother produces a fear of castration in the 
male child which is denied in the erection of a substitute 
maternal phallus: 
"Yes, in his mind the woman has got a penis, in spite of 
everything; but this penis is no longer the same as it was 
before. Something else has taken in its place, has been 
appointed its substitute, as it were and now inherits the 
interest which was formerly directed to its 
predecessor."[9] 
This conception of the substitute, according to Glas, is a 
"strict fetishism"[lO]: the truth is the (castrated) 
maternal phallus, the substitute - its ideological 
disguise, as it were (as will be seen, there is underway a 
critique of the radical method's concept of 'ideology') -
is the fetish. The fetish would be a substitute, false 
and opposed to the self-evident truth of which it is a 
copy or imitation. For Derrida this means that "something 
- the thing - is no longer itself a substitute; there is 
the nonsubstitute, that is what constitutes the concept 
fetish"[ll], the concept 'fetish' (and Derrida is 
approaching saying that the concept is fetishistic, the 
concept-fetish) is then "the sphere of truth, the 
opposition of Ersatz to non-Ersatz, the space of good 
sense, of sense itself"[12]. It is within this context, 
then, that 'phallogocentrism' makes sense - which is to 
say that the phallus makes sense. Just as the 
logocentrism of the s'entendre parler represses its 
constitutive difference - registered in its dependency on 
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the inscription which escapes the authorial voice - so 
does phallocentrism arise as the counter-assertion that 
seeks to maintain its integrity against an anterior threat 
of division, repressing the cut that is thereby its, the 
phallus's, constitution. 
A closer attendance to the maternal phallus, to the 
occasion of the mother's castration, teaches, however, 
that the structure of substitution erected by strict 
fetishism cannot be maintained. The woman has always 
already been castrated, the maternal penis 'is' never. 
Whereas Freud asserts that "the fetish is the substitute 
(Ersatz) of the woman's (the mother's) penis"[13] and the 
phallus would thereby be the general 'key', the 
transcendental signifier (this is always Derrida's reading 
of Lacan's work: the phallus as undisturbed and maintained 
in its circulation, in its 'always arriving' at its self-
destination[14]). This key, however, comes to be seen as 
a substitute for a substitute; the (fetishistically 
phallic) key as the 'fundamental' but never-present 
phallus of the mother. The maternal phallus is, itself, 
an Ersatz, is itself fetishistic: it is what "the little 
boy once believed in and [ ••• ] does not want to give 
up"[15]. Sarah Kofman considers that with this 
conception Freud, himself, effects a rupture with 
metaphysical opposition and is given too little credit by 
Derrida. According to Freud, the fetish 
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"breaks with metaphysics, with the idea of the penis as 
the 'thing itself' since the penis for which the fetish is 
the substitute is a phantasmatic penis, and has never been 
perceived as such, [ ••• ] the mother's penis, 'the thing 
itself', is always already a fetish fictionalised by the 
the child, a belief implying at the same time the denial 
and affirmation of castration."[16] 
This is a rupture with strict fetishism and is its 
inscription within a general fetishism. There is no 
original, phallic, Setzung except as a structure of 
Ersetzung and, thus, the substitute is not opposable to 
the 'thing itself' - rather, the constitutive no-place/no-
thing provokes the attempt to erect the thing itself and 
within this structure 'opposition' transmutes into 
'oscillation'. The transcendental Ersatz produces a 
phallic Setzung which both denies and affirms the fear of 
division and disintegration which effected it. 
Fetishism as the method of Glas, the 'knell': the title 
resounds to this as the ceaseless oscillation of the 
clapper in the bell - the bell which is both hollow and 
hard, affirms and disavows the mother's castration, the 
bell which is the form of a sheath. Freud's account sets 
the text ringing with "the argument of the girdle, the 
sheath [gaine]" [17] as he describes the simultaneity and 
ambivalence of the fetish as with "the patient [who] 
oscillated in every situation in life between two 
assumptions" and in 
"the case of a man whose fetish was an athletic support 
belt which could also be worn as as bathing-drawers. This 
piece of clothing covered up the genitals entirely and 
concealed the distinction between them. Analysis showed 
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that it signified that women were castrated and were not 
castrated; and it allowed of the hypothesis that men were 
castrated, for all these possibilities were concealed 
under the belt."[l8] 
The duplicity of the fetish - constituted by a perforation 
and escaping from comprehension as if through a hole - is 
then the reason for - and of - an "economy of the 
undecidable": this oscillation is a death knell for it 
announces the fundamental expropriation of the truth as 
self-presence, self-proper. The Hegelian system had been 
criticized as "dialectics cut short"[l9], as recuperative: 
with the method of general fetishism dialectics itself is 
regarded as appropriative, its own 'cutting' - evident in 
its oppositional difference, self-inflicted for 
presupposing a fundamentally-integral subject - is 
reconstructed within the context of an attempt to control 
and contain the effects of a castration complex, maintain 
that presupposed integrity. The economy of the 
undecidable, general fetishism, would see all thought of 
'truth' as fetishistic: overcoming that transcendental 
'loss' of the maternal penis with the counter-erection 
(what Derrida terms the "antherection") of the 'thing 
itself', its positing of the self-proper as a "sign of 
triumph" [20] over the female 'void'. It would regard the 
subsequent differentiating and self-dividing of 
determinate negation as premissed upon the defence of what 
dialectics tries to maintain as a 'fundamental' identity. 
Earnest explanation of irony, reconciliation in the 
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'meaning' of tragedy, inclusion through the granting of 
rights to woman: this would be the 'truth' of the 
"dialectical remains", the difference regarded as 
surmountable inasmuch as it is predicated on opposition, 
thus, identity. Yet the oscillation of the sheath-
argument surpasses this basic identity for the fetish is 
both denial and affirmation: dialectics, Derrida 
considers, is never entirely serious about the 
simultaneity of the terms of its 'contradiction' - "this 
at-once, the in-the-same-stroke, the du-meme-coup of the 
two contraries, of the two opposite operations, prohibits 
cutting through to a decision within the undecidable". 
The method of this generalised fetishism, therefore, 
"plays with the dialectical", it undermines the 
dialectical "feint" that "consists in pretending to lose, 
to castrate oneself, to kill oneself in order to cut 
[couper] death off" in its maintenance of the remain(s) 
wherein the transcendental castration - the originary 
Ersatz - is registered and repressed~ The transcendental 
alienation will not permit the dialectical 'semi-
castration' for there is, thereby, no possibility of a 
guarantee of accumulation through speculation - the 
subject of property alienating a portion of that property 
the better to appropriate the interest. The right to that 
propriety has always already been lost, the gambler cannot 
win: "one loses on both sides, in both registers, in 
knowing how to play all sides [~~ deux tables]"[21]. 
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The "remain(s)", then, are deposits which refuse 
reappropriation: they indicate the impossibility of the 
Hegelian system and the conditions of that impossibility. 
As resistant to Hegel, Derrida is concerned that they 
should not reflect a naively 'external' view of Hegel nor, 
however, represent any 'immanent' critique~ Indeed, the 
argument that attaches to the remains demonstrates - by 
means of its transformation of the dialectical difference 
into transcendental difference (that is, its departure 
from determinate negation) - what the 'radical method' 
chose to ignore: the indissolubility of 'method' and 
'system'. The "remain(s)" of Glas complete the task of 
distinguishing method and system undertaken by the 
previous critique of Hegel: transcendentalised, the 
methodological difference renders impossible the 
systematic closure which the radical method, also, sought 
to preclude - and it does so by underscoring (again in 
harmony with 'dialectics') the substitutive character of 
this purportedly 'conclusive' identity. However, the 
deconstructive critique of Hegel then effects what amounts 
to a radicalisation of the radical method - dialectics, 
through fear of its being 'cut short', is sent into 
perpetual oscillation. The 'method' did not recognise its 
identity with the 'system' - contained in the determinate 
negation; identity and contradiction of the True as 'in-
itself for-consciousness'[22] - and comes to the 
recognition of this unity only as Glas subsumes both, 
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together, under the category of strict fetishism or 
restricted economy. This is to say, the method conceived 
Hegel in terms of sheer, abstract opposition such that the 
'in-itself for-consciousness' was recognised not as the 
process of recognition and misrecognition which affects 
consciousness and its 'object' - the history of formation 
(Bildung) of the determination of the abstractions and 
oppositions of metaphysics - rather, the methodological 
difference presupposed those abstractions and oppositions 
(indeed, as oppositions) and sought to reinvigorate the 
term it considered suppressed. In the formal-identical 
understanding of the 'in-itself for-consciousness' 
therefore, the determination of the true out of the self-
inadequation of the thought of the object is transformed 
into the imposition of thought upon the object, the object 
devoured by an omnipotent subject - the 'in-itself' is 
subsumed beneath its characterization 'for-consciousness'. 
In response to this, the dialectic can merely seek to act 
as an emetic, compel the system to vomit, excrete what it 
has ingested, and in this the transformation effected in 
differance is realized: the attention to the "remain(s)" 
is to this excrement that indicates an unsustainable 
formal identity, the dialectical inversion of the 'in-
itself for-consciousness' whereby the thing-itself escapes 
except as a relativistic 'for consciousness' - this is the 
passage to a generalised Ersatz. 
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This is the "economy of the undecidable": not only is the 
(formal) identity of the method's 'conservative system' 
criticised and abandoned but so too is the dialectic's 
oppositional structure for, adhering to the task of 
uncovering the false 'in-itself' of the system, the 
dialectical method nevertheless undertakes the attempt to 
determine the truth of that falsity. It is, therefore, in 
its unconscious fidelity to the - otherwise misconstrued -
speculative thought of Hegel that the method is rejoined 
to the system by Glas. Indeed, Glas's rupture with the 
method of difference is due to its having known something 
like this unity all along thanks to the Kojevean reading 
which guides its Hegel., It is through this interpretation 
that Glas presumes the unity of 'dialectic' and systematic 
closure: the dialectical method is at one with the body of 
the system as the labouring-negating 'desire' of the 
subject of the system whose satiety in the product of its 
labour is the latter's closure (this is the "dialectic of 
hwnan existence" which is, in Kojeve's words, "in my 
opinion [ ••• ] Hegel's principal title to glory"[23]). It 
is this Kojevean unity of system and method that, 
conducted on the side of a 'radicalism', effects the 
deconstructive need for a further radicalisation - the 
transcendentalisation - of difference. 
The effects and indications of a transcendentalized 
'difference' which retain the impossibility of synthesis 
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that such a constitutive 'cut' involves - the "remain(s)" 
- are thus the registration of the effects of the "trace" 
of castration. The metaphysical or dialectical difference 
- always conceived as the assimilation or victory of the 
masculine, 'active', term of differentiation over the 
'passive' feminine - is 're-sexed'; the text resounds to 
the effect of the woman. This is to say that the elements 
which will be inadmissable in the system of decidability 
refuse the moment of synthesis through their dissembling, 
doubling, their asserting at one and the same time the 
integrity and the incompleteness of the 'subject'. 
Moreover, the alignment of the transcendental difference 
with the unpresentable anteriority of the event of the 
castration of the mother, not only permits "the remain(s)" 
to indicate a 'feminine' effect on the text but also - in 
that this effect is the "antherection" , the disavowal of 
castration in the 'erection against' the threat, the 
structure of phallogocentrism as it represses the 
constitutive difference - this feminine effect as it gives 
rise to fetishism renders sexual difference, too, a matter 
of indecision. The girdle-fetish permitted the wearer to 
maintain "that women were castrated and that they were not 
castrated· and it also allowed of the hypothesis that men ,
were castrated" and, insofar as it was 'just a girdle', 
that they were not castrated. "The remain(s)" preclude 
the decision for that "cutting through" would be 
implicated in the 'original' cut/non-cut of the mother and 
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be an effect of it. When the transcendental difference 
which is constitutive of Hegel's work is construed in "the 
remain(s)" it will, then, being evocative of this 'arche-
threat', be the remains of a sexual difference which would 
not tolerate its constriction in a structure of 
opposition. The Ersatz, transcendental expropriation, 
would be the echo of a repressed feminine that shakes the 
solid, solitary, phallic column of metaphysics. Glas has 
two columns; the book practices this method of general 
fetishism whereby neither opposition, direct 
correspondence nor - so it would have it - a common 'law' 
makes it possible to combine the two. Kofman describes 
how the Ersetzung is played out such that the columns 
"are not opposed; yet, they are heterogeneous: the 
generalised fetishism does not end up as an 
indifferentiation, neither sexual nor textual: one column 
does not speak the language of the other, it obeys neither 
the same rhythm nor the same law; they differ one from the 
other as 'the dialectic of the galactic', they are as two 
colossal towers erected om a double solitude, without any 
apparent relation". 
Nevertheless, the undecidability of the fetish means that 
- whilst each does not exhaust the meaning of the other as 
'its' other - there is a relation: 
"Not opposed but heterogeneous, they nevertheless 
communicate among themselves: because these columns are 
not unbroached [inentamees], because they are double, 
oblique, because there are judases, jalousies, there is 
established between them a series of exchanges, of winks 
[clins d'oeil] - they glue and unglue [collent et 
decollentl passing from one to the other."[24] 
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Before examining more closely the construction of "a 
Hegel" wherein the 'fundamental' act of Setzung obscures 
the dependence on a general and transcendental Ersetzung, 
the metonymic "aigle" which discredits dialectics and the 
'radical method' by collapsing it into the 'conservative 
system', assimilating the Roman and Prussian eagles 
through the Kojevean Napoleonic Hegel, before attending to 
the Hegelian system as the dialectical construction of an 
imperium, one should attend to the 'truth' of the two 
columns. That is, examine how, in its "oblique" 
difference from the Hegelian 'tower', Genet's 
affirmatively-fetishistic text effects the former and what 
- as the structure of undecidability - stands between 
them. Displacement of a 'virile' subject, inscription of 
the repressed and unreappropriable bodily "remain(s)", the 
account of theft and expropriation, the parody of 
mortification, etc: what will be prepared by an 
examination of the use to which Genet is put, the effect 
of the 'other' column, is, then, an encounter with that 
Roman Hegel of Ego and dominion. The presupposition of 
Hegel in accordance with the "metaphysics of the proper" 
will be seen to site Hegel within Roman legal status and 
"personality"; the Kojevean aigle of the abstract state 
and its unrecognised presupposition, the commodity. In 
this, one might witness the misreading of Hegel as it is 
reinforced by the 'other' column and embark on the 
reconsideration of the deconstructive 'general fetishism' 
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in the light of the structure of Ersetzung coterminal with 
the Setzung of property law in the fetishism of the 
commodity. 
ii. Fetishism of the commodity: personality, property and 
the Ersatz 
Through the Freudian account of the effect of the 
'castrated' mother, Glas can translate the transcendental 
alienation of Ie propre, which the Grammatology traced as 
'writing', into the politics of gender., The metaphysical 
proprietor is masculine and the anterior alienation which 
general fetishism records is the registration of 
phallogocentrism as the attempt to maintain ownership, to 
maintain the law, despite its 'absolute' status already 
having been destroyed. The phallogocentric Setzung is 
seen to 'depend' on a sitelessness - the maternal 
'phallus', which is never present and is always 
representational, substitutive. Thus, the Setzung is 
possible only through the infrastructure of a general 
substitutability - a transcendental 'Ersetzung' which 
thereby renders the absolute identity of masculine self-
positing, its secure integrity, always provisional and 
always vulnerable to threat. The masculine law is ruined 
through the "trace" of woman; the masculine law is always 
constructed 'against' this threat and herein lies its 
identitarian and suppressive telos. Hence, the woman, the 
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mother, all that does not confirm the full self-presence 
of the masculine concept (a tautology), is inadmissable to 
the system, unsubsumable by the law, for general fetishism 
precludes the conceptual reappropriation of the 
'different' ('woman') as its negation inasmuch as that 
figure is the trace of conceptuality's condition of 
(im)possibility. 
Differance implies a general fetishism: dialectics, a 
restricted fetishism. Glas makes explicit the departure 
of deconstruction from the Hegelian 'radical method', as 
it takes in the Marxian appropriation of Hegel. 
Dialectics does not leave the restricted economy of this 
totalizing and recuperative method for, in adhering to the 
opposition of negative and positive - even if by way of 
positing-through-negation - it establishes the opposition 
of Ersatz and non-Ersatz. This "restricted" fetishism, 
therefore, does not acknowledge its being conditioned by 
and included within a general fetishism. It holds fast to 
the material truth which it considers, hitherto, to have 
been substituted in idealism's mystifications. The strict 
fetishism of radical dialectics does not realize that its 
concept is effective only through the anterior 'nothing', 
differance, and that this leaves the self-identity - the 
integrity - of the 'proper' always already breached. In 
addition, strict fetishism responds to this anterior 
alienation by asserting more forcefully its integrity - an 
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assertion that, in accordance with Freud's notion of the 
"oscillation" of the fetish, echoes the structure of 
signification as it both affirms and disavows its 
representational and Ersatz character. The priority and 
absolute truth of Ie propre discover themselves to be 
secondary and 'proper' only within the context of a 
general substitutability, a structure of representation. 
In short, radical dialectics replays the systematic 
reduction of differance inasmuch as it is the further 
reduction of the substitute in Hegel. Nevertheless, 
attendant to the question of propriety and formal 
universality, Marx's notion of 'fetishism' can be seen to 
restage the 'general fetishism', bearing on its character 
of anterior alienation and substitution and disclosing the 
limitations of a reading of Hegel - as well as Marx - that 
assigns him to a 'strict fetishism'. Indeed, this task -
the introduction of the Marxian fetish - is already 
undertaken by Glas. Furthermore, it is in the Derridean 
construal of the fetish and its omission of any mention of 
the commodity that one glimpses a parasitism of the 
"remain(s)" and its fetishistic 'method' upon the 
alienating, substitutive power of the commodity-fetish. 
From Hegel through Feuerbach to Marx, Derrida sees the 
engendering of a materialist dialectic by way of the 
reduction of what is construed as the Ersatz - idealized, 
theologized reality - to its anthropological basis and 
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truth~ This, for deconstruction, is the pursuit of full 
self-presence through the rejection of structures of re-
presentation~ It is the attempt to fill the 'gap' 
constitutive of meaning but always menacing it. As such 
it seizes on religion and the mother - both re-
presentative, both registering an impossible 'time 
anterior to all presence'~ Glas attends to the young 
Marx's criticism of Feuerbach: Feuerbach resolves the 
Ersatz-family, the Holy Family, into the truth, the 
secular family; Marx sees this 'truth' as itself an 
Ersatz-unity, demanding that "once the earthly family is 
discovered to be the secret (Geheimnis) of the Holy 
Family, the former must be destroyed in theory and 
practice"[l]. The point is, then, to reduce the effects 
of the mother: reducing the Ersatz amounts to curtailing 
the familial influence, the dialectic must effect the 
complete reduction of the substitute, of the 'gap' that 
still pertains in Hegel's idealism even as the 'philosophy 
of religion' sought to comprehend self-presence in 
religious representation. Derrida quotes further the 
young Marx: "After all these delightful antics of idealism 
(ie of Young Hegelianism) expiring in the guise of 
criticism, even now idealism has not expressed the 
suspicion of the necessity to settle accounts critically 
with its mother [seiner Mutter], the Hegelian 
dialectic"[2]. The objective is an anthropological self-
propriety, man not divided from himself through the 
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substitute-unities of religion or family, Ersatzen which 
register the effects of the feminine. Thus the dialectic 
reasserts itself as the project of phallogocentrism: 
against the transcendental alienation in the mother, it 
seeks to erect itself as the true, the non-Ersatz. It is 
not surprising to find the construction of a Hegel - one 
for whom religion is to be reduced to its essence in the 
full self-presence of man - elided with the young Marx. 
The elision is achieved in the dependency of Glas on the 
, 
Left Hegelianism of Kojeve~ The strict fetishism - like 
the restricted economy - is the unrecognised method of 
Kojevean anthropologism; it is the reduction of all 
discourse to the status of an Ersatz-anthropology, 
everything reflecting in its essence man's universality, 
his propriety. Kojeve declares that 
"[f]or Hegel, the real object of religious thought is Man 
himself: every theology is necessarily an anthropology. 
The suprasensible entity, transcendent with respect to 
Nature - ie the Spirit - is in reality nothing but the 
negating (ie, creative) Action realized by Man in the 
given World~ But as long as Man is religious, he is not 
aware of this: he thinks as a theologian, he 
substantializes and externalizes the concept (Begriff) of 
Spirit by re-presenting (Vor-stellen) it to himself in the 
form of a Being (Sein) outside of Man and independently of 
his Action. While in fact talking about himself religious 
Man believes he is talking about a God."[3] 
For Glas, dialectics is a strict fetishism in its attempts \ 
to 'comprehend' an alienation that is constitutive, that 
cannot be conceived even as it provokes such attempts. 
The Kojevean alignment of a Hegel for whom God is the 
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bourgeois state and the anthropological early Marx - the 
construction of the masculine subject of the system as the 
invulerable self-identity that incorporates religion as 
its alienated truth - is the source of Derrida's attempts 
to resuscitate this 'externality' just as it is the source 
of the reading of the Marxian 'fetish' and its continuity 
with Hegel., The substitute will always be revealed for 
what it really is, brought down to earth as the alienation 
that the subject performed upon itself: for Derrida and 
general fetishism this procedure is the consequence of the 
effects of an alienation that has always already taken 
place, an alienation that constitutes and sunders the 
absolute identity of the secularizing subject, that 
achieves and destabilizes even its very gender. The 
method of Glas is to echo the effect of the transcendental 
alienation of this "Man". It seeks to echo the 
reassertion of the incision, the castrating-cut, the 
differance that makes possible the vocal Kojevean subject, 
the anterior alienation that the reduction of 
representation to presence, alienation to property, 
religion to philosophy, attempts to suppress. The 
transfer from Hegel to Marx, however, reveals in its 
choice of texts that it is Kojeve who provides the course 
for Derrida's critique of a strict fetishism by general 
fetishism~ Thanks to Kojeve, radical dialectics is to 
return man from the substitutes of religion and family to 
his 'proper' - material, technical, appropriative, 
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'practical' - self. The passages Glas excises from Marx's 
canon adhere resolutely to the orthodoxy's notion of 
'false consciousness' whose paradigm lies in the opiate of 
religion. The reading of Marx undertaken by general 
fetishism restricts itself to (and names) the 1844 
Manuscripts and the Theses on Feuerbach - works of the 
younger Marx - whilst, in its interim conclusion, it 
alludes to (neither naming nor quoting), eliding with the 
above, The German Ideology and Capital - the latter being 
the occasion of Marx's mention of "the fetish". 
The elision of two differing conceptions of ideology and 
the reluctance of Derrida to undertake any close, 
'rigourous', reading of the work that addresses the notion 
of fetishism appear symptomatic. In that first chapter of 
Capital are the resources for a criticism of the "economy 
of the undecidable" which would, nevertheless, refuse 
reduction to the demystified and non-Ersatz 
anthropological subject. In the account of the fetish of 
the commodity one discovers the attendance to the 
phenomenon of the Setzung that the anthropological account 
never mentions and whose antitheses it presupposes and 
'naturalizes'~ That is to say, Marx's discussion unfolds 
the equivocations of the 'proper' in legal positing and 
its definition of ethical life - of social recognition -
in accordance with the categories and oppositions of 
property-ownership. The "economy of the undecidable", 
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moreover, can be reconvened as the result of the 
transcendentalisation of the suppressed 'difference' of 
appropriation and exchange, elucidated in Marx's account. 
The substantial inequality in the exchange between 
formally-equal proprietors would arise as a difference 
inadmissable by the universality of property law - an 
injustice of legality. Similarly, the formally-secondary 
'thing' of property would attain substantial priority over 
the owner in exchange, as each abstractly-identical person 
is recognised in the concrete difference of his property -
the phenomenon of personification/reification which 
maintains the formal universality of property right whilst 
rendering that self-identical 'I' a substitute-thing. 
This has been addressed in the Introduction: differance 
and the "remain(s)" effect and register the transcendental 
alienation of a Kojevean self-identity through the 
attendance to its fundamental presupposition of a subject 
of private property. The "economy of undecidability" 
seeks to ruin this propriety and finds its means in the 
generalization of the 'substance' of personality, of its 
formal identity and equality - that is, alienation (the 
inequality of exchange) and substitution (the 
personification of the commodity, the reification of the 
proprietor). The Kojevean and Derridean accounts, 
restricted economy and general economy, divide 
appropriation from alienation: the Kojevean propre 
suppresses all mention of its substantial difference, 
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bourgeois society and exchange, whilst the Derridean 
differance - by way of the 'un(re)cognizability' of the 
transcendental - can evade acknowledgement of the law it 
presupposes by its anteriority, convening appropriation as 
conditioned and frustrated by a transformed 'alienation'. 
Derrida attempts both to allude to Capital and to restrict 
its reading to that of an anthropological Marx - the 
focus remains on the religious, re-presentative, character 
of the fetish. The Marxian 'fetish' appears in Glas 
associated with the family's theoretical and practical 
destruction: 
"[t]his problematic will have been developed in the dark 
chamber of ideology: grappling with the question of 
fetishism and of truth (unveiled thought), of the status 
of analogy in the Marxist or psychoanalytic criticism of 
religion."[4] 
Whence this "dark chamber", whence this "analogy"? This 
construction of Marx's 'ideology' - the elision of two 
texts, neither named - is the confusion of two different 
conceptions. Whence the dark chamber? In describing how 
"conceiving, thinking, the mental intercourse of men, 
appear at this stage as the direct efflux of their 
material behaviour" a metaphor comes to mind and The 
German Ideology asserts 
"[i]f in all ideology men and their circumstances appear 
upside-down as in a camera obscura, this phenomenon arises 
just as much from their historical life-process as the 
inversion of objects on the retina does from the physical 
life-process". [5] 
This is the classical restatement of 'ideology' as 
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epiphenomenal, superstructural - it is an Ersatz-reality 
produced by a trick of the light~ And Derrida's 
"analogy"? In Chapter One, Section Four of Capital's 
first volume, Marx interrogates the power of the 
commodity, the reason for the thing's dominant and 
determining force. Split into use-value and exchange-
value, the thing is on one side a thing satisfying needs, 
qualitative, whilst on the other a quantitive amount of 
value realizable in exchange. With the latter, 
qualitatively different forms of labour are rendered 
formally identical as they achieve their ends in the 
realization in exchange of the value of their products 
and, this being the case, are determined in the market-
place by their product and its value in money~ The 
mystery of the commodity lies in the fact of this physical 
thing's mediating between individual producers; as 
quantitative, as a value, it is the reduction to identity 
of heterogeneous products and thereby of the difference of 
labouring individuals., In the structuring of ethical life 
according to legal personality and the right of property, 
the social bond of individuals resides in their private 
property: it is in the private transactions of commodity-
owners that the social whole is constituted - this, one 
might add, is the presupposition of the 'community' of the 
modern state. Moreover, just as the formal universality 
of the state and the abstraction of the citoyen are the 
release of this heterogeneity, individualism and an-arky 
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which is brought to order by the commodity, so too is the 
abstract universality of the legal person realized in its 
substance as the guise of the commodity. The ethical 
whole is impossible to conceive, social relations and 
recognition can be conducted and gained only through 
exchange and the commodity, therefore, appears as the 
sublime master of society: 
"the labour of the private individual manifests itself as 
an element of the total labour of society only through the 
relations which the act of exchange establishes between 
the products, and, through their mediation, between the 
producers~ To the producers, therefore, the social 
relations between their private labours appear as what 
they are, ie they do not appear as direct social relations 
between persons in their work, but rather as material 
[dinglich] relations between persons and social relations 
between things"[7]. 
This is the enthrallment of the producers to their 
product: by virtue of commodity-production - the private 
production of goods which gain a social character through 
their assuming the form of value - individuals come under 
the sway of the products of their labour, are 'socialized' 
by these things and experience their social existence as 
one dictated by things. This is the fetishism of the 
commodity -
"[i]t is nothing but the definite social relation between 
men themselves which assumes here, for them, the fantastic 
[phantasmagorische - phantasmagoric] form of a relation 
between things. In order, therefore to find an analogy we 
must take flight into the misty realm of religion. There 
the products of the human brain appear as automous figures 
endowed with a life of their own, which enter into 
relation with the human race~ So it is in the world of 
commodities with the products of men's hands~ I call this 
the fetishism which attaches itself to the products of 
labour as soon as they are produced as commodities, and is 
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therefore inseperable from the production of 
commodities."[8] 
Derrida would rather not address the question of the 
fetish of the commodity, preferring to attend to its 
religious "analogy" and thereby focusing on the aspect 
best suited to the deconstructive schematized Marx, 
pursuing the suppression of difference in the privileging 
of presence over (religious) re-presentation. Whereas the 
earlier - anthropological - writings of Marx posited an 
essential subject of "species-being" and assumed a ready-
made structure of opposition in self and nature, 
ultimately subsuming the 'object' under the subject, the 
discussion of commodity fetishism accords with Hegel's 
construction of the dissolution of Greek Sittlichkeit in 
Roman legality and the principle of universal private 
property. That is, what commodity fetishism elucidates is 
the possibility of grasping the law of appropriation as 
one inscribing alienation and bondage. Furthermore, the 
fetish - despite Marx's religious analogy - is not simply 
an Ersatz, reducible in an instant of recognition to its 
'reality' as social labour for, as Marx writes, the 
historical and geographical specificity of such a form of 
production 
"appears to those caught up in the relations of commodity 
production [ ••• ] to be just as ultimately valid as the 
fact that the scientific dissection of the air into its 
component parts left the atmosphere itself unaltered in 
its physical configuration"[9]. 
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What is underway in the account of the fetish of the 
commodity is not a reduction to the essential 'man' but an 
account of the commodity as a form of social 
(mis)recognition consequent upon the determination of the 
individual as a proprietor, a 'person'. Marx's discussion 
bears on the question of ideology not in order to posit -
in place of the Ersatz - another law but rather to permit 
the aspect of the social whole suppressed and 
misrepresented to be recognised in its occlusion by the 
law of the 'person'~ Equally, the elucidation of 
'personification' permits the re-cognition of the aspect 
of ethical life excluded from the law to be grasped in its 
re-formation, in its 'recoil' upon the concept that would 
maintain its subjugation or occlusion by the law~ This is 
the significance of the phenomenon of 
personification/reification: the propriety of the 'person' 
is inverted as the individual is recognised as a thing, 
the thing as a person. Within the terms of commodity 
production social relations necessarily take on a 
particular opacity, individuals are subsumed or 
overpowered by the things which - formally and legally -
they enjoy priority over. What is under inspection, then, 
is not a non-Ersatz in its static identity, the imposition 
of 'another' law, but the re-cognition of the law of 
universal private property in the context of commodity-
production and the negation of the formal universality and 
equality of that law by its substance and consequences, 
- 67 -
together with the re-formation and inversion of the 
individual of 'personality' as the subject of that law. 
The 'substitutes' of ideology are, then, determinable and 
effective in their residence in legal form as the 
inversion and expropriation that this abstract subject 
suffers. As with the account of personality's usurpation, 
delineated in the description of bourgeois society as a 
'phantasmogoria' - phantasma, illusions or appearances 
which meet in the market-place, agora - it is the aporetic 
structure of the social and ethical whole that is under 
consideration, the incoherence of the claims of a formal 
law and its substance, the re-cognition of that aporia and 
of the social whole, hitherto obscured by the fixity of 
the law. In the matter of 'ideology', Marx in Capital 
does not posit the anthropological human essence - a 
"species being" - as the 'truth' of ideology but rather 
implies a notion of ideology from within the account of 
the justification, the legality, of the exchange of 
'equivalents'. Both true - as between commodities of 
equal value - and false - in its presupposition and 
consequence of the social inequality registered in the 
extraction of surplus value - the law of commodity-
exchange is ideological inasmuch as it maintains the one 
side of 'appropriation' without acknowledging alienation. 
The existence of ideology is not a sheer unveiling for 
there remains this duplicity - it 'is' in its untruth; 
- 68 -
that is, it is structured by a difference that it denies. 
This is to argue against the Derridean construal of 
'speculative dialectics' as the process of 
rationalization, whereby it would effect the positing of 
the self-identical in its totality through the 
demystifying act of tearing away the veil (the text, the 
non-identical, etc). The question of the 'fetish' of the 
commodity does not reduce the mysterious power to the 
self-mastery of the proper (what is implied in the 
attendance to the religious "analogy") but seeks to 
recogise its power as the substantial expropriation of any 
formal-legal 'self-mastery' in the commodity's control and 
mediation of all social intercourse. True and untrue - a 
formal law that is substantially unjust - this is not to 
construe the untruth as an Ersatz, reaffirming the 
'proper' concept, but is to exceed the concept by the 
recognition of its self-inadequacy, the recognition of its 
aporetic structure. If Kojeve, maintaining the concept of 
formal identity, can only do so at the expense of 
intuition - the suppression of substantial non-identity 
which, in his state-building account, means civil society 
- then the Derridean account can be regarded as the 
preclusion of the concept by a substantial non-identity 
made constitutive and therefore 'unknowable' as 
substantial. In this context, then, the fetish of the 
commodity would be taken in its religious analogy, as the 
alienation of self-identity: in its religious analogy, it 
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is a sublime master that enacts the ambivalent role of 
protector and threat, disavowing and affirming the 'fact' 
of absolute loss in maternal castration. For general 
fetishism the fetish is a 'resistance' to the imposition 
of the identitarian concept, configured here as the 
masculine law of integrity. Yet the undeterminability -
embraced here as a refusal of subsumptive formal identity 
- can be configured as complicit with such identity when 
one reconstructs Hegel and Marx not as narratives of 
reappropriation but as thinkers of the tragedy of modern 
social and ethical life, the aporia of state and civil 
society. In this context, therefore, the undeterminable 
and generalized fetish preserves its alienating function -
it refuses reduction to a present meaning - but only by 
virtue of the success of identity: the power of the 
commodity would not release individuals to 'difference' 
and the dissolution of the state (Kojeve's aversion to the 
bourgeois) but would, of course, encase them in a formal 
identity extending far beyond that of the abstract state. 
The criticism of the 'fetish' is not its replacement by 
the non-Ersatz (effected by a change of consciousness -
Hegel and Marx aligned in a Kojeve-inspired Young 
Hegelianism) but the determination of a principle of 
equivalence realized as a form of social recognition. In 
the alienation and substitution of the commodity, 
therefore, undeterminable fetishism is not a liberation 
from the identitarian concept - the ruin of Ie propre -
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but the extension of the writ of abstract identification 
and the invocation of an homogenization of the 
heterogeneous without resistance. 
None of this Derrida can acknowledge. Hegel is presupposed 
as positing - as occupied in the Setzung of a metaphysics 
of the proper, presupposed as acting within the structure 
of the abstract law of property - the very law that the 
argument of the "analogy", the argument of commodity 
fetishism, seeks to determine in its contradictions. The 
elision of the two conceptions of ideology in Marx is 
eloquent testimony to this misunderstanding whereby the 
text - of Marx as with Hegel - is presumed to presuppose 
oppositions rather than determine the law which posits 
them~ Overlooking the notions of phantasmagoria and legal 
status, the deconstructive reading regards the Marxian-
Hegelian account as the reiteration of metaphysical 
oppositions, its telos the restoration of the superior 
term in ideology-critique's antitheses of real/false, 
transparent/obscure, essential/apparent. The 
deconstructive reading takes these antitheses as a 
starting-point for its displacement of the absolute 
identity which they are seen to, ultimately, restore. 
The presupposition of the law which determines the 
antitheses is overlooked, the antitheses regarded as the 
metaphysical workings of the text, the law then maintained 
and occluded by deconstructive practise which operates -
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half-consciously - within the sphere of private property 
law, privileging (in the law's positing of both 
appropriation and alienation) the expropriative pole. 
Sarah Kofman has summarised this synthesising misreading 
and its strategic uses: "The German Ideology like Capital 
repeats a system of traditional, mythical and ideological 
oppositions and yet these same texts effect some 
displacements such that it is possible to start from them 
in undertaking a work of deconstruction of a system of 
oppositions to which they remain tributaries" [10]., 
General fetishism is parasitic upon the law of private 
property: it derives its critique of the proprietorial 
subject (albeit tacitly - Derrida seems but half-conscious 
of the dependency) from the determination of the law which 
underlies the fetish of the commodity, the positing of the 
person. The commodity-fetish becomes the general fetish 
as the Ersatz, transcendentalised, is both driven beyond 
any structure of substitution - generalized, it is no 
longer 'substitutive of' anything - and, at the same time, 
this arche-substitute does not depart from the traditional 
indeterminability of the 'transcendental ~ priori 
condition of possibility'. Thus, a general fetishism 
disguises its source, its law. The general fetishism 
takes issue with the strict fetishism which it construes 
as reducing the ideological epiphenomenon to the 'thing 
itself'. As such, general fetishism amounts to the 
- 72 -
indefinite expansion of the camera obscura - indeed, to 
the extent that there cease to be an 'exteriority'. 
Parenthetically, one can note that this is to unearth 
Althusserian foundations: "ideology has no outside (for 
itself), but at the same time [ ••• ] it is nothing but 
outside (for science and reality)"[ll]~ In this strenuous 
division of ideology and science, the very 'anteriority' 
of ideology - unthinkable by science but effective - meant 
that science could not long hold out against its inclusion 
in ideology. And ideology, now generalised, ceases to 
bear the name. Science's very 'properness' subsumes it 
beneath 'ideology' and the generalization/dissolution of 
the latter is alluded to by deconstruction when, in 
Kofman's words, the impossible self-presence means that 
"the camera obscura is never relieved [relever] by a 
camera lucida"[12]. Yet this, it emerges from Kofman's 
account, is merely to say that the absolute self-propriety 
of the person is itself 'ideological': general fetishism 
is constructed upon the strict fetishism of legal status, 
of the person. Taking the latter in its lucidity, its 
definition of itself as, in Hegel's words, "absolute 
Being"[13], deconstruction - under the influence of the 
Kojevean reading (supplemented, one might add, with the 
Althusserian dehistoricizing of the legal subject[14]) -
takes this to be the Setzung of 'the Hegelian subject', 
the 'non-ideological'. It then follows the destruction of 
this subject - a ruin maintained in the antinomy of its 
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Setzung: tithe contradiction of a consciousness which is at 
once independent and dependent"[lS] - and both repeats the 
dissolution of personality which is reiterated in the 
fetish of the commodity and, having cut off access to the 
law of its determination through its transcendentalising 
of alienation, deposits this fetishism as 'generalised'. 
Kofman underscores this movement and the presupposition of 
Glas when she describes the inadequate and narrow 
'ideology' of a strict fetishism, writing that the 
revelation of the non-ideological in all its 
'transparency' "would be to forget the possibility of 
hallucination, negative or positive, [which] would be to 
forget that transparency is, also, a product of history 
and not a given which would pre-exist ideology"[16]. Yet, 
having arrived at the positing of a pre-existent 
'ideology' in the generalized, "always already" of the 
Ersatz, nothing further can be determined as to history's 
'production'. This is to say that the 'general fetishism' 
eschews cognition and determinability as synonymous with 
the suppressive concept and, at the same time, insists 
upon the substantial differene obscured by that concept. 
Yet, disavowing cognition as always the reduction to 
formal identity through procedural reason, the 
deconstructive rejection of ideology-critique - for 
reasons of the latter's entrapment in the 'ideological' 
privileging of terms whose value is not given - would free 
thought from ideology by construing it as undeterminable 
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and thereby general, failing to realize that the 
questioning of the historical production of 'non-
ideological' values is coincidental with that of 
'ideological' ones~ Transparency is not a 'Sollen' 
because - and this is implicit in Kofman's distrust of it 
as a 'value' - it is known to be occlusive in its result 
(the 'transparency' of legal right, for instance); as 
such, it is Hegelian re-cognition which permits a 
'critique' of transparency in its duplicity for it reckons 
on the necessity to rethink this 'obscuring transparency'. 
Deconstruction - oscillating between full self-presence 
and absolute indeterminability - noting its failure of 
self-adequation, would find confirmed the constitutive 
role of indetermination and leave the concept to its 
uncognizability. 
That the "remain(s)" as the focus of a general fetishism 
cannot do without the presupposition of the commodity 
fetish appears to be confirmed in the deconstructive 
treatment of the (contract-) signature in Glas~ This 
'substitute' is the power of the commodity which is no 
longer the property of its proprietor but that which 
determines him in his frustrated attempts at appropriation 
in exchange (losing more than he gains) and the loss of 
the 'absolute selfhood' of legal status through the 
structure of substitution that the commodity ensures. 
Loss of self through losing more than one gains: this is 
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the extraction of surplus value in the supposedly-equal 
exchange in the purchase of labour by capital. The loss 
of self in the exchange of the object of property, is the 
appearance of the proprietor as Ersatz-thing in being 
recognised in the exchange - the substitute necessitated 
by the fact that "commodities cannot themselves go to 
market and perform exchanges in their own right"[l7]. 
That this general fetishism is dependent upon the 
presupposition of the subject of the Hegelian system as 
'self-proper', that Derrida always presupposes the 
bourgeois subject as the justification of Hegel's 
'speculation', that the displacement of this takes a route 
dictated by the law of private property - this is apparent 
as Glas describes the "remain(s)", the structure of the 
fetish, of its 'undecidability' and - as is also apparent 
- its character as the reified 'dehiscence' of the 
absolute subject~ In the context of the Hegelian critique 
of the Kantian contractual marriage, Derrida writes: 
"The contract signature is under the jurisdiction of 
abstract right, always concerns just a thing, the 
possession or disposition of a thing outside persons. 
Isn't the seal of the contract itself in the end a thing, 
a remain(s) between persons that draws its efficacy fro. 
this status?"[l8] 
The exteriority, excreta, signature, all that "falls" from 
the system becomes thus construed within the setting of 
the transfer of property and what is extracted from the 
person. Derrida conceives, rightly, that herein lies the 
flaw in the bourgeois subject - in exchange is its status 
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recognised and destroyed; it realizes itself as a person 
and yet is brought to this pass by the very 'subordinate' 
object of property and in this object is it recognised. 
Moreover, the antinomies of legal status - in particular 
the positing of personality as the institution of the 
confrontation of the Ego and an 'inessential' nature - are 
also drawn into line with the contract-signature, the 
alienation in appropriation through exchange, the 
excrement of the proper. In short, just as Ie propre is 
cleanliness, neatness, propriety as well as right of 
ownership, so, in the "remain(s)" does the Derridean 
account draw out the experience of legal status wherein 
the very abstractness of the proper means that its content 
and substance lie in the concrete difference - the 
'inessentiality' of that which had been posited as its 
property. As such, the process of legal personality's 
learning that it is without substance is one embracing the 
fetishism of the commodity - the object of property comes 
to be dominant, substantial - yet, bearing within it the 
antinomies of the proprietorial subject, this process is 
also one wherein the 'inessential' and subordinate 
mUltiplicity of nature comes to inhabit its abstractly 
universal antithesis, personality. The "remain(s)" is the 
rehearsal of that reconfiguration of consiousness, 
described in the Phenomenology, whereby personality - in 
the shape of Stoicism and Scepticism - gives way to the 
Unhappy Consciousness. This is the discovery on the part 
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of the Self posited as "absolute Being" that it is, 
rather, inessential: taking its substance from another, it 
is left in the antithesis of the Unchangeable - the alien 
'essence' - and itself qua the inessential and changing. 
When considering the Genet column of Glas the 
'unhappiness' - or otherwise - of this consciousness will 
be considered, for the moment one may notice how with the 
"remain(s)" comes not only the fetishistic inversion and 
particularization of personality's universality but also 
the diremption of this hitherto 'absolute' Ego into a 
(non-manifest) universality and a 'natural' particularity 
which, absolutely sundered from its antithesis, is a realm 
of degradation and shame~ The person discovers in himself 
the 'nature' which, whilst afforded its right in Greek 
ethical life, under the jurisdiction of abstract right and 
Roman property law has been suppressed by abstract 
subjectivity and now takes its seat within the person. 
Thus, Derrida's elision of a contractual signature -
possible by means of the legal definition of the abstract 
equality of persons - and associations of repressed or 
unassimilable but 'indispensable' corporeality (the 
corpse, defecation, disseminative ejaculation -
anticipating the discussion of Genet's text) indicated in 
the notion of the "remain(s)", this serves to assemble the 
consequences of Gesetz~ 
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The contract signature is not merely the underlining of 
the flawed universality of the Ego of personality: Derrida 
- as has been emphasised - enroles this subject as the 
personification of Sittlichkeit. Moreover, the 
communication between the abstract Ego, posited in 
confrontation with inessential nature, and the structure 
of repression - again, noted by Derrida in the notion of 
Ie propre - is constructed according to this paradigm of a 
'Roman' ethical life. Thus, Glas effects the arresting 
elision of Absolute Knowing, the categorical imperative 
and the Oedipal complex: the Roman "aigle" will be a 
universalized proprietorial subject which (as was 
documented in part one) will enjoy priority through the 
suppression of its constitutive mother; the autonomous, 
self-transparent and identical subject, personality, is 
the affirmation and denial of that which permits it to 
exist as such, indeed, constitutes it as such. The model 
of self-filiation enables the logocentric 'I' to persist 
in its universality: the subject of the categorical 
imperative depends on the myth of an immaculate 
conception, whilst the construal of Hegel's Spirit as the 
legal person permits the elision of this "IC" (Immaculate 
Conception and imperatif categorique) with Absolute 
Knowing and Sittlichkeit, savoir absolu. Derrida writes, 
"Sa from now on will be the siglum of savoir absolu. And 
IC let's note this already since the two staffs represent 
-' 
each other, the Immaculate Conception"[19]. Hegel is 
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engaged in strict fetishism, constructing an 
uncastratable, self-filiating subject, yet the dependence 
of this reading upon legal status - echoing the 
"remain(s)" of the contractual signature - is announced by 
that con-founding of the kingdom of ends with 
Sittlichkeit: the categorical imperative takes its place 
within the Hegelian system not as the paradigm of ethical 
life but rather as the fundamental imperative of abstract 
right, of private property, the command which is the 
minimal condition of personality's realization in 
exchange., Hegel marks thi s when he says: 
"Personality essentially involves the capacity for rights 
and constitutes the concept and the basis (itself 
abstract) of the system of abstract and therefore formal 
right. Hence the imperative of right is 'Be a person and 
respect others as persons'."[20] 
Similarly, this abstract imperative - which invites the 
inversion of its formal identical subject by its 
concretely differential substance (the route which Derrida 
takes, transcendentalizing the latter) - is reiterated as 
solely, negative - a vacuity: 
"The unconditional commands of abstract right are 
restricted, once again because of its abstractness, to the 
negative: 'Do not infringe personality and what 
personality entails'~ The result is that there are only 
prohibitions in the sphere of right, and the positive form 
of any command in that sphere is based in the last resort, 
if we examine its ultimate content, on prohibition~"[21] 
The construal of Hegel as maintaining an ethical life 
founded upon the preservation of private property, the 
Roman "aigle" of imperium and Ego translated as 
Sittlichkeit and Spirit, would then permit the 
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transcendentalisation of its substance which, the realm of 
Ie propre as universal in name only, would be its 
prohibitions. Just as the thing of property permits a 
general fetishism when it emerges as the substance, the 
sine qua ~ of its proprietor - the subordinate and 
external thing as the possibility of the person - so do 
the prohibitions come into force as the content of the law 
guaranteeing that abstract right of propriety. Fetishism 
is aligned with theft: the figure of Genet approaches the 
text of Hegel as the 'substance' of the reign of 
propriety, the other column erected as the affirmation of 
a method of general fetishism. 
iii~ Genet and general fetishism: the supplementary column 
and legal status 
If the methodology of a general fetishism cooperates with 
the presupposition of subjectivity and private property 
and - in this presupposition - is found to be tacitly 
dependent on the fetish of the commodity, how could the 
text of fetishism, the affirmation of fetishism in/as the 
text, the column of Genet, be thought to enact this 
fetish, operate within the sphere of private property? 
Glas has two columns, the book practices the method of 
general fetishism whereby neither opposition, direct 
correspondence nor - so it would have it - a common 'law' 
makes it possible to combine the two. Kofman describes 
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how the Ersetzung is played out such that the columns 
"are not opposed; yet, they are heterogeneous: the 
generalised fetishism does not end up as an 
indifferentiation, neither sexual nor textual: one column 
does not speak the language of the other, it obeys neither 
the same rhythm nor the same law; they differ one from the 
other as 'the dialectic of the galactic', they are as two 
colossal towers erected in a double solitude, without any 
apparent relation~" 
Nevertheless, the undecidability of the fetish means that 
- whilst each does not exhaust the meaning of the other as 
'its' other - there is a relation: 
"Not opposed but heterogeneous, they nevertheless 
communicate among themselves: because these columns are 
not unbroached [inentamees], because they are double, 
oblique, because there are judases, jalousies, there is 
established between them a series of exchanges, of winks 
[clins d'oeil] - they glue and unglue [collent et 
decollent] passing from one to the other."Ll] 
The two columns repeat, emphatically represent, the 
structure of 'antherection' - the 'erection against' that 
is the mark of logocentrism's fetishistic control and 
denial of constitutive difference - just as the margin 
that is now central echoes the 'hole' that provokes the 
erection. The columns are as legs, the (foot-) 
fetishistic structure renders what separates them - the 
gap - as that which is of interest: oscillation from one 
column to the other is also uncovering as covering, 
disavowal and affirmation. Furthermore, the columns are 
not symmetrical and, as such, neither are they 
heterogeneous - in each case this would be to invite 
synthesis according to a 'proper' law. As Glas conceives 
it, the failure of propriety in Hegel's attempt to reduce 
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the threat to integrity is embraced by Genet - "he wanted 
to make a success of failure"[2] - and what binds the two 
texts, then, is what is denied by one, affirmed by 
another; is that to which both columns are subject yet 
which, in the 'other' column, Genet's, is registered in 
its effects with all the consequences for logocentrism's 
presuppositions of authority, communication, literality. 
This 'second' column affirms the constitutive 'loss' but 
does not escape it: the supplementary column knows that 
what is under way is the expropriation of the 'I' and 
erects itself as such. 
Moreover, the reader is not spared this expropriation: one 
is holding a text impossible to grasp. Inscribed within 
the structure of general substitution, reader and 
author(s) (the latter pluralized on account of the 
parasitism of Glas and its extensive quotation) oscillate 
between two 'poles' for behind the self-sufficiency of the 
'I' is that constitutive 'hole', difference, differance. 
On the side of the reader, Derrida accounts for the method 
of the two columns as the displacement of the reader as of 
the logocentric fetishist: 
"Why make a knife [couteau] pass between two texts? Why, 
at least, write two texts at once? What is desired? In 
other words, what is there to be afraid of? who is 
afraid? of whom? There is a wish to make writing 
ungraspable, of course. When your head is full of the 
matters here, you are reminded that the law of the text is 
in the other, and so on endlessly. By knocking up the 
margin - (no) more margin, (no) more frame - one annuls 
it, blurs the line, takes back from you the standard rule 
[regIe] that would enable you to delimit, to cut up 
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[decouper], to dominate. You are no longer to know where 
the head of this discourse is, or the body neck [cou] is 
dissimulated from you so that you cannot bear your--
own."[3] 
This is the strategem of the author: to prevent the reader 
from occupying any secure site for contemplation of the 
"soliciting" of 10gocentrism; to emphasise that the 
'transcendental', the 'anterior', the 'arche-' trace -
difference, writing - do(es) not secretly permit their/its 
own location. The very typography laughs at any attempt 
to read it 'at once' and the hysteria (recalling the 
maternal 'trace' to which fetishism responds: differance 
as a matrix, 'womb'-like) is no less when one comes to 
read each column, each judas, even the discontinuities, 
'as if' they stood alone or 'as if' they corresponded. 
Yet, from the glint of the blade to the (Medusa's) head, 
the authorial strategem operates within the ruse of 
castration - the latter is acknowledged. Derrida, on the 
side of Genet (the right-hand of the page) is therefore 
operating within the fetishistic structure such that the 
double-column writing affirms the textual unconscious 
without 'reducing' it, without assimilating it to the 'one 
true erection' of a phal10gocentrism. Glas seeks not to 
escape the economy of the undecidable but to echo it - and 
few other places in Derrida's oeuvre bear witness to such 
an authorial, authoritative, authorized loss of mastery. 
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Self-expropriation is the insistent theme of this general 
fetishism. Parenthetically, one is therefore led to ask: 
does this general fetishism release the grasp of 
subjective, dominating, practical reason; does it evade 
the ultimate-propriety characteristic of the dialectical 
"remain(s)"? Is not the universal 'I', the "absolute 
Being" of legal status, maintained - above and beyond the 
antherection - in the very counterposing of a constitutive 
loss to metaphysical, logocentric, ontotheological, 
Cartesian 'identity'? This refers one back to the 'trace' 
- only a transcendental 'hole' seems able to maintain the 
authorial mastery as that mastery's 'condition of 
(im)possibility': the mastery of the 'I' identifies the 
constitutive no-place as such and thereby is both affirmed 
and denied - "(im)possible". The Derridean 'Ego' and its 
positing is always already within that structure of 
Ersetzung, thus does Derrida's authorship contrive to 
escape charges of domination or mastery even as the 
textual strategem is announced~ Embracing the general 
fetish, one is able to maintain authority, lose authority, 
posit the maintenance-in-loss of authority by virtue of 
the anteriority of the substitute. If I posit the 
substitute, the objection that this Setzung is the work of 
an absolute Ego is met with the response that this 
positing is, in fact, merely the counter-erection that 
seeks to control the effect of the 'original' substitute: 
the Setzung permissible insofar as it acknowledges its 
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possibility - the 'threat' of difference, the effect of an 
Ersetzung, the self-expropriation of the questioned 
positing.' Derrida describes the method of this madness: 
"It is not enough to be crafty [ruse], a general theory of 
the ruse that would be part of it must be available. 
Which comes down to making a confession, unconscious to be 
sure~ The unconscious is something very theoretical~ 
If I write two texts at once, you will not be able to 
castrate me. If I delinearize, I erect. But at the same 
time I divide my act and my desire. I - mark(s) the 
division, and always escaping you, I simulate unceasingly 
and take my pleasure nowhere. I castrate myself - I 
remain(s) myself thus - and I 'play at coming' [je 'joue a 
jouir']~"[4] 
That this has been construed throughout as a 
'transcendental alienation' is the dependence of this 
argument upon the person, the universal Ego of abstract 
property law: alienation - the loss of self that takes 
place within the realization and recognition of 
personality - is made constitutive, unthinkably 'anterior' 
to the 'metaphysical' 'I', Ie propre. For Glas the 
dissimulating 'I' of Genet is the affirmation of this 
effect upon the absolute Ego. It is what has been 
anticipated in 'La Parole Soufflee': theft figured as the 
impossible self-coincidence of the 'I'. This theft is the 
constitutive difference of signification therefore aligned 
with castration, defecation, and death - the loss of self-
completion, the insinuation of an original expropriation. 
The question of the "remain(s) of a Hegel" is, then, the 
indication of the other column: what the infinite self-
return of the Hegelian system - the familiar course of its 
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"semiology"[S] - is seen to suppress is registered in the 
'Genet column'. This is to say that theft or flight (~) 
and fetishism - their involvement already adumbrated in 
the essay on Artaud - are convened within the text of 
Genet as the condition of (im)possibility of the self-
present/proper logos: the "remain(s)" of this 
logocentrism, the general-fetishistic column describing 
its unassimilable and transcendental form, is "scato-logy 
itself"[6]~ Indeed, this scatology gathers together 
theft/expropriation, the figure of the mother, and the 
"remain(s)" which Derrida indicates as "gl" , all as the 
response to and attendance upon the orifice, the 
indication of an irreducible exteriority~ As such, it is 
a scatology which is evident as the attendance upon the 
hole that is loss, flight, theft of all propriety and 
Genet is construed as the respondent to the threat of 
castration. Moreover, Genet engages a scatology which 
registers the transcendental alienation of birth whereby a 
constitutive separation communicates with the two orifices 
- Derrida has already written of "the orifice of birth, 
the orifice of defecation to which all other gaps refer, 
as if to their origin"[7]. This is, then, the 
constitution of the 'I' in the work as an "original 
alienation"[8]. Indeed, the account of Artaud's 
intolerance of all 'relation' and the abomination of 
difference - construed as the wild enactment of the 
identitarian telos of metaphysics - has figured this 
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anterior self-separation (consititutive of 'selfhood') as 
a reject-phenomenon and a "remain(s)"; it is "conceived as 
pollution, obscenity, 'filthiness', etc."[9] 
Maternal hole, theft constitutive of signification, the 
droppings that realize the author-Ego and render that 
integrity both possible and impossible - this is how the 
fetish is thematized by 'Genet'~ The "remain(s)" become 
methodological as the original alienation~ Derrida refers 
to these "remain(s)" by the siglum, "gl". He thereby 
inscribes this expelled, ejaculated, unassimillable, 
'work' of the 'I' into the text of Glas: constitutive of 
the 'I' because it is that transcendental alienation; 
fetishistic because the liquid substances elide into the 
string of the Ersetzung. One reads: 
"just as The Thief's Journal leaves, proceeds from Guiana 
('that region of myself: Guiana'), so gl begins to spurt 
[gicler], to trickle [degouliner], to drip [goutter]: out 
of the mouth or the tail of the stylite, of the tube of 
vaseline, of the nursling's esophagus. Sperm, saliva, 
glair, curdled drool, tears of milk, gel of vomit - all 
these heavy and white substances are going to glide into 
one another, be agglutinated, agglomerated, stretched out 
(on)to the edge of all the figures and pass through all 
the canals."[lO] 
This string is the truth taken from Genet's text - "that 
precious cobweb, a tissue which I secretly called Ie voile 
du palais [the veil of the palace, the soft palate]"[ll]: 
Derrida's gloss is that "it is hardly useful to add that 
the 'voile du palais' furnishes another title for the 
question of truth"[12]. This veil of truth is the general 
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fetish as the reinscription of truth as '(un)concealment', 
aletheia., The fetish figures this for it accords with the 
textu(r)al as the weave of fleece - the female pubic 
fleece of which Freud speaks: 
"Writing remains modest because it is caught in a fleece. 
A propos modesty, 'braiding', 'weaving', and 'felting', 
Freud proposes a model natural to the feminine technique 
of the text: the hairs that dissimulate the genitals and 
above all, in the woman, the lack of a penis~"[13] 
This keeps Genet circling signification as constituted by 
the 'hole', fetishism as textuality - occlusion and 
revelation, denial and affirmation - with the veil 
'itself' as the object of attention and unstable, 
undecidable place~ Thus, the "remain(s)" afford a truth 
to the text - as the text: the excrement, the substitute-
structure of their conjoining or "agglutination" and the 
remarking of truth as (un)veiling are gathered and 
distributed as the "remain(s)" in Genet's voile~ Against 
the metaphysics of the proper - and its truth as adeguatio 
intellectus et rei - Genet's 'text' is one that affirms 
its own textuality: it does not seek to master its 
impossible self-coincidence - the differance that permits 
and escapes, ruins, it - rather it occupies itself around 
this 'hole' and the general Ersetzung it provokes~ 
Genet expropriates, thieves and sets in flight the self-
proper, rings the "glas of the proper name"[14] with a 
florid, generous, act of expansion - an "act of 
'magnifying' nomination"[15]~ This is an inflation 
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(mindful of souffler as breath, spirit, theft) of the 
propriety of nomination, its appropriative character for 
which, it appears, "there is no purer present"[16]. The 
ceaseless naming that occupies Genet's work - characters 
named as things, characters named as saints (Genet's 
fetishism, one can note - anticipating - always involves 
the substitute-thing and the Ersatz-sacred) - this naming 
puts Genet in a certain position regarding literature and 
its 'condition'~ Derrida asserts, "the name is not, as it 
seems on the first approach, a thing encountered in nature 
or acquired in commerce"[17] and what is being unfolded is 
the irreducibly secondary nature of the name. Although it 
is not explicated by Derrida, Glas sees to it that beneath 
this general 'secondariness' will be subsumed both the 
naive 'priority' of natural, proper, names and the 
inessential, substitute names "acquired in commerce" -
thus is the Ersatz of the proper generalized out of the 
sphere of exchange~ The name that is the substitute for 
the mother, the fetish of signification which covers, 
disavows and affirms, indicates that anterior dependence, 
the loss of absolute self-appropriation~ The legitimate 
and proper name is that of the father - yet this is 
already substantially alienated by virtue of the 'secret' 
dependence on the mother., 'Genet' refers to and affirms 
this fetishism: the name is not a father's but always the 
register of the never-known, never-present mother; it 
advertises its constitution by the differance of the 
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mother whose "breast [sein] [.' •• ] steals away from all 
names, but it also hides them, steals them; it is before 
all names~"[18] The name indicates the general fetishism 
and its 'source'; the mother's 'lack' reinscribed as the 
trace, the structural 'toujours deja' of the maternal-
threat of the loss of integrity - the threat that provokes 
as antherection, fetish, the phallogocentric attempt to 
'stave' it off., Genet's name is, then, its own 
expropriation - advertises the nomination of differance 
whereby "all the names that it receives in our language 
are still, as names, metaphysical"[19] - and it refers to 
the 'other' of maternity knowing this to be the case; that 
there is a general fetishism and no proper essence, no 
"presence of the thing itself in its proper essence"[20]. 
The mother cannot be tolerated by strict fetishism because 
of her being always-already, escaping the self-presence, 
self-proper., Genet's embrace of this structure establishes 
his refusal of the metaphysical intolerance of the hidden, 
its castigation of the non-manifest divinity of all 
religions other than Christianity as 'jealous' ("if self-
revelation is refused Him, then the only thing left to 
constitute His nature would be to ascribe envy to 
Him"[21]). Within the topography of Glas and the 
deconstruction of the Hegelian Antigone, the 
feminine/familial law is unconscious and unrevealed, 
escaping all determination, and in this its divinity is 
regarded as jealous by the jealousy of the human, maculine 
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law which seeks to reveal it in its full and conclusive 
presence.· The itinerant 'mothers' who wander through 
Genet's novels register a generalized jealousy just as 
they do of a general fetishism: it is the embrace of the 
impossibility of seizing the constitutive difference, 
submission to - and a certain celebration of - the 
substitutive character of signification, the differance of 
all property, legitimacy, fulfillment~ Derrida writes 
that 
"the mother fascinates from the absolute of an already. 
Fascination produces an excess of zeal~ In other words, 
jealousy~ Jealousy is always excessive because it is busy 
with a past that will never have been present and so can 
never be presented nor allow any hope for presentation, 
the presently presenting"[22]. 
The maternal name of Genet, then, expresses that "original 
alienation" of which (reminiscent of Freud's "throne and 
altar") all public, civil, political life is substitutive 
- "this alienation, already [deja], even before I return 
to myself, promenades my proper name in the street"[23] -
and this maternal trace is further evinced in 'genet', the 
"flower name"[24] which establishes the propriety of the 
author in this Ersatz~ Indeed, the Ersetzung of Genet's 
text is played out across the number of substitutes that 
the flower can form - phallic in its erectness and stamen, 
maternal castration in its (bell-like) hollow, reversible 
like a glove (the double-use linking with the fetishist's 
girdle) and also undecidable in its allocation on the side 
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of either nature or culture. Indeed, the flower is the 
most apparent fetish of the 'other' column - yet, within 
that general fetishism, the flower will not be the 'key' 
to a logocentric settling of what Genet means-to-say. 
Sartre in Saint Genet has fallen into this "trap"[25]: 
even as he has indicated the 'textuality' of the flower, 
conversely, "the question of the flower, the anthological 
question is, among others, studiouslyavoided"[26]. What 
Derrida follows is the floral "remain(s)": the anthology 
that is the collection of dead flowers; the wreath that 
testifies to a flight, to what cannot be thought in the 
time of self-presence, what is no-longer or always-
already; the floral evocation of textuality when, as the 
"flowers of rhetoric"[27] , it is the image of poetry, the 
metaphorical expression of metaphor - what Sartre names 
"the poetic object par excellence"[28]. Whilst for Saint 
Genet this would be the location of rhetoric and the 
revelation of the truth of poetry - the floral Ersatz, 
Genet's "nocturnal language of flowers"[29] revealed as 
what it 'really is' - for Glas this is the pose of strict 
fetishism 'deciding', cutting through the verbiage as 
foliage to the thing itself, the signified in its glory. 
This is, then, the swordsmanship of the Setzung which is 
incorporated - as its cutting and decapitating motion 
suggests - into the structure of the antherection and 
counter-castration, thus, into the Ersetzung of the 
maternal 'trace'. Yet more than this - in this account , 
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of the meaning of the flower in Genet, strict fetishism 
cooperates with the general fetish: this "poetic object" 
is, in Derrida's book, a "transcendental excellence", "the 
figure of figures and the place of places"[30] and Sartre 
has thereby made transcendental the metaphorical. The 
isolated, fixated 'secret' of Genet is exhibited as the 
figure which, in itself, 'is' nothing, is a signifier of 
something which is not there. Against a 'proper' 
univocality - the self-proper Setzung, the 'meaning of the 
metaphor' - the other column echoes a plurivocality and 
its constitutive 'trace'. The transcendental flower 
remakes the Sartrean ontological reading such that it 
affirms not the self-presence of the metaphor but rather 
the 'lesson' of general fetishism - and one which would 
have done with lessons, exemplary figures and the 
transcendental 'as such' - also the 'transcendental' as 
such. This transcendental Ersatz - necessarily, the 
impossibility of a true, somewhere self-present, 
transcendental condition of possibility - is named in the 
context of flowers as Derrida writes: 
"If, then, there is no language of flowers, if the flower 
is in (the) place of zero signification, how can this 
symbolic zero take hold in a jungle of signs and figures 
belonging to the natural tongue, to nature, to the 
physical, to the physical tongue, as a mother tongue that 
is necessarily foreign to it? A question again of phusis 
as mimesis." [31] 
Saint Genet is in evidence in Glas where that structure of 
castration and antherection - the structure wherein "a 
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certain mere nothing, a certain void [ ••• ] erects"[32] _ 
is passed over and the Ersatz is always to be reduced. 
Derrida quotes Sartre to the effect that Genet has taken 
himself for the Other, that this is "the key to his 
conduct and his disorders", that "our certainty of ourself 
finds its truth in the Other"[33]. Below the reference to 
Sartre's "transcendental key" is the reminder of Lacan's -
Derrida quotes from Ecrits and "the universal phallus 
(just as we say: universal key)" - whilst, contained in 
the judas aligned with the two quotations, one reads that 
the tendency of commentators on Genet to judge and 
imprison him within essays on his "case" or concerning his 
"failure" ('Genet's Failure' in Bataille, Literature and 
Evil), is equivalent to the turning of that transcendental 
key that reduces a general fetish to its proper meaning. 
Crucially, this is incarceration by/in the dialectic: "the 
case can falsify, rather force, a dialectical law, a lock 
[~ serrure] that should nonetheless be open to all"[34]. 
The restriction of the general Ersetzung that springs 
Genet, that releases the tightly-woven (serre) text the 
lock contains, is the dialectical law that is followed as 
closely by Sartre as by Lacan, according to this reading. 
It casts a glance across the divide to the strict 
fetishism of "aigle" - in other words, to the impression 
left on Lacan, Sartre, Bataille, by the lectures of 
Kojeve. The supression of the arche-trace in maternal 
'castration' by phallogocentrism is described elsewhere in 
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Glas as the metaphysical 'sexual difference' of masculine , 
active, dialectical opposition and feminine, passive, 
indifference. The reduction of the floral Ersatz, the 
"nocturnal language of flowers" is the Kojevean operation 
upon the nocturnal law of woman and the unconscious, 
whereby the other is recognised in its identity. It is 
the assimilation of the other whereby subjective self-
certainty is made objective and the two self-
consciousnesses, according to Kojeve, "come to light"[3S]. 
The 'dialectic' is the active differentating-resolving of 
Reason which brings to light the passive unconscious of 
the feminine: this is the reliance on Kojeve's reading of 
Antigone wherein the sexual difference is that of "the 
Universality of Action" in "the warlike citizen of a 
State" as opposed to "the particular and particularist 
Family" whose sphere is passivity, "the biological 
existence of man", "man in his inaction [ ..• ] as if he 
were dead"[36]. Dialectical resolution is a 
reappropriation of death and an assimilation of the 
feminine law of night and the unconscious; it rescues from 
"static, given Being"[37], from biological fact, the 
universal aspect and renders the unconscious explicit. So 
with the "universal key", the Other is brought to light in 
its alienation, its particularity is grasped, it is 
subsumed beneath the universality of a law, put in its 
proper place. 
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The right-hand column is the expropriation of the left: it 
robs the eagle-imperial concept of Hegel just as it is, 
itself, never in full propriety of its meaning. Derrida 
alights upon the figure of the eagle within Genet's oeuvre 
and, describing the works it spans and the forms it takes 
(tatoo in the Miracle of the Rose, chimera in The Balcony, 
aquiline nature of Ganymede in The Thief's Journal), sets 
in flight the eagle that is the assimilation of Rome, 
Prussia and Napoleon. The eagle of Genet is the vol du 
voleur - the self-expropriation evinced in 'The Parole 
Soufflee' - and its effect upon Hegel, the effect of a 
general fetishism, is "the flight/theft of his empire -
polysemy"[38]. This is, then, the theft of absolute 
knowledge which translates, in accordance with the 
structure of the general Ersatz, the vol du voleur, the 
transcendental alienation, into Derrida's "theft is 
absolute knowledge"[39]. This is, once more, the evidence 
of "a Hegel" as conceived in Kojeve: throughout Glas the 
eagle, the "aigle", bears witness to the alignment of 
Hegelian 'Spirit' with an Ego derived from the abstract, 
'I' of legal personality and 'Sittlichkeit' with an 
'imperial' order that echoes Roman "dominion" - the 
eschatology of "Sa" (the rewritten savoir absolu) enfolds 
both within the wings of the eagle-standard victorious at 
Jena. Genet's theft represents the resistance to a Hegel 
- and one for whom, as Kojevean, a traditional left/right 
topography would cease to apply - who consummates the 
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virile subject and speculative thought in the absolute 
state of a heroic bourgeoisie. All talk in Glas of 
empires, eagles, Sa, is a parodic echo of the voice from 
the lectern asserting: "Absolute Knowledge became -
objectively - possible because in and by Napoleon the real 
process of historical evolution [ ••• ] came to its 
end"[40]; that "the 'absolute' State that [Hegel] has in 
mind (Napoleon's Empire) is the realization of the 
Christian Kingdom of heaven"[4l]"; an eschatological Hegel 
wherein 
"the phenomenon that completes the historical evolution 
and thus makes the absolute Science possible, therefore, 
is the 'conception' (Begrieifen) of Napoleon by Hegel. 
This dyad formed by Napoleon and Hegel, is the perfect 
Man, fully and definitively 'satisfied' by what he is and 
what he knows himself to be"[42]. 
The glas of logocentrism is the attempt to render 
impossible the fulfillment of this eskaton and it takes 
shape as theft insofar as the subject of the imperial Sa 
is the person: the Ego endowed with rights granted by this 
'heroic' bourgeois state. Genet is enroled in Glas as the 
one denied and denying legitimacy - of property, lineage, 
sexuality - by and to Sittlichkeit construed as Sa, the 
'absolute' bourgeois state. Kojeve has already asserted 
that the one who does not labour experiences only 
'internal' change and is deprived of recognition, 
remaining 'mute'; "this change, then, transforms man into 
a madman or a criminal, who is sooner or later annihilated 
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by the natural and objective social reality"[42a]. 
Nevertheless, this expropriation of the bourgeois subject, 
the legal person, will follow the course of the fetishism 
of the commodity: the constitution of the state and its 
citizen (by whom "History" is "completed, realized and 
'revealed'"[43]) will be unhinged by the loss of propriety 
experienced in exchange; the absolute 'I' of the citizen 
will be overthrown by the inessential, the inessential 
thing - as object of property or bodily excrement, "gl" -
will come to take the shape of the 'absolute'. The 
Setzung, the positing of the law of the person, is 
effected in such a way that it can be nothing but 
Ersetzung: the law of the proper, the Gesetz, within the 
thief's journal is recovered in its consequences (the 
realization of personality in its substance: 'I' is an 
Ersatz, a 'mere thing'). The nominating operation of 
Genet's work, whereby "magnified, the recipient becomes 
somewhat the thing of the one who names or surnames him, 
above all if this is done with the name of a thing"[44], 
this operation draws attention to its appropriative aspect 
as it does to the subsumption of the person beneath the 
thing. In this there is, then, the tacit adoption of a 
notion of fetishism: Glas enrols Genet's as the text which 
in its string of names suspects and celebrates its 
dependence on the commodity, leading Derrida to ask "What 
is a thing? What is the name of a thing?"[45] and to 
deploy this substitutive-structure of the 'absolute' 
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against the KOjevean-imperial state. The structure is 
clear: on the one side is the discourse of proper law -
Gesetz - which is also that of the identitarian state, the 
Roman "aigle" of Ego and dominium, (it is worth noting 
that on the open page of the book, Glas's Hegel is to the 
left and to the right - in accordance with the Kojevean 
Hegel, both 'radical-dialectical' and 'bourgeois-
statist'). On the other side, the column of Genet, is the 
general Ersatz, the expropriation of the proprietor by 
means of its substitution in appropriation - the fetishism 
made general and, subsequently, constitutive. The latter 
move thereby displaces the opposition of the two sides, 
the vol du voleur repeats that structure of self-
expropriation to which the "absolute person" of legal 
status falls prey - the 'absoluteness' of theft is the 
blurred copy of that substitute-self (the personifying 
commodity) which is the embodiment of alienation, the 
realization of personality in the thing, and as such "is a 
mere laying-waste of everything and therefore merely 
beside itself, and is really the abandonment of its own 
self-consciousness. "[46] 
"Remain(s)", resistance to a dialectical eschatology, 
theft of the possibility of conclusive self-presence: 
Derrida deploys Genet against the proprietorial subject of 
Hegelian logocentrism as "a writing that will never 
return, by some proper or circular course, to its own 
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place"[47] and this Genet thereby would trespass upon 
Hegel's 'property'. That this is the case has already 
been maintained - Derrida presupposes private property 
throughout the grammatological critique, establishes the 
logocentric propre in accord with Hegelian "personality" -
but one can, moreover, catch Genet in the act: within the 
'implicitude' of the concept of personality, the thief 
goes to work as the deferral of fulfillment. The 'self-
return' of the person is attended to in the Zusatze to 
paragraph 66 of the Philosophy of Right. Hegel describes 
the accordance of the concept of personality with its 
existence, "the act whereby I take possession of my 
personality [ ••• ] and make myself a responsible being, 
capable of possessing rights and with a moral and 
religious life"[48]. Derrida, taking the definition of 
personality as, generalised, the absolute subject, renders 
Genet the errant, aberrant, possibility of the person -
the possibility of the failure of self-coincidence and of 
the legal individual's (e)rectitude. What Hegel accounts 
for as abberrant in abstract right's constitution of the 
person, Derrida will render constitutive. Whilst the 
person, as bearer of rights, is autonomous and self-
conscious: the self-coincidence of essence in its 
embodiment for 
"it is just in this concept of mind [Geist] as that which 
is what it is only through its own free causality and 
through its endless return into itself out of the natural 
immediacy of its existence, that there lies the 
possibility of a clash: ie what it is potentially it may 
not be actually [ ••• ] and vice versa, what it is actually 
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(eg evil in the case of the will) may be other than what 
it is potentially."[49] 
In the character of the infinite subject as constituted by 
the possible non-coincidence, the transcendental 
alienation comes to the fore and - in this case -
personality's 'other' aligns itself with the role of 
Genet. In this non-coincidence "lies the possibility of 
the alienation of personality and its substantive being, 
whether this alienation occurs unconsciously or 
intentionally. "[SO] This alienation, in turn, is 
conceived by Hegel as serfdom, the disqualification from 
property ownership which accords with the improper Genet 
as it does with the feudal apparel of his text - not only 
with the figures of dukes, kings, palaces, "Spanish 
grandees", but also with the Ersatz-sacred, with a 
proliferation of saints and cathedrals. Indeed, even as 
it accords with 'impropriety', the persona of Genet 
nevertheless also serves to confuse the 'aberrant person' 
of private property (a law which, instituting abstract 
equality and universality, also permitted errance, 'free', 
untenured, labour) with the servile subject of feudalism. 
Genet is set to straddle modern, abstract right and what 
Hegel has termed "Culture" (Bildung) - and in so doing 
aids Derrida in the generalisation of 'propriety' - yet 
the insistence of theft and impersonation within Genet's 
oeuvre cannot evade its presupposition of legal right. 
The prison is an Ersatz-cathedral ("we were carrying on 
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the tradition of the monks who went about their business 
at night, in silence. We belonged to the Middle 
Ages"[5l]) yet the inscription of Genet within abstract 
right, Derrida's configuring of theft as an "original 
alienation", is confirmed in its intention of displacing 
the Hegelian subject when that 'theft' aligns itself with 
the account of the alienation of the person: 
"alienation of intelligence and rationality, of morality, 
ethical life, and religion is exemplified in superstition, 
in ceding to someone else full power and authority to fix 
and prescribe what actions are to be done (as when an 
individual binds himself expressly to steal or to murder, 
&c, or to a course of action that may involve crime), or 
what duties are binding to one's conscience or what 
religious truth is, &c."[52] 
This also brings the voleur - alienation of intelligence 
(meaning) and property - into relation with the "monk", 
just as it did the serf. Yet, less an incursion into the 
Middle Ages than a parody and embrace of self-abnegation 
and withdrawal to the margins, this brings Genet's work 
into line with Rome for the thief and the Ersatz-religious 
are parasitic upon Roman legality. Substitute, criminal 
and Catholic are conjoined in the antinomies of abstract 
property law and it is there that Genet's drama is staged, 
despite attempts to lend Genet an 'unlocatability' and 
regarding all attempts to think his work - including 
Glas's [53] - as efforts toward incarceration (granting 
Genet a freedom as abstract as that of the personality 
which conditions it). Rome is presupposed in the 
- 103 -
proliferation of personae - the substitutes, 
representatives, the "'magnifying' nomination" - for here 
is the dramatisation of the Setzung of the abstract 'I', 
the fiction of legal personality, just as it this positive 
law which determines theft, criminality, as it does 
propriety and the person. Similarly, Rome is presupposed 
in the figure of the monk for the same anterior, positive 
law lays claim to the monastic as it does to the rectitude 
of the "unyielding rigidity of personality"[54]. With the 
dissolution of ethical life - Sitte - and custom's 
immediate unity of the individual in the universal (what 
Derrida mistakes for its very destruction: the 'absolute' 
identity of the person) the prior, posited, abstract law 
will see in the criminal "a sin existent, a trespass 
possessed of personality"[55] and the divorce of ethical 
right from the individual is also enacted in the 
withdrawal into cloisters - moreover, it echoes the vol du 
voleur when Hegel accounts for it as flight, for "rather 
than rouse a fate against himself, he flies from 
life"[56]. The monk is at one with the thief: moreover, 
the dissolution of ethical life in Roman legality - the 
decayed world that gives rise to monastic withdrawal and 
flight - leaves the isolated individual as an orphan 
through Jesus' demand that "his friends [ ••• ] forsake 
father, mother, and everything in order to avoid entry 
into the profane world"[57]. Genet thereby undermines 
Sittlichkeit - the orphan, thief, monk is set against 
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ethical life - yet occupies the sphere of an imposed law 
(Gesetz), the very law which Glas believes is dissolved. 
The presupposition of the Hegelian 'infinite subject' as 
the self-relation of the person is the construction of a 
Kantian Hegel. For Hegel the categorical imperative 
pertains to personality alone - it is the command of 
personality and the guarantor of private property: "be a 
person and respect others as persons"[58]. A Kantian 
Hegel would, thefore, identify the mutual respect of the 
exchange relation, of contract (and all the time is 
looking for what escapes the identity of the two parties, 
the Signature, the "remain(s)") with the structure of 
recognition in otherness: in short, it would transform the 
concept and imperative of personality into a formal 
identical 'being-for-self-in-otherness', it would elide 
formal identity (contract) with the speculative thought of 
're-cognition', overlooking the latter's determination of 
the difference in oneness - and of the law which unites 
the different terms. Again, this 'elision' is the 
intrusion of the Kojevean reading; there recognition is 
construed as technical-practical domination - "man, to be 
truly 'man', and to know that he is such, must, therefore, 
impose the idea that he has of himself on beings other 
than himself: he must be recognised by the others"[59] -
the law which unites the two is not determined in its 
necessity and contradiction, rather, it is presupposed (as 
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bourgeois right) and imposed in its generality. From this 
the production of an autonomous, transparent Ego qua 
'self-consciousness' is regarded as the end of 
'recognition' and, as such, (so Derrida is aware),it 
reflects the real violence of the bourgeois subject, so 
placid in the abstract 'ought' of the categorical 
imperative. From within the lectures on an "aigle", then, 
the assimilation and transmutation of consciousness, self-
consciousness and Spirit into a logocentric metaphysics of 
Ie propre takes flight and this complete, transparent 
self-presence which overcomes all division and enjoys the 
autonomy of s'entendre parler is aligned with the 
antherection and the trace of the mother, the structure of 
a general fetish. Under the siglum "IC" Derrida elides 
the imperatif categorique and the Immaculate Conception -
the production of that autonomous Ego, the rigid, 
unyielding self of personality is continuous with the 
counter-erection of a fiction which maintains self-
production and supresses the 'trace' of maternity in the 
figure of the father just as it expresses an Oedipal 
desire: 
"so the son or the phallus of the virgin sleeps 
immediately with his/its mother, the father that is dead 
(or set aside [ecarte] by the Immaculate Conception, but 
because of this fact, excusing himself just as well from 
passing essentially through his mother, consequently 
engendering his son all by himself, self-inseminating 
himself and calling himself in him: the son that is the 
father is also the mother that is the son [ ••• ]) feigns to 
put no more obstacles in the way."[60] 
This substitute-structure which attempts the overcoming of 
• 
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the mother is advertised across Genet's text but is seen 
to be strictly disavowed in Hegel's production of the 
infinite subject out of revealed religion and the Trinity. 
Furthermore, and in accordance with the eagle-imperial 
completion and realization of the kingdom of heaven, the 
Ie is joined with Sa - the rewritten absolute knowing is 
the celebration of the apotheosis of the self-proper, of 
the absolute transparency and self-revelation of the 
subject: the antherection is, to repeat, always construed 
as the rectitude of that "rigid unyieldingness"[61]. 
That absolute knowledge is in flight is also the 
experience of personality. As with the Derridean account, 
personality holds only to its appropriative capacity. It 
identifies alienation as unthinkable, absolute loss to 
which it is immune: what is not proper to it is posited as 
alien, opposed and inessential, to which it has a right of 
appropriation. Nevertheless, this right appears to be 
founded in absolute difference and to be in flight, 
stolen, as the abstract 'I' finds its substance 
expropriated, embodied in the inessential object. The 
"remain(s)" - the resistance, the refusal, the 
inassimilable on account of its inessentia1ity -
'operates' within a structure of recognition which (as has 
been noted), from its contractual arrangement is conceived 
according to the categorical imperative. Mid-way between 
the speculative determination of the law of abstract right 
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law, it is a Kojevean Hegel upon whose premisses Genet 
intrudes: the thought which effects both the 
generalisation of bourgeois right and yet which does not 
shy away from its implicit violence, indeed embraces it. 
Nevertheless, this is not to say that the thief does not 
follow the career of personality. As Genet's work - its 
dramatis personae as well as its poetry - displays, not 
only is the voleur inscribed within and by legal status, 
the affirmation of fetishism of the other column 
enveloping itself in the fetishism which accompanies 
positive property law, but it follows the course of the 
thought of the person, the abstractions actualized in 
legal personality as Stoicism, Scepticism and the Unhappy 
Consciousness. It follows personality in its self-
consciousness yet casts these forms in ironical roles: 
just as Derrida has emphasised that differance is no 
negative theology or tragic Weltanshauung - "it would not 
mean a single step outside of metaphysics if nothing more 
than a new motif of 'return to finitude', of 'God's 
death', etc were the result of this move"[62] - so does 
the 'unhappiness' of Genet consume itself by virtue of a 
refusal of all nostalgia for lost presence. Yet this is 
not to say that it departs from personality - as witnessed 
in the monastic gaol, Genet's narrative is one which 
advertizes its play, inflates its metaphorics, expands the 
simile to the point of its explosion: "Harcamone is God, 
since he is in heaven (I am speaking of the heaven I 
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create for myself and to which I am devoted body and 
soul)"[63]; "Stilitano whose image was already inscribed 
in a heaven of glory"[64]; "I call the Virgin Mother and 
Guiana the Comforters of the Afflicted"[65]. Derrida 
takes this elision of the sacred and profane to be the 
advertisement of the antherection, the general fetishism 
of affirmation as well as disavowal whereby "Guiana" is 
Holy Mother and "that hole" - the fetishism that registers 
the "remain(s)". Yet just as this takes place within the 
anterior, positive law that unites monastic withdrawal, 
Jesus' refusal of ethical life, and the abstract, 
universal 'I' of personality, so does the profanation of 
an Ersatz-religion occur within the sphere of legal right. 
Genet rings the glas of the ontotheological subject 
without invoking the dead God, without 'nostalgia': he 
repeats the motion of Hegel's co.ic consciousness - "into 
the latter, all divine being returns, or it is the 
complete alienation of substance"[66] and is unthinkable 
outside legal status for "in the condition of right or 
law, then, the ethical world and the religion of that 
world are submerged and lost in the comic 
consciousness"[67]. 
'Genet' is, therefore, not a column set at an oblique 
angle from the Hegelian propre; rather, it enacts the 
impossible self-identity, the abstract and formal 
rigidity, of the legal person. It follows the universal 
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self of personality as a 'substitute', an appearance. 
Realized as a mask or a shadow, the Setzung of personality 
remains within the dissembling of the dramatic persona -
affirmed and repeated in Genet's 'magnifying nomination'. 
Furthermore, the determination by legal personality of the 
'inessentiality' of the thing - the transition, in Hegel's 
account, to scepticism - occurs as theft, flight (vol). 
The universal person is an Ersatz, 'inessentialized', all 
'essence' is lost to the beyond and the 'I' consigned to 
the shame of its corporeity, oscillating between divinity 
and degradation: "this essence is the unattainable beyond 
which, in being laid hold of, flees, or rather has already 
flown"[68] whilst the "gl" , the "remain(s)" , is the mire 
into which consciousness is returned; "Consciousness is 
aware of itself as this actual individual in the animal 
functions [ ••• ] in them the enemy reveals himself", 
incapable of 'purifying' itself within the terms of the 
antinomy, consciousness therefore is glued to this enemy, 
"in fixing its attention on him, far from freeing itself 
from him really remains forever in contact with him, and 
forever sees itself as defiled"[69]. That monastic flight 
from the world - the purging of self, the mortification of 
the flesh, the vows of chastity and poverty, in other 
words the "holy" as opposed to the ethical[70] - this is 
then echoed and travestied by the comic consciousness 
within Genet's works. 
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Glas is attached to the notion of 'travesty' and therein 
it brings to the front of the house the question - alluded 
to several times already - of personality as persona, the 
dramatic antecedent of the legal subject. With the comic 
consciousness it is as if personality, following its 
travails and in the awareness of its inessentiality, 
returns to the 'explicit' consciousness of its 
fictionality. This is what the general fetishism achieves 
- the inessentiality of the Setzung sends it into the 
abyss of a general Ersetzung - and it acknowledges its 
substitutive character as role-playing, role-casting as 
not excluding sexual 'identity': the androgyny of Genet's 
text is allied with its comedy insofar as it is a travesty 
- it ridicules as it cross-dresses. Glas cites Genet: 
"This may not be an original thought with me, but let me 
restate it anyway, that the patron saint of actors is 
Tiresias, because of his double nature ••• For seven years 
a man's clothing, for seven years a woman's ••• his 
feminity followed in close pursuit of his virility, the 
one of the other being constantly asserted, with the 
result that he never had any fixed point where he could 
rest."[7l] 
This question of sexuality is situated within the domain 
of sexual roles; the fetish oscillating in the definition 
of the role, in the 'secondary', 'inessential' matter of 
vestment - the improper and external as usurping the 
universal and necessary. Genet's 'undecidability' invokes 
a further complicity in the antinomies of private property 
law: the self-proper has transmuted from the mask, the 
persona. As ever, Glas conjures with the actor, ironist, 
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dissembler as a means of overturning Hegel's ethical life 
- yet does not recognise that the construal of ethical 
life (the "reign of law", of the absolute proper, the 
subject of Gesetz) is that not of Greece but of modern 
property law, that which posits with its formal, abstract 
identity the shapes of dissimulation and concrete 
difference. Tiresias remains within this structure of 
dissembling for representation comes on the scene with the 
dissolution of the substantial and immediately ethical 
life of Greece and the rise of the absolute 'I', the 
principle of subjectivity. The duplicity and oscillation 
of the actor is between mask and player: "the hero who 
appears before the onlookers splits up into his mask and 
the actor, into the person in the play and the actual 
self"[72] and the comic consiousness is in evidence as 
this role-playing is generalized, the notion that 
dissembling is at the heart of all universality. 
Nevertheless,the very substitute-stability of this general 
Ersetzung - the 'I' that holds in abeyance its own loss, 
staves off, in its comedy, the Unhappy Consciousness, what 
is kept in abeyance by Derrida with the refusal of a 
'nostalgia' or negative theology - occurs as "the 
pretensions of universal essentiality are uncovered in the 
self"[73]. A general fetishism operates such that comic 
consciousnes staves off its "completion"[74] in the 
Unhappy Consciousness - "the knowledge of this total 
10ss"[75]. Glas refuses the 'ungluckiche Bewusstseyn' by 
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adhering to a constitutive difference. The method of a 
radical self-expropriation maintains itself by refusing 
the thought of the aporetic except as 'anterior' and 
sublime. The glas that is the death-knell, constructed 
within the transcendental Ersatz, permits the gathering 
around the grave of life, permits a religious yearning 
(what Hegel once described as "the chaotic jingling of 
bells"[76]) and yet escapes the necessity of determining 
this loss, the meaning of its 'non-meaning', by the 
presupposition of a metaphysical conceptuality resolutely 
fused with self-propriety. It is in the account of 
Antigone that this tomb is configured as the consitutive 
'loss' and it is there that the deconstructive schema of 
expropriation is disclosed as parasitic upon a Hegel from 
whom it derives its resources. In considering the 
reconstruction of Antigone's tragedy and the repatterning 
of the conflict of the two laws, the passage from 
determinate negation to transcendental difference can be 
uncovered. Moreover, in Derrida's enrolement of Hegel as 
Creon in Glas's production, the misconstrual of 
Sittlichkeit and the Hegelian 'absolute' are apparent and 
confirm Antigone as 'trace', differance. In the reading 
of Antigone, therefore, the meaning of Hegel's 'ethical 
life' will be contested, the adherence of Hegel to the 
'masculine law' will be under question. In Glas's account 
of Antigone the construal of Hegelian legality is 
contested. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
The Transcendental Tomb: Antigone in Derrida and Hegel 
Throughout the Derridean text Hegel is construed always 
the same: a system which maintains the teleology of se1f-
presence along a course in which the dialectical unfolding 
of the implications of immediate being-as-presence will 
entrain consciousness in the circular reappropriation of 
the whole as self-presence. The dichotomy of radical 
method/conservative system is reconfigured as the 
teleology of self-presence the privilege of the voice 
which hears itself speak, of the light that is self-
manifestation and parousia - versus the otherwise infinite 
chain of differance as evinced, paradigmatically, in 
writing - in the trace of an impossible presence which is 
difference as the only condition of possibility of 
signification. The agonistics of system and method are 
replayed according to this schema and Hegel is constructed 
such that 
"on the one hand, he undoubtedly summed up the entire 
philosophy of the logos. He determined ontology as 
absolute logic; he assembled all the delimitations of 
philosophy as presence; he assigned to presence the 
eschatology of parousia; of the self-proximity of infinite 
subjectivity" 
whilst, on the other, 
"Hegel is also the thinker of absolute difference. He 
rehabilitated thought as the memory productive of signs. 
And he reintroduced [ ••• ] the essential necessity of the 
written trace in a philosophical - that is to say Socratic 
- discourse that had always believed it possible to do 
without it; the last philosopher of the book and the first 
thinker of writing"[l]. 
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All the writings of Derrida on Hegel are, therefore, 
attempts to arrive at the 'thinker' through the 
deconstruction of the philosopher; to enter the circle of 
Hegel's logic and - without involvement in that circle in 
such a way as to legitimate it, without falling under the 
sway of determinate negation and the discipline of the 
Aufhebung - to extract the figure which betrays the 
difference, that refuses idealization, which resists the 
circle whose course is reckoned as the spiral ascent to 
'Absolute Knowledge' and the annulment of difference. 
Hegel as philosopher is regarded as proponent of a 
semiology which appears to figure difference as the detour 
between an original essential identity and its 
reattainment. The time of this detour is always such that 
it permits nothing a place outside of it whilst everything 
within it cooperates in a time of 'implicitude' in which 
the very necessity of the course informs every element 
with the temporal tense of the future anterior - "what 
reason will have thought". The omnitemporal nature of the 
schema, evidence of difference in the service of identity 
- as the momentary loss which precedes self-return at a 
gain; the time between the two as "the time of a detour, 
the time of a sign. The time of the sign is ••• the time of 
referral ••• always, from the outset the movement of lost 
presence will have set in motion the process of its 
reappropriation" [2]. As such this omnitemporality is an 
atemporality - the annullment of difference - which leads 
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the deconstructive pursuit of the thinker within the 
circuit of the philosophy in the direction of that which 
resists this history of self-promotion, of that which 
resists history, of what is left behind - what the system 
cannot use. At the start of Glas Derrida frames the 
question: "what, after all, of the remain(s) today, for 
us, here, now, of a Hegel?"[3], which is to say - what 
falls out of the circle, what continues to testify to an 
ineradicable difference that would be the ruin of all 
pretence to the fullness of self-presence in its very 
constitution of signification. This is to say that the 
thinker is to be sought in the philosopher, as the 
transcendental condition of the latter's possibility; the 
'method' will be the sine qua ~ of the system and, 
rather than being disciplined by it, difference will be 
seen to be the condition of (im)possibility of Absolute 
Knowledge. '(Im)possibility' for it will render the 
detour that is the path between an original self-presence 
and its reappropriation as a deferral: the absolute 
identity which is the telos of the system will be deranged 
by an irreducible incoherence at the heart of 
signification - the identity as untenable, the difference 
which it disciplined is seen as its ground and destruction 
and a certain 'method' freed from the 
identitarian/logocentric 'system'. 
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It is clear that this is a - deliberately -
transcendentalized Hegel. The question of Glas is the 
attempt to avoid an involvement in the rotation of the 
circuit and to find an element which, unusable by the 
revolution, will be found not only to be its "remains" -
isolated and at rest - but to be so as the pivot upon 
which rotation takes place. The quest is for that which 
bears witness to the transience of the system - its 
omnitemporality as a kind of unceasing organic 
circulation: a 'biological' Hegel of acorns and trees is 
continually evoked - a witness which will testify to the 
circle of reappropriation and its explosion. What is 
being sought is the figure which, whilst in the train of 
self-consciousness or at least a station on the road to 
Absolute Knowledge, will not only refuse that movement but 
also exemplify its impossibility. What is sought is a 
figure that betrays the irreducible difference of 
signification, the difference which is the only 
possibility of meaning and which is only present as re-
presented, as never 'all there' - what Derrida famously 
terms 'trace' or 'differance', what announces "the origin 
of meaning in difference"[4] uncovering the "hinge 
(brisure) in language" which, it is argued, "marks the 
impossibility that a sign, the unity of signifier and 
signified, be produced within the plenitude of a present 
and an absolute presence"[S]. 
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Throughout the Derridean text Hegel is construed always 
the same. In Of Grammatology one reads that the trace 
would be removed by onto-theology whose last word is 
Hegel's - "an onto-theology determining the archaeological 
and eschatological meaning of being as presence, as 
parousia, as life without differance: another name for 
death, historical metonymy where God's name holds death in 
check"[6] - a thought bearing the marks of Thanatos under 
the cosmetics of "infinite life". Whilst in the essay 
called 'The Pit and the Pyramid' one finds the circular 
path of signification moving from the "pit" wherein 
presentable memory traces await expression to the 
"pyramid" which is the sign and the status of its 
completion, an absolute concept as silent and timeless as 
the end of signification - as the tomb. Differance finds 
its proscription by this system to be predicated on the 
fundamental figure of the latter - death and the site of 
its commemoration and preservation, the tomb. Hyppolite 
(at whose seminar the essay was presented) had written of 
"The Concept of Existence in Hegel's Philosophy" as 
guaranteed by death; that "the animal is unconscious of 
the infinite totality of life in its wholeness, whereas 
man becomes the for-itself of that totality and 
internalizes death. That is why the basic experience of 
human self-consciousness is inseperable from the 
fundamental experience of death" [7] - the telos of the 
system inclines it toward death as the condition of 
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possibility of life, and also - Derrida adds - as the 
restriction of the otherwise-disseminative differantial 
tendencies of life as signification. Hegel's 'tomb', for 
Derrida, is therefore ambivalent: it is secondary and 
discarded - the body of the meaning (Bedeutung) of Spirit, 
the pyramid as alien to its contents - yet "raised over 
the sober and abstract weave of the Hegelian text"[8] it 
is privileged to be the exemplar of the life of Spirit, 
"composing the stature and status of the sign". This 
ambivalence opens the system to the transcendentalising 
move, for just as Hyppolite declares "death is the 
principle of negation", "man cannot exist except through 
the negativity of death", "the movement of universal life 
manifests itself in this ceaseless and monotonous 'death 
and birth'"[9] so does that which testifies to this 
"principle" become the 'remains' of the system. And more: 
the tomb it is that 'falls' away, that stands outside the 
"ceaseless and monotonous 'death and birth'" as a 
testimony and comprehension of it, it is the condition of 
possibility of a philosophy which pretends to the status 
of a 'Book of Life' and seeks the annullment of the 
living, that is to say, temporizing, 'significant', 
differance. It is the paradigm of the comprehension and 
spiritualization of life in its containment of it: 
Derrida writes that 
"The tomb is the life of the body as the sign of death, 
the body as the other of the soul, the other of the 
animate psyche, of the living breath. B~t the to~b also 
shelters maintains in reserve, capitallzes on llfe by 
marking fhat life continues elsewhere. The family crypt: 
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oekesis. It consecrates the disappearance of life by 
attesting to the perseverance of life. Thus the tomb 
also shelters life from death. It warns the'soul of 
possible death, warns of death of the soul, turns away 
(from) death. This double warning function belongs to the 
funerary monument. The body of the sign thus becomes the 
monument in which the soul will be enclosed, preserved 
maintained, kept in maintenance, present, signified. At 
the heart of the monument the soul keeps itself 
a1ive ••• "[10] 
The tomb is the transcendental condition of possibility of 
the system - the eschatological pursuit and reinstitution 
of an absolute identity which abolishes differance. And 
yet its very stasis is its refusal of the system. It does 
not so much present the absolute as re-present it: the 
soul does not find self-expression in the tomb but is 
referred to by the latter. Contrary to the systematic 
design, it evokes the trace precisely by its "resisting 
time" - the future-anteriority of the text - indeed, it 
thereby "resists the movement of dialectics, history and 
10gos"[II]. The tomb, hitherto telos of the system, 
uncovers the 'method' in that it cannot but indicate the 
perpetual difference which is signification; the 
impossibility of full self-presence is attested to in the 
petroglyph which does not enact the speaking voice or the 
phonetic writing the voice will privilege and subsume, but 
which is the persisting trace of the unpresentable, of 
loss without regain. As the sign, the tomb which is the 
pyramid thereby 'restores' the differance of 
signification: death is not "sublimated" in God but 
rather, as tombstone and work of mourning, the 
- 123 -
impossibility of full presence is adumbrated - in contrast 
to the systematic sign as the route to a complete self-
coincidence in signification. 
Throughout the Derridean text Hegel is construed always 
the same. Derrida makes direct allusion to Glas in a 
footnote to 'The Pit and the Pyramid' in such a way that 
the essay appears almost as prologue: "In a work in 
preparation on Hegel's family and on sexual difference in 
the dialectical speculative economy, we will bring to 
light the organization and displacement of this chain 
which reassembles the values of night, sepulcher, and 
divine - familial - feminine law as the law of singularity 
- and does so around the pit and the pyramid."[12] The 
essay underscores a Hegel wherein signification is only 
possible as a circuitous detour between original identity 
and its reconstitution; elsewhere (at the start and 
finish) difference is removed in the name of absolute 
identity. The silence of death is both the end of such a 
vital process and its displacement, death unsublimated by 
ontotheology - in an infinite subjectivity - restoring 
that repressed trace of the unpresentable. The eponymous 
"glas" will similarly entwine and separate these themes of 
death, differance and signification, and the 
transcendental oikesis will be assigned a guardian. 
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The eponymous "glas" is elusive, diffuse but insistent. 
As 'death-knell' it is, above all, the announcement of 
differance - the death of the myth of full self-presence 
in the (undifferential) sign. It echoes the death-drive 
of Absolute Knowledge ironically, as it is precisely the 
impossibility of such a closure: the "glas" sounds the 
"end of the Book" as telos and finis. No longer will the 
sign be fixed, stable, 'absolute' but rather, as evidence 
of an impossible presence, as the tomb-structure 
elucidated in the essay, it will have the character of a 
death-knell: sounding in commemoration of loss, akin to 
"differance as the relation to an impossible presence, as 
expenditure without reserve, as the irreparable loss of 
presence, the irreversible usage of energy, that is, as 
the death instinct, and as the entirely other relationship 
that interrupts every economy"[13]. Closure, fixity, 
decideability are all thrown into disarray by the 
differing-deferring of signification and, like a tombstone 
that marks this movement - that is, its trace - "glas" 
acts as the sign of this dynamic. Derrida plays 
throughout with the metonymy of "glas" - 'glissement', the 
sliding signifier; 'glans', 'gland', the phallogocentrism 
held in place by an organicist system and metaphors of 
seeding and this is its paradigmatic perpetuity. Not 
the death heralded by the absolute concept but a death -
or a sign of death - which is the witness (and 'producer') 
of life. 
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This "remains" which is indicated by and as 'glas' is - as 
the bell's 'oscillation' echoes that of a general 
fetishism -intimately related to the question of gender 
for Derrida and in this Antigone appears as its 
personification. The question of the tomb, of the 
remains, of the 'glas', is that of persistance, survival. 
If one recalls Ryppolite: "the movement of universal life 
manifests itself in this ceaseless and monotonous 'death 
and birth'" - the question of the remains of Hegel's 
system, its condition of possibility, the stasis and 
fulfillment of death, turns to the figure who guards the 
tomb, who survives all and commemorates their passing and 
who is witness to birth, being the one who gives birth. 
In the 'other' column - and as I have sought to relate -
Derrida has chosen Genet as witness to this maternal 
perpetuity: Genet, the bastard child of a mother who has 
never been present and who himself takes on the role of 
mourner in Funeral Rites. Of Genet's 'mothers' Derrida 
writes "it is always the mother - now one knows what this 
word means (to say) nothing more than what follows, 
obsequences, remains after killing what it gave birth to" 
[14] • 
'Glas' is the tombstone, the differance that marks how 
"the death agony of language is structurally interminable" 
and this site of death, its interminable and perpetual 
movement, is watched over by the one who, discovered 
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within the Hegelian circuit, will express that which the 
system requires and proscribes. The "glas that can't be 
stopped"[15], the figure of death who, transcendentalized, 
permits the system as an organic, vital, circle and yet 
deranges it, rupturing the possibility of a stable, 
undifferentiated sign and of closure in Absolute 
Knowledge, is discovered in Antigone. Antigone is the 
differance which the system of ethical life attempts to 
overcome yet who is - as the difference that is the 
condition of possibility of its meaning - fundamental to 
the system as the death that is the "principle" of 
Hegelian life~ Antigone is the "remain(s)" when one 
recalls this as all that does not fall in with the 
"Hegelian semiology" of the 'Pit and the Pyramid' - the 
sign as a detour between self-presence and its 
accomplishment, the sign as the "time of a detour" with an 
origin and conclusion in the timelessness of absolute 
identity. "Time's remain(s) - for the seminar(y) of Sa 
[Savoir Absolu] - that is nothing"[16] , yet time as the 
temporization, as the active sense of differance, 
'exhibits' such a remains in the movement of 
signification. A perpetual difference which will not 
subscribe to the determinate negation - regarded as an 
inverse affirmation of presence-regained - but will rather 
take effect as the "dehiscence" of the sign, its irony. 
An irony which, taking its cue from Hegel, delimits sexual 
difference in that it will draw together the mother and 
- 127 -
sister under the law of the family whilst that law, with 
its prime function of servicing the dead, will draw out 
the very 'trace-structure' of the feminine. A quotation 
will carry us from the 'tomb of the sign' and the 
transcendentalized death-witness to the case of Antigone: 
"The inalienable blow [CjUp] of the woman is irony. 
Woman, '[the community's internal enemy' can always burst 
out [eclater] laughing at the last moment; she knows, in 
tears and in death, how to pervert the power that 
suppresses. The power of irony - the ironic posit(ion)ing 
rather - results - syllogistically - from what the master 
produces and proceeds from what he suppresses, needs, and 
returns to.. Antigone is Cybele, the goddess-Mother who 
precedes and follows the whole process. She is at all 
catastrophes, all downfalls, all carnages, remains 
invulnerable to them, is killed invulnerable [y reste 
invulnerable]. Her very death does not affect her. 
All remains in her. She is to come after, to be followed, 
to be continued [a suivre]."[17] 
Derrida construes Hegel always the same: a refurbishment 
of the dichotomy of radical method/conservative system. 
The method not only escapes but also explodes the system 
on account of the transcendental status of difference: the 
method is the condition of possibility of the system by 
virtue of its "principle of negation" and, when such a 
differential dynamic is grasped in its full, 
destabilizing, effects, it takes shape as the condition of 
systematic impossibility.· If the disseminative differance 
of signification is thereby transmuted into the form of 
Hegelian methodology despite itself, then in adversity 
does it confont a system constituted by the movement of 
Aufhebung - for Derrida, the serial incorporation of 
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a1terity, the unfolding of the implicit absolute identity 
in Spirit, the familiar career of infinite subjectivity as 
self-presence. Antigone is convened as personification of 
the differance - the interminable death to which 
signification is subject, the ruin of possibility of 
systematic closure - a transcendental place whose Hegelian 
site was uncovered by Hyppo1ite; at the same time, as 
sorority she will refuse the systematic constitution that 
is the Aufhebung by taking no part in the dialectic of 
master and slave - the ruin of systematic closure as 
constructed by Kojeve. Hyppo1ite and Kojeve stand at each 
shoulder when Derrida exalts Antigone as the 'glas' of 
Hegel, they combine to yield the binocular view that 
Derrida takes: 
" ••• Since the Hegel text remains to be read, I re-form 
here its ellipse around two foci: (the) burial (place), 
the 1iason between brother and sister."[18] 
Derrida seizes upon the cleanly-delineated opposition of 
family and state which - for him - is Hegel's reading of 
the Antigone of Sophocles. Derrida's construal takes 
Antigone as the differance of the text, she always is 
found by the tomb; as guardian of the law of the family, 
woman, the divine, obscure and unconscious, of 
individuality, she confronts the living universal of the 
state (the law of the human , the masculine, the visible 
and illuminated) and assumes the function of one occupied 
perpetually with death. The reading of this section of 
the Phenomenology to be found in Kojeve's Lectures 
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reproduces the conflict of family and state - of the laws 
of human and divine, feminine unconscious and masculine 
light - as a fruitless struggle, the result ruination and 
a descent into slavery thanks to the victory of the 
principle of woman. The conflict is one without 
possibility of synthesis: whilst the two sides co-exist -
"the particular and particularist Family is a necessary 
complement of the universal and universalist pagan state" 
[19] - the very passivity which must be characteristic of 
a devotion to the dead renders the feminine inactive and 
therefore incapable of rising to the universal. The two 
sides cannot be united (in the terms of Kojeve's reading) 
because woman is locked into particularity and, attendant 
upon the dead, she is unable to undertake the action 
necessary to constitute her as human - "the human Actions 
of Fighting and of Work"[20]. The tragedy of Antigone is, 
then, the compulsion on the part of the citizen to 
renounce the family and risk death "for the universal 
cause" which thereby sets the two - "mutually exclusive" -
laws in conflict. The univeral and particular cannot 
enter into the conflict which is the sine qua non of 
'humanity', the paradigmatic struggle for recognition of 
master and slave, because one of the parties refuses to 
subscribe to this human law, indeed this is their 
conflict~ Kojeve delivers a "particularist" Antigone 
whose "essentially inactive existence is not truly human", 
who stops dead the expansion of the universal state -
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conceived as the Kriegstaat for "since the only human 
value is the one realized in and by Fighting and the risk 
of life, the life of the State must necessarily be a 
warlike life: the pagan state is a human state only to the 
extent that it wages wars for prestige"[21]. This is the 
scenario for Derrida's restaging of the drama yet with a 
significant difference - one that both confuses and 
distinguishes Kojeve and Hegel. Kojeve is incapable of 
conceiving of the family, in its distinction from the 
state, as anything other than 'particularity' in 
opposition to 'universality'. Derrida's extravagances 
with the Hegelian text nevertheless show a greater 
attentiveness: the "individuality" that is familial 
separates Kojeve from Hegel and underlines the level of 
generalization, schematization and abstraction in the 
former's 'Introduction', yet the confusion (to which we 
shall turn shortly) is apparent in the reliance, in Glas' 
restaging, on the stage-directions of Kojeve. 
"Individuality" releases Antigone from the abstract 
dialectic of the Kojevean drama yet serves then to both 
expel her from the stage (subsequently to resume that 
drama of dialectical 'universalization') and exalt her as 
'the stage': Derrida returns to Hegel for the unicity of 
Antigone, whilst remaining in Kojeve for the general 
schema of ethical life and absolute knowledge. 
'Individuality' is necessarilly misread as 'particularity' 
by Kojeve for it explodes the generalized agonistics of 
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master and slave: Derrida is intent upon this 'explosion' 
but within the terms of a misreading - the confusion of 
Kojeve and Hegel - as significant for the ends of his own 
text as Kojeve's was. 
Antigone's 'singularity' draws out the transcendental 
structure of the differance anew; the irony of the 
universal, the refusal of the formative struggle for 
recognition - her completeness and apparent self-
sufficiency is borne out in the relationship which is 
the master/slave's deconstructive 'counterpart' (no 
possibility of its enrolment in the circle - unlike 
Kojevean 'particularism'). Antigone is an internal 
resistance which refuses internalisation - she reinforces 
what has been seen to be the role of the tomb just as she 
is its guardian: 
"The effect of focusing, in a text, around an impossible 
place. Fascination of a figure inadmissable in the 
system~ Vertiginous insistence on an unclassable. And 
what if what cannot be assimilated, the absolute 
indigestible, played a fundamental role in the system, an 
abyssal role rather, the abyss playing an almost 
transcendental role and allowing to be formed above it, as 
a kind of effluvium, a dream of appeasement? Isn't there 
always an element excluded from the system that assures 
the system's space of possibility? The transcendental has 
always been, strictly, a transcategorial, what could be 
received, formed, terminated in none of the categories 
intrinsic to the system. The system's vomit. And what if 
the sister, the brother/sister relationship, represented 
here the transcendental position, ex-position?" [22] 
The desirelessness of the relationship of brother and 
sister sets Antigone apart, assures her the transcendental 
place of one who, in a general schema, is "unique in the 
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Hegelian universe"[23] in that she is outside any 
dialectic of recognition. The brother and sister, for 
Hegel, are without desire, whilst the sister, in her work 
of mourning for the brother, is accorded the status of 
"the highest presentiment of the ethical"[24]. The sister 
- stranger to the war and desire characterizing the 
history of the master/slave and yet apparently the single 
supreme case of ethical purity - therefore revokes the 
principle of the masculine consciousness - the war 
against, and conquest/sublation of, alterity - and stands 
apart; as still and resistant to dialectical history and 
determinate negation as the tombstone, the marker which 
perpetually refers - outside the horizon of presence - to 
an unthinkable absolute negation. The law of the polis is 
refigured as the Kojevean procedure of Desire - war of 
desire leading onto the victory and satisfaction of the 
slavish consciousness in labour - and it is in 
confrontation with this history (which is, in the 
Derridean construal, 'History') that Antigone, as 
sorority, throws the conscious law into confusion. The 
brother and sister do not join battle: 
"Brother and sister 'do not desire one another'. The for-
(it)self of one does not depend on the other. So they 
are, it seems, two single consciousnesses that, in the 
Hegelian universe, relate to each other without entering 
into war. Given the generality of the struggle for 
recognition in the relationship between consciousnesses, 
one would be tempted to conclude that there is no 
brother/sister bond, there is no brother or sister. If 
such a relation is unique and reaches a kind of repose 
(Ruhe) and equilibrium (Gleichgewicht) that are re~used to 
every other one, that is because the brother and s1ster do 
not receive from each other their for-self and 
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nevertheless constitute themselves as 'free 
individualities'. These for-self's recognize, without 
depending on, each other; they no more desire each other 
than tear each other to pieces."[25] 
The feminine law as singularity, Derrida figures, will not 
participate in the state-and-system-building of a 
univeralizing desire. Furthermore, in the opposition, as 
Derrida conceives it, of state and family are convened two 
laws which resist sublation on account of one of the terms 
not only refusing the textual schema of Aufhebung but also 
possessing the status of its transcendental condition of 
possibility. Kojeve reported the two laws as "mutually 
exclusive", Derrida - alighting on the refusal of the two 
laws to conduct themselves according to the Kojevean plan 
- finds rather that one of them is in priority to the 
other~ Within the terms of their opposition is contained 
the very 'displacement' of the system for which the 
antagonism of family and polis is constitutive. Derrida 
takes seriously and literally the status of the divine law 
as that of "the unconscious": in the confrontation of city 
and family there is a chain of terms in opposition and 
Derrida aligns them in such a way that a virile state and 
a 'virtual' logic are revealed and undermined by their 
antagonist. 
"To this great opposition [family law and state law] is 
ordered a whole series of other couples: divine law/human 
law, family/city, woman/man, night/day, and so on. Human 
law is the law of daylight because it is known, public, 
visible universal" human law rules, not the family, but 
the cit~, governme~t, war, it is made by man (vir). Human 
law is the law of man. Divine law is the lawor-woman; it 
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hides itself, does not offer itself in this opening-
manifestation (Offenbarkeit) that produces man. Divine 
law is nocturnal and more natural than the city. Once 
more the family appears as the most natural degree of the 
ethical community. Natural, divine, feminine nocturnal 
familial, such is the predicative system, the'law of ' 
singularity~ In this law - this is said more precisely 
in this place, of the family - the concept is ' 
"unconscious"~ The Penates are opposed to the people, to 
absolute spirit, to universality-producing labour. The 
proper end of the family, of the woman who represents the 
family, strictly, is the singular as such."[26] 
Woman - Antigone - becomes the textual unconscious in the 
twofold sense that she is organised, in the clash with the 
state, as the upholder of the "unconscious law" in face of 
the conscious, political law and that, as the 
transcendental figure, she orchestrates the teleology of 
the text, both permitting and confounding the opposed law 
(which is, of course, to be taken as the conscious end of 
the textual exertions). The Hegelian 'unconscious' is 
reckoned by the system to possess the teleological 
distinction of 'virtuality': "the unconscious is a 
possible conscious, a virtual truth"[27]~ Disciplined by 
the law of the city, of light and man (~), the text 
assumes an unconscious which is 'consciousness-implicit' -
the assured bringing-to-light in all its implications and 
in the full presence of comprehension of that obscure law, 
the Aufhebung of the feminine. The text attempts to 
entrain that which it figures as 'unconscious' within the 
circuit of the conscious - a trait, incidentally, which is 
neatly explicated by Kojeve's English editor: "Kojeve 
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gives an example of what it means to follow out the 
necessity of one's position manfully and 
philosophically" [28] - the unconscious is figured as the 
implications or the implied, to be uncovered and 
illuminated by the subject of the masculine law. Yet 
Derrida finds in Antigone's tragedy - the crime which 
cannot be undone - evidence of the perpetual resistance to 
presence; the Nachtraglichkeit - delayed effect - which 
differance, as a deferring as well as (spatial) differing, 
draws on~ Antigone refuses the role of an unconscious 
which is 'implicitly-conscious' - already what it is not 
yet - in that Hegel describes a tragic fate that befalls 
the ethically pure or - as in the case of Oedipus - the 
ignorant. Despite the illumination of the unconscious 
crime "the relief does not lift [leve] the culpabilility, 
does not wash away [lave] the crime. An after-effect [~ 
effet d'apres] offers endless resistance there. The crime 
has taken place, the culpability remains"[29]. In the 
ineradicable discrepancy in the ethical action which is 
criminal, the "teleological temporality of self-presence" 
[30] - the law of the city, light, man - is disturbed and 
only the conclusion of death, that which leaves in Hegel 
the tremendous feeling of appeasement, seems to allow the 
death that is in fact perpetual - Antigone as the 
differance, the glas of the myth of full self-presence in 
signification - to be returned to the systematic structure 
of the Phenomenology: the deathly stasis of Absolute 
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Knowledge. 
Already the eschatology of the system has been addressed -
the mark of Thanatos which ontotheology is seen as 
bearing, only sublimated by an infinte subjectivity, God -
and Antigone, whose destiny is to die as singularity, 
desireless, complete, immune to the mutual dependence and 
across-the-counter bargaining of the master/slave, is 
figured as the paradigm of such a systematic death-drive. 
And yet her opposition to its systematic organisation is 
such that she has an effect of ruination which exceeds the 
bounds within which the Phenomenology seeks to confine it. 
Antigone 'unmans' the community; the perpetual irony which 
unhinges the unity of the sign in the advance to Absolute 
Knowledge and Sittlichkeit, as Cybele she is the perpetual 
circle of birth and destruction whose priests - Derrida 
has recourse to Hegel's 'Spirit of Judaism' as 
reinforcement - "were castrated (verschnitten), unmanned 
in body and spirit (an Leib und Geist entmannt)"[31]. An 
absolute negation which mirrors the absolute identity that 
is the telos of the system and which, standing apart from 
its logic of determinate negation (characterised by 
Derrida as the means whereby "the absolute spirit records 
a profit in any case, death included"[32]), both 
guarantees that concern with death and renders its desire 
for 'sublimation' impossible. It is only with the 
employment to their fullest extent of the powers of the 
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masculine law that the text can subsequently reorder the 
'ruin' of ethical life to its own advantage, yet Antigone 
remains - as the 'remains', the trace, differance, that 
which enacts the perennial "dehiscence" of the sign: "the 
one who poses the transcendental question of questions on 
the possibility of your own proper discourse can always be 
referred to the sister"[34]. 
One cannot configure Antigone's role in Glas, then, 
without pursuing the strange dependence of the discourse 
of differance and its transcendental tomb (and Antigone's 
role is once more assigned when Derrida writes: "crypt -
one would have said, of the transcendental or the 
repressed, of the unthought or the excluded - that 
organises the ground to which it does not belong"[3S]), 
the dependence of this thought which reiterates the 
perpetual differing-deferring, upon the Kojevean Hegel of 
closure and the cessation of difference in absolute 
identity. This dependence is evident in the Derridean 
Antigone's remaining within an eschatology, the differance 
appears to depend on 'death-dealing' in equal degree to 
its adversary. Antigone enacts the trace-structure and 
the interminable death that is signification - and 
displaces Absolute Knowledge - inasmuch as 
"Nothing should be able to survive Antigone's death. Plus 
nothing more should follow, go out of her, after her. The 
announcement of her death should sound the absolute end of 
history. A glaze(d) virgin, sterile transparency. 
Without desire and without labour."[36] 
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One would be preparing to ask whether the 'glas' that is 
(enacted in the tragedy of) Antigone, the dramatization of 
differance, does not communicate with a Kojevean 
eschatology, remaining wedded to a notion of nihilation , 
of subjective striving-through-negation which, although no 
longer granted the tomb-like rest of Absolute Knowledge, 
is relieved in the stasis of the perpetuity of general 
difference. Derrida's account testifies that Antigone is 
the transcendental site of both Hegel's and his own 
thought. 
Derrida has removed the misplaced Kojevean "particular" 
from the ethical order - the "individual" which Kojeve 
ignores is reassigned its place for the reason that it was 
hitherto-obscured: in the conflict of family and state it 
appeared that this individual, this singularity, would 
refuse the subsumptive dynamic of the law, would stop the 
passage of the ethical order into the realm of Roman 
legality dead in its tracks~ There could be no 
dialectical war of desire unless there were aligned the 
logical counterparts of particular and universal. The 
family is found to be the precursor of Roman 'privacy' 
through the continuum of the victory of its 
"particularism" - "that principle of Particularity that is 
hostile to Society as such and whose victory signifies the 
ruin of the State, of the Universal properly so-
called"[37]. Derrida subscribes to the emphasis on 
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mutual-exclusion which each law exercises upon the other, 
and to the character and destruction of this "Universal" -
but configures the 'individualism' of the family as that 
which, precisely, destroys perpetually the possibility of 
the system's self-recovery in the passage to legality. 
What draws both Kojeve and Derrida into line, then, is 
that each conceives the opposition as one fixed and clear 
- "the Family and State are mutually exclusive"[38]; "the 
family imperils the head"[35] - and then proceeds to 
privilege one of the terms: Kojeve the "Universal" and 
Derrida the "singular", in turn allocating the place of a 
transcendental condition of the eschatological system's 
(im)possibility to that privileged term. 
Throughout its discussion of the Hegelian Sittlichkeit, 
Glas has construed it as given its model form in the 
ethical life of Greece, the citizen of the polis as the 
paradigmatic free subject. Being-for-self attains its 
ideal form in the Greeks and is a mode of propriety, the 
subject one of appropriation. "If one follows this value 
of the proper", writes Derrida, "of property (propriete, 
Eigen, Eigentum) one must conclude that the free citizen's 
independence and quality go on a par with private 
property" [39]. Moreover, the ethical order is, according 
to Derrida, nothing other than "the reign of law"[40]: the 
implication - monarchism and positive law, the monarchism 
of positive law. The commerce of a transcendentalised 
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(mon-archical) 'ethical order' with one of positive law is 
emphasised in Derrida's reinforcement of the distinction 
and exclusivity of Family and State. Yet, in a move 
reminiscent of Kojeve, the 'individual', 'singular', 
familial silently translates into the 'particular': whilst 
Derrida accounts for the ethical order in its division as 
torn between the 'written' law of the state and the 'non-
written' law of the family, this introduction of positive 
law into ethical life is further confused when he writes 
of the family's "personal independence, independence of 
property (Eigentum) always bound to the family, personal 
right and real right (dingliche Recht) that assures 
possession"[41]~ This is nothing less than the 
introduction of the language of Roman legality into the 
sphere of ethical life. The confusion sends the 
description of Antigone's 'singularity' into incoherence -
as a representative of "personal right" she would belong 
to civil soceity, exhibit the "particularism" that Kojeve 
describes and both confirm and confound the 'glas' of the 
system. Confirm, for, 'particularized' Antigone would 
underscore a model of ethical life which undertook the 
work of appropriation, which permitted the Aufhebung to be 
translated as 'relever' and 'relever de' (come under, 
sUbsume) - a model of practical reason. Confound, for it 
would thereby confer upon her a certificate of entry into 
such a system: as in Kojeve's account, she would not prove 
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dynamic yet would serve as a dialectical step in the 
spiral ascent to Absolute Knowledge. 
The point is: transcendentalised, the system necessarily 
cooperates with Roman legality; the search for the figure 
which justifies the text, the 'principle' according to 
which it unfolds, all presumes to accord a priority which 
is at odds with Hegel's description of the ethical order. 
Derrida, concurring with Kojeve's account of each as a 
"hostile principle", "mutually exclusive", has alighted 
upon the opposition of family and state in media res - at 
the point of tragic conflict - driven them to extremes, 
and taken one of the terms as the transcendental. Although 
for Hegel the family is "substance in general", "general 
possibility of the ethical sphere", "the unconscious, 
still inner Notion of the ethical order"[42], this does 
not imply a transcendental priority but rather is the 
acknowledgement of the unknown in such a way that, unlike 
the movement of a transcendental structure, it will not be 
thereby dominated by the known, visible, illuminated. 
Indeed, it is only by alighting on the tragedy as its 
opposing terms have taken their place in confrontation 
that Derrida could render the ethical order a sphere of 
personality/subjectivism: the very structure of that 
"cleaved Sittlichkeit" which is the tragedy of Antigone is 
produced out of the mutuality of the Family and State -
the abstract and ossified terms of 'individual' and 
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'universal' which reach such delineation in the 
confrontation of Antigone and Creon serve to obscure their 
'circulation' in the ethical sphere. Of course, it is 
such a circulation - a resistance to criticism, to the 
granting of a critical purchase on this system without 
presuppositions - that drives Derrida to the seizure upon 
this apparently-transcendental place. Yet the 
misconstrual of the ethical order as the realm of Roman 
legality is the inevitable result of a transcendentalizing 
thought confronting Hegel - that is, a thought which 
betrays a greater adherence to positing law and its 
concomitant subjectivism than Hegel's does~ Within the 
context of the Hegelian attempt to think political 
relations apart from the dominating subject, Glas strives 
to reintroduce personality - as if it were the only means 
deconstruction had of considering the politico-legal. As 
if its incredulous response to a thought seeking to derive 
and pursue the construction of the abstractions of 
positive law were to return that thought insistently to 
those abstractions, as if to deny the possibility of doing 
otherwise except by way of describing in abstraction the 
perpetual and general grammatological unsettling or 
instability of their terms~ 
The thought of deconstruction remains more than parasitic 
upon the abstractions of 'metaphysics' and this is evident 
in its transcendentalizing drive. The presupposition of 
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Hegel's 'system' as the legitimation of "introjective 
subjectivity" - a thought imagined to suppress the 
deconstructive transcendental difference with great force 
- serves to announce the very subjectivism of Derrida's 
discourse. The elision of the individual with the 
particular in certain moments of the discussion of 
Antigone betrays the fixity assigned to the oppositions of 
ethical life, a fixity which can afford the subsequent 
privileging of one term of the opposition as 
transcendental. Yet this is precisely what the dynamic of 
ethical life - without the figure of modern abstract 
'subjectivity' or the particularism of civil soceity -
outstrips in its constitution through the 'circulation' of 
individual and universal, family and city, woman and man: 
"The husband is sent out by the Spirit of the Family into 
the community in which he finds his self-conscious being. 
Just as the Family in this way possesses in the community 
its substance and enduring being, so, conversely, the 
community possesses in the Family the formal element of 
its actual existence, and in the divine law its power and 
authentication. Neither of the two is absolutely valid; 
human law proceeds in its living process from the divine, 
the law valid on earth from that of the nether world, the 
conscious from the unconscious, mediation from immediacy -
and equally returns whence it came~ The power of the 
nether world on the other hand, has its actual existence 
on earth; th;ough consciousness, it becomes existence and 
activity."[43] 
The difference is the dynamic of the unity of ethical 
life; one of the terms - as 'unconscious' - is not the 
condition of the other as 'the head', government, 
masculine and conscious law~ Indeed, the question of the 
rapid Derridean elision of this opposition of conscious 
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and unconscious with the ethical order serves to 
demonstrate the distinction between the psychoanalytic 
schema which refers to repression and non-recognition, a 
transcendental unconscious ironically akin to the 
'virtual' - ie transcendental - unconscious Derrida finds 
in Hegel, and the unity-in-difference of conscious and 
unconscious in the movement of the ethical substance. The 
transcendentalizing structure is the introduction of the 
terms and schemata of Roman legality and it is under such 
a law - with the abstraction of personality, the advent of 
the "rigid unyielding self" that is no longer "the self 
that is dissolved in the substance"[44] - that the 
necessary 'un-thinking' of the unconscious which Derrida 
sees as typifying the Hegelian philosophy of presence in 
its attitude towards the "hidden law" comes on the scene. 
Within each individual in the ethical sphere there is the 
immediate acknowledgement of the universal - and precisely 
because it is not 'written' or posited but is the 
actualization of the individual - whilst the universal 
acknowledges its "force and element" in the unconscious 
familial law. The transcendental thought which cannot 
dispense with a certain linearity and concern with 
unequivocal origins - even if despite itself; even if 
written in the insistent terms of "non-originary origin", 
"conditions of (im)possibility" etc - necessarily is 
incapable of conceiving of the ethical order except in 
terms of the structures of abstract subjectivity. The 
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transcendentalised, 'uni-directional' Hegel of the 
"virtual unconscious" cannot be sustained by a return to 
the Phenomenology, to the ethical order as 
"an immaculate world, a world unsullied by internal 
dissension. Similarly, its process is a tranquil 
transition of one of its powers into the other, in such a 
way that each preserves and brings forth the other. We do 
indeed see itself divide itself into two essences and 
their reality; but their antithesis is rather the 
authentication of one through the other ••• " [45] 
Derrida takes to task a Hegel for whom the system is the 
justification of a Sittlichkeit functioning according to 
the law of phallogocentrism; an infinite appropriative 
subjectivity which seeks to subdue what it determines as 
'Nature' through 'the' Aufhebung conceived as relever. 
Derrida seeks to shatter the accomplishment of this end 
through the privileging of the alternative law to the one 
transcendentalized and, thereupon, he completes the 
transcendentalizing gesture: Antigone - "representative" 
of the law of the hidden, unconscious, obscure - is 
detached from that conception of non-posited law whereby 
the universal and individual were at one - an immediate 
knowledge of the right - and transformed to assume the 
position for which, in abstract isolation, she is so well-
suited~ As unknown - "undecideable" - her place is that 
assigned to the transcendental in accordance with a 
metaphysics which, whilst eschewing the language of 
de(con)struction, Hegel knew in all its abstractions. The 
transcendentalized Hegel returns us to those abstractions 
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whilst the differance which enacts the dehiscence of 
'absolute identity', far from repeating the attempt at the 
determination and derivation of the abstract oppositions 
of philosphical culture, reaffirms them as according with 
an unknowable law of undecideability - an interminable 
shifting or alteration akin to the clapper in the bell, 
that bell which sounds the 'glas' of signification: the 
stasis of a perpetual difference. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Religion in the Reliquary: The "remain(s)" of Spirit from 
Christian Filiation to the mastery of the Jews 
The discussion of Antigone in Glas bears witness to the 
deconstructive schematising of Hegel's attempt to rethink 
'ethical life'. Whereas Hegel sought to determine -
rather than defer to - the abstract oppositions of 
positive law, Derrida - with no notion of law other than 
as posited and identitarian - incarcerates the Hegelian 
attempt and leaves thought with an 'unthinkable' law; 
positivity 'sous rature'. Sittlichkeit and "True Spirit" 
are reconstructed within the matrix of a polis identified 
by deconstruction as "the reign of law"[l], a legality 
that is depicted according to the imposed unity of 
masculine Gesetz; a Hegel of Setzung and "regle"[2]. 
Derrida's misreading of Antigone holds a peculiar irony 
for it focuses on what is perceptively taken as 
'exemplary' (and that 'exemplarity' - for Hegel - bears on 
the very (im)possibility of a nonposited law "for us, 
today, here, now") and yet it returns Antigone's 'law' to 
the fixed oppositions of positive law, understanding the 
tragedy of Antigone and Creon in terms of a hierarchical 
opposition geared to the restoration of the abstract 
state, that "reign of law". Thus, even as it reads the 
Hegelian attempt to think ethical life beyond the fixed 
oppositions of positive law and the discourse of Setzung, 
- 149 -
the machinery of Glas cannot operate except in those 
terms; maintaining Hegel within them and itself evading 
the subsumptive concept only by configuring the latter's 
oppositions as its, the concept's, (transcendental) 
alienation. This procedure is repeated in the 
'glassifying' treatment of 'Spirit': Glas turns again to 
an instance of Hegel's criticism of the suppressions and 
occlusions of positive law and, approaching the text with 
the schematic and oscillating oppositions inscribed in a 
general fetishism, it elides the intimations of ethical 
life with the abstract state just as it celebrates the 
violence and 'unconsciousness' of the legal concept and 
its application insofar as they testify to perpetuated 
difference and impossible closure. 
The text that Derrida employs to carry out the 
displacement of identitarian Spirit is Hegel's early 
essay, 'The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate'. As the 
'family' - the oikos - was produced as paradigmatic of 
Hegelian self-presence, so does Glas undertake a reading 
of 'The Spirit of Christianity' that pursues this. 
Indeed, the path from oikos to oekesis - from the ideal 
self-propriety of the family hearth to its constitutive 
'nothing', the crypt - is represented from within Hegel's 
account of the absolute religion and its Aufhebung of 
Judaism. Hegel's essay is construed as an example of 
Christian apologetics - a Jesus-Hegel emerges, for Glas, 
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from its pages - and Spirit is conceived as the identity 
through filiation of Father and Son. This familial 
identity, however, is displaced through a reconstruction 
of the Hegelian death of God and its premonitions -
particularly, in the Last Supper (also the scene of 
filiation: the instance of the annunciation of Jesus' 
parentage). Finally, the failure of reconciliation which 
religious Vorstellung reflects - the failure of Christian 
filiation - would send the absolute presence of Spirit 
'back' to the Jews: the return from a loving and revealed 
father to a castrating, jealous master - unmanifest and 
sublime~ The "remain(s)" of religion in Glas is 
registered in its re-presentative aspect; it preserves an 
incapacity - a modesty, one might say, recalling the text 
as fetishistic "fleece"[3] - which holds it back from full 
self-presence, leaves Savoir Absolu as only ever re-
presented, its closure deferred. 
Rereading 'The Spirit of Christianity' in the wake of 
Glas, this chapter seeks to underscore the construction of 
a 'Spirit' which, by means of the deconstructive oikos 
comes to reassemble itself under the law of the 
Grammatology's "metaphysics of Ie propre". I maintain 
that the deconstruction of Hegelian 'Spirit' turns it in 
the direction of the subject of legal personality with the 
consequences of a Sittlichkeit reconstructed according to 
Recht and the antinomies of positive law. The "remain(s) 
- 151 -
for us here, today, of a Hegel" will thus be deposited 
within the contemporary context of the abstract 
oppositions of reflection which, in the 
'transcendentalising' schema of Glas, will be perpetuated 
as means of thwarting the pretensions of domineering 
logocentrism. Secondly, the construal of the implicitly-
philosophical nature of Hegel's 'religion' is seen to 
pursue precisely the lines of Kojeve's "God-Man" and the 
eskaton of citizenship in the bourgeois state. This has 
consequences less for the Derridean critique of the 
absolute religion than for the convening of the Jews as 
the religious "remain(s)". The third part of this chapter 
will reread Glas's translation of the Jews from Hegel's 
essay, regarding it as conducted according to the Kojevean 
schema that ejected all that did not succumb to the state-
building route of war and labour. The Jews will be seen 
to 'personify' the suppressed difference of the Kojevean-
Hegelian absolute knowledge/state, reintroducing the 
element that Kojeve sought to reject. The first section 
of this chapter closely follows the construction in Glas 
of 'Spirit'. This somewhat lengthy exegesis is justified 
as the pursuit not only of the rhetorical and metonymic 
reconstruction of 'Spirit' and its echo of and cross-
reference to the column of Genet in particular, but also 
as the inspection of the deconstructive appropriation of 
Hegel's essay. The exegesis seeks to unfold the manner in 
which the parasite prepares, making habitable and 
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nourishing, its host and - contrary to its claims - what 
violence it does to the latter. 
i. 'Spirit' for Glas: autonomy autonomination and the Ie 
in the phantasm of the Father --
Glas produces a Hegel that is the justification of a 
(phal)logocentric subject. As such it construes a 
'Spirit' that is the subsumption of 'nature' beneath the 
law of Ie propre: as the subject of Hegel, Spirit is 
conceived in accordance with the 'values' of breath and 
the voice, the absolute identity of the s'entendre parler. 
Equally, it is constructed within the left-hand column as 
an operation obeying the laws of restricted fetishism 
wherein the constitutive 'cut' is suppressed by way of an 
Ersatz-absolute, an identity which would stave off 
acknowledgement of the castration whose effect is 
registered in such an identification. This is to say that 
Glas situates Spirit '~famille'. The identity of Spirit 
is one with the Father, the return-to-self of the speaking 
voice is repatterned according to the development of the 
Hegelian metaphor of the seed and its self-return in a 
phallic 'tree of life'. Furthermore, this Spirit that 
develops out of the paternity of the Christian God is also 
one that embodies the filiation of absolute knowing as Sa, 
its registration of divine immanence and the seedling of 
God is the recognition that it is the anticipation of that 
which has already occured: the self-return of the 
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figurative 'divine' into its self-comprehension in Spirit 
and philosophy according to religion's designation by 
Hegel as philsosophy-implicit. The question of the 
"remain(s)" of Hegel attends to this seed as it seeks to 
memorialize that which renders Spirit incomplete, that 
which precludes the fulfillment of the system's eskaton. 
The methodological 'remainder', then, attends to the 
family and to the teleology of a seed and it will seek to 
record the fall of this seed, its remaining only a part, 
its departure from the circle. This will reverberate to 
the "gl" of the Genet column and its method, whose end is 
the de-legitimation of spiritual paternity, will therefore 
be "a bastard course": 
"a bastard path, then, that will have to feign to follow 
naturally the circle of the family, in order to enter it, 
or parcel it out [partager], or partake of [partager] it 
as one takes part in a community, holy communion, the last 
supper scene, or part [partager] it as one does by 
dissociating". [4] 
Taking as his text 'The Spirit of Christianity and its 
Fate', Derrida develops a reading of "absolute religion" 
which, derived from Hegel's Philosophy of Nature, is 
indissociable from the traditional conception of the 
sexual opposition of active/differentiating masculinity 
and passive femininity. The masculine route of Aufhebung 
is therefore unthinkable without a phallocratic hierarchy 
and thus, for Derrida, the 'implicit' path from religion 
to ethical life follows a logic of 'virtuality' that is -
through and through - masculine/paternal. Glas seeks to 
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reread the 'three-stroke' structure of "speculative 
dialectics" through the prism of the Christian Trinity 
but, in accordance with the method of a general fetishism 
and what Kofman terms its "sexualization of the text"[5] 
and along the route of the Kojevean education which 
teaches that the telos of the system is the "Perfect Man", 
the "God-Man", Glas rewrites the third term - Spirit -
such as to hold it to its family commitments. 
'Speculative identity' is to be thought on the terms of 
the relation of Father and Son. As Derrida writes: "one 
enters the analysis of Christianity and of the Christian 
family elaborated by the young Hegel as the conceptual 
matrix of the whole systematic scene to come"[6]. This is 
to say that the unity of Father and Son expressed in the 
notion of the Trinity is the speculative 'identity' and 
Glas rewrites the Hegelian 'absolute' as this -
transcendental - identity such that "this ~ priori 
infinite synthesis [of father and son] is the condition of 
all synthetic ~ priori judgements"[7]. 
Glas attends to the Christian Aufhebung of Judaism as 
Hegel describes it in 'The Spirit of Christianity'. In 
place of an abstract and remote master, the Christian 
recognises a loving father; in place of a positive law 
with its concomitant discrepancy of duty and inclination, 
the Christian is granted the 'love' which overcomes the 
difference and fulfills the law. What is at issue, then, 
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is Spirit as the identification of finite and infinite. 
The Derridean reading maintains that this takes place in 
Hegel's text thanks to the role of a transcendental 
paternity: the antecedents of the revealed religion fail 
to effect this speculative unity on account of their 
insufficently familial nature. In consequence, the 
maintenance of finitude unreconciled with the infinite is, 
in the terms of Glas, the refusal of the maculine-paternal 
'values' (Creon's law) that are exhibited in revelation -
lucidity, self-consciousness, self-possession, the 
expression of parousia - and this reconciliation thereby 
gathers within the notion of 'Spirit' the family, 
Christianity and Sittlichkeit. The Jew is conceived as 
antinomial on account of his distance from the divine, his 
restriction to the finite, his unfilial relation to an 
'unknowable' father. This is a hard-hearted adherence to 
the law and the maintenance, within a Kantian-structural 
Moralitat, of an unknowable God. The Hegelian fulfilment 
of the law in love and the revelation of the divine as 
such is therefore accomplished as a bringing to light of 
God's paternity. The revealed religion is then the 
revelation of a Father through his off-spring, a relation 
that goes under the name of Spirit and whose 'combination' 
is the speculative identity itself. Glas notes that Hegel 
writes that whilst other religions referred to God as 
Spirit, this could only be realised in Christianity for 
there God - as a Father - is other than himself in His 
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Son; He is thereby revealed as diremptive and conceived in 
the unity of this difference[8]. Derrida glosses this 
strictly within the terms of a controlling paternity and 
insemination, reading the Spirit to the letter - in 
accordance with its familial metaphors and analogies - and 
preparing its construal as a thread or line of 
communication (fil) that is the generation of a 
pha1logocentric identity: 
"The Christian God manifests the concrete spirit, which 
still remained veiled and abstract in Judaism; but he 
manifests this only by becoming a father. The father -
the Jewish God certainly was one - remains an abstract 
universal form, as long as he has no acknowledged son. A 
father without a son is not a father. He manifests 
himself as concrete spirit - and not just anticipated, 
represented, vorgestellt - only by dividing himself in his 
seed that is his other, or rather that is himself as the 
object for himself, the other for him and that then 
returns to him, in which he returns to himself: his son 
[fils]."[9] 
The self-return, the unity of the diremptive God, that 
which sets the Christian religion apart and permits its 
assuming the status of an absolute religion, is the third 
term that is the (self-)knowledge of the divine - the 
Spirit. Thus, for deconstruction, the fil is the Spirit; 
it is what aligns the Father and Son, it is that which 
identifies the different terms and carries itself back to 
the hitherto-abstract universal. If the Jews are as 
stones, needing to be raised by the eagle, if Glas 
rewrites this in accordance with a schema wherein "the 
logic of the concept is the eagle's, the remain(s) the 
stone's"[10], it is evident that this 'concept' is Spirit. 
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The third term of the Trinity, assimilated to the 
grammatological schema as the 'identity' of the difference 
and as the 'self-return' of the universal, is the concept 
which subsumes particularity beneath its identity. As 
Derrida writes that "the knowledge relation that organizes 
this whole scene is a third, a third term, the element of 
the infinite's relation to self: it is the holy 
spirit"[ll], 'speculative dialectics' is configured in 
accordance with the radical dialectic arrested by a 
conservative system. Spirit, defined as the "knowledge 
relation", is synonymous with the conservative-systematic 
impOSition of 'the concept' upon the non-identical. 
Meanwhile, Glas, in accordance with that "sexualization of 
the text", transcribes this concept as the vigilance of 
the Father. In Glas the 'Ego-Spirit' of traditional 
Hegel-critique is departed from but only insofar as this 
'relational' Spirit is, nevertheless, the operation and 
expression of the Father: 
"The spirit is neither the father nor the son, but 
filiation, the relation of father to son, of son to 
father, of father to father through the mediation of the 
son, of son to son through the mediation of the father. 
The spirit is the element of the Aufhebung in which the 
seed returns to the father."[12] 
This seed called Spirit is then taken up as the figure of 
the 'acorn', scattered across Hegel's text and construed 
as the totality of Hegel's system~ Derrida - in a 
reference to the Lacanian letter, attended to in 'La 
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Facteur de Verite', the letter that "always arrives"[13] _ 
finds that "the style is almost a seminar's"[14]: the 
acorn, seed, semen, is determined as a representation of 
the relation to self as it is of the return to self 
"through its own proper production"[15]. Indeed, it is 
this concept of production as self-reappropriation (the 
Kojevean-Cartesian self-certainty which, as 'self-return', 
binds the Lacanian and 'Hegelian' seminars) that governs 
Glas's depiction: the logocentric 'Spirit' joins the 
finite and infinite as the route of a self-knowledge which 
would 'infinitize' the contingent. What is under 
investigation in Derrida's account is, then, the 
production of autonomy or what the deconstruction of Ie 
propre rewrites as 'autonomination'. That the Kojevean 
subject is under (re)construction is not left to doubt 
when Glas sets the discussion of Spirit within the 
'infinitizing' process of self-legislation. The debt owed 
by a spiritual self-filiation or self-insemination to the 
'autonomy' of the abstract, legal person is made evident 
as Glas asserts that "[The human individual] conceives 
itself. Because it has interrupted the natural pressure 
and deprived itself of self-mobility, it has given itself 
law. It names itself, autonamedly [autonommement]"[16]. 
That this (finite) autonomy can be infinitized is thanks 
to the transcendental priority of that infinitude - the 
logic of the seed ensures a 'finitude' which is the 
particularization of the (prior) universal. Derrida's 
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familial Hegel, organizing the system as the logic of 
insemination and the development of the germ and 
construing this circuit as the infinite ~ ~ - the Holy 
Family - rehearses the 'ontotheological' construction of 
the subject: an infinite autonomy. This parasitic 
dependence of the Derridean 'family' upon legal-personal 
'autonomy' can be gleaned from the definition of the 
familial at the outset. Identifying thought with a self-
nomination ("to think is to call, to name oneself"[17]), 
for Glas the family will always be construed as the moment 
of self-proximity and transparency; the Hegelian 
'speculative' will be reduced to a profiteering 
speculation through the self-proper as the oikos, the 
family-economy. Conclusively, Glas situates the family 
within the legal order of private property, its 
construction of the 'autonomy' that is the telos of the 
familiar (the raising, elever, of 'persons'), when Derrida 
writes: 
"Economy: the law of the family, of the family home, of 
possession. The economic act makes familiar, proper, 
one's own, intimate, private. The sense of property, of 
proprierty, in general is collected in the oikeios. 
Whatever the exportation of the concept economy, that 
concept never breaks the umbilical cord attaching it to 
the family~ Or rather yes, it always breaks the cord, but 
this rupture is the deduction of the family belongs to the 
family process as that process includes a cutting 
[cou1ante] instance. The Aufhebung, the economic law of 
abso ute reappropriation of the absolute loss, is a family 
concept." [18] 
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When the infinitizing logic of the family is in question, 
it is this reappropriation that is invoked: the familiar 
as "self-feeling" [19] , as "being-(close)-by-self"[20], is 
positioned as the route of a speculative identity grasped 
as 'love' but configured by deconstruction as Ie propre, 
personality. Derrida describes the moment of love which 
implies the family strictly within contractual terms and 
as such the family is always already a person. The unity 
in difference that love expresses, the unity which is 
inconceivable for Verstand (why? because it could only 
understand a contractual relationship) is therefore 
rewritten by Glas as an exchange relation: the 
psychoanalytic language of personae (of (Er)Setzung) will 
be easily implied within the context of property-bearers. 
In Glas, Hegel's account of the paradox of love is 
translated into the strict and formal recognition of the 
contract: 
"what I count for in love, the price of what I dispossess 
myself of is fixed by what the other finds in me. I am 
only as much as I count for something (ich gelte). I count 
for something for the other, a formula about which we 
would have to agree before concluding any deal [marche] 
whatsoever, good or bad. I speculate here, like the 
other, in order to derive some profit from a contract 
between love as narcissism and speculative 
dialectics."[21] 
This pattern of 'recognition' would, of course, utilise 
the other in the interest of that narcissism. 
"Speculative dialectics" (the 'speculative' arresting the 
dialectic, the dialectic set in train by profiteering 
speculation) are here inscribed within the family circle 
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of love, seeding, and all the figures that account for the 
production of an infinite autonomy wherein the marche that 
is the step or stair is ascended through the marche - the 
deal, the market. Nevertheless, the question of the 
"remain(s)" of the self-presence of love would be invoked 
in - or rather, as - the contract. As elsewhere in the 
text of Glas[22], the contract-signature will effect the 
dehiscence of the infinite subject qua Ie propre: the 
attention to the "ligament" that is the binding of those 
in love, the binding that is conditional upon an infinite 
filiation, upon the love of the paternal God, will be 
attended to in its instability. In accordance with the 
fetishism of the commodity, the contract which guarantees 
the exchange of property effects a loss of that which it 
is employed to secure. To anticipate, Glas finds this 
played out in 'The Spirit of Christianity's account of the 
Last Supper. 
That 'autonomy' or 'autonomination' would preclude the 
general Ersetzung is evident as the exteriority of the 
metaphor is suppressed by the logocentric circuit. In the 
'speculative' logic of insemination and the always-
arriving seed of the family model there is, for Glas, the 
institution of the non-Ersatz which would render 
impossible the talk of 'models' as the involvement of all 
finite models in their infinite arche, their participation 
in the Father, would remove all accounting for 
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metaphoricity. The "Hegelian semiology" of the seed is 
one whose circularity is a self-justification: the 
question of the "remain(s)" and of the metaphor in Hegel's 
system is prompted, and its strategy promoted, by the 
deconstructive end of obtaining its condition of 
(im)possibility - something which the system precludes 
except upon its own terms, except by sweeping all 
'exterior' and transcendental remnants into its circuit. 
That filiation expresses this is, for Derrida, evident 
inasmuch as the finite seed is conditional upon the 
infinite, divine, filiation (the participation of the 
infinite in the finite and, thus, the comprehension of the 
finitude of the 'human' seed). That the general fetish, 
the general Ersatz, which would also go under the name of 
"play"[23], is the question of justification (a 
justification which a system geared to the reinstitution 
of the immanent God finds only within itself), that Glas 
launches an inquiry into the legality of God - the law of 
the Father, the Setzung of the divine-paternal Gesetz - is 
clear when Derrida convenes the court that would try the 
case of God: 
"In the case [cas] - unclassable - of the absolute spirit 
(God), (no) moreplay in that sense. 
The case of God, can that be said? Can the name of God 
be classed? 
If there were a case of God, if God could be taken as an 
example, that would mean that one takes God for a finite 
body, that one is mistaken in making God fall outside what 
God is, that one takes God for another. God, if he is 
God, if one thinks what is being said when one names God, 
can no longer be an example, and the play of substitution 
can no longer be brought about [s'operer]."[24] 
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God is his own justification by way of his Son, the Son is 
justified by the Father and, thus, the operation of 
logocentrism, the suppression of the metaphor as 
grammatology conceives it, is the absorption of the finite 
by the infinite - the finite becomes an infinite-in-
waiting. Equally, the refusal of the 'trace' in the 
complete self-reappropriation of this ontotheological 
family cooperates with the resistance to the 'guastio quid 
juris' of "absolute spirit"~ In this way, then, would the 
transcendental question of the "remain(s)" rescue the 
metaphor and - as "play", "general fetishism" - render it 
the very condition of (im)possibility of that which seeks 
to install, in its 'non-place', infinite self-identity or 
autonomy. The language that is thought on the basis of 
the infinite seed, therefore, just as it ultimately 
disqualifies 'models', so it does metaphorics. 
Furthermore, if the latter is distributed on the side of 
the human and finite and its comprehension is positioned 
on the side of the divine or infinite, then the point of 
exchange between poetics and the absolute, argues Derrida, 
is in Christ - the mediation of the finite and infinite. 
Thus does the question of the "remain(s)" turn to the Son 
as contractual. Christ is the contract struck between 
infinite and finite, love and religion, Father and Spirit. 
"So only the figure of Christ can regulate the productive 
exchange - amortization and gain - between rhetoric and 
ontologie. Investment [Investissement: financial and 
cathectic] of the Holy Family, or rather of the 
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Trinity". [25] 
The figure of Christ the mediator is constructed by G1as 
as the contract between two lives: he is the particular of 
the universal, the son of God, he is the medium and means 
of exchange between the finite life and eternal life. For 
Derrida and the question of the "remain(s)" of Spirit it 
is the Last Supper "scene", transcribed from 'The Spirit 
of Christianity', which is the signing of the contract in 
the bread and wine - the Host configured as the 
"morselling" of the body of Christ. Glas puns on la cene 
('The Last Supper', 'communion') for this is also the 
primal scene of parental copulation which, under the 
mastery of Ie propre, is represented as the union of 
father and son. Spirit qua "filiation" represents the 
cene as autonomination, auto-insemination, self-filiation 
under the law of the Father. This reconstruction of the 
Last Supper alights upon it as the event which both joins 
the Father and Son as the naming of this filiation and 
effects the dehiscence of the absolute Spirit: Glas notes 
that la cene, the event of communion, takes place 'between 
stages'; between love and religion, the Son and the Father 
(that is, prior to the return) and the Father and the 
community-proper., The scene is within the effects of the 
'glas' of religion for the family circle is interrupted -
in spite of the bread-morsel's apparent purpose it does 
not return the believer to unity with the Father. One 
could have anticipated - Derrida is drawn to Hegel's 
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account of the Last Supper because it permits an elision 
of personality and the Unhappy Consciousness: the 
construction of the logocentric subject according to 
private property law is permitted to extend its 
jurisdiction for, in the account of the Last Supper, the 
expropriation of self-property in what was intended to 
secure that propriety - the "morsels" of bread and wine -
cooperates with the sundering of infinite from finite in 
the religious feeling of the death of God. The Last 
Supper enacts the anterior alienation of all 
appropriation. Arising out of this construction, 'Spirit' 
will be construed by Glas as the attempt to stave off that 
expropriation and maintain the unity of infinite and 
finite - God's presence - all, therefore, within the terms 
of a subjectivity defined by/as personality. 
The Last Supper, in Derrida's reconstruction of Hegel's 
account, is both the site of filiation and of the 
"remain(s)". It is the "love-feast" [26]: not yet 
religion, it is nevertheless the occasion of love, it 
respects what Hegel describes as the fulfillment or "the 
pleroma" [27] of the law achieved in Christ whereby (as 
Glas notes) the unrelieved alterity of abstract right and 
Moralitat is overcome in the self-presence of the feeling 
of love. In the deconstructive schema this means that the 
love-feast invokes complete assimilation for "love has no 
other"[28]. The Last Supper is occupied completely with 
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this love - it does not involve adoration or worship, it 
does not unite its common feeling of divine penetration 
with an image and as such is not truly re1igious[29]. 
Thus, as Hegel notes, the meal, the eating, the 
introjection, occurs in an unstable place - it floats 
between a table of friendship and a religious act, its 
spirit is difficult to characterize. Indeed, the very 
'figure1essness' of the feast permits Derrida to give it a 
double site - a situation that is in accordance with the 
logic of "undecidability" and with the "remain(s)" and 
dehiscence of religious parousia. That is, the very 
'paradigmatic' construal of the auto-affective character 
of love and the family would render the figurelessness of 
the feast an anticipation of absolute knowing - just as 
love, the Aufhebung of abstract right, does of 
Sitt1ichkeit. Nevertheless, the insufficiency of this 
love is announced in its transition to religion and, thus, 
the anticipation of Sa is also the restoration of the 
necessity of Bi1d and Vorste1lung - figure, figuration, 
representation, the sign. Derrida attends to the 
'objects' of the feast which are insufficiently religious 
in that they are insufficiently 'objective'. He attends 
to the menu for it is the eating that registers the 
undecidability of the occasion and it is the status of 
what is eaten that holds the feast in this 'between'. The 
interpretation of Hegel's discussion of the Last Supper in 
'The Spirit of Christianity' takes it to be the communion 
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that a common eating always is (the example of the Arab's 
coffee drinking) but more inasmuch as the bread is offered 
with the assertion that 'this is my body'. For the 
deconstructive restaging, the 'interiority' of the love-
feast does attain to an objectivity that is not merely 
symbolic, for 
"something more still happens in transubstantiation. This 
more, to state it briefly, is a certain judicative 
proposition of the type ~ ~ P (this is my body, the wine 
is blood, the blood is spirit) and a certain intervention 
of the father in the discourse". [30] 
The "more" (in Hegel's words, mehr, and Derrida slides the 
trace of the mother, la mere, into the passage) is 
supplied as the paternal annunciation, the (Lacanian) 
"Name-of-the-Father" [31] that ensures this identification 
and idealization.· Transubstantiation would anticipate the 
transition from understanding to speculative reason, from 
a symbolic/allegorical comparison of bread and body to the 
disciple's feeling of a divine penetration in the 
ingestion. This path to the feeling of unity with the 
divine, achieved by ingestion and the resubjectivation of 
the morsels of bread/body and wine/blood, is identified by 
deconstruction as the process of Aufhebung. Furthermore, 
the grammatological interpretation of Spirit is given 
further impetus by the analogy whereby - in a "remarkable 
reflection" - "Hegel compares this penetrating 
resubjectivation to the real movement of the tongue's, as 
language's hearing-understanding-oneself-speak in 
reading"[32]. The would-be 'symbolic' morsel, thanks to 
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the feeling of divinity that comes through the presence of 
the Father at the feast, thanks to the Spirit, is returned 
to the infinite self and Hegel compares this to a reading 
which would - in its comprehension of the letter - cause 
the writing to vanish. This is, then, the 'success' of 
the feast; one of complete ingestion - not a crumb nor 
drop is left over, "the spirituality of the Christian Last 
Supper consum(mat)es its signs, does not let them fall 
outside, loves without remain(s)"[33]. 
Derrida seizes on two instances of the Son's filiation to 
configure and excavate Spirit's "remain(s)" and both 
resound to the 'glas' that announces what Hegel termed 
"the grave of life"[34]. Again, the trace of 'Antigone' 
as the identitarian self-propriety of the family economy, 
the oikos, will once more be shown to be founded on a non-
place, the trace-structure of the tomb, the oekesis, the 
indication of 'flight' and impossible self-presence. This 
is to say that the account of Spirit follows its failure 
to the grave.- This failure of self-return is considered 
to be exhibited in Hegel's account of the insufficency of 
'love' as described by the Last Supper, an insufficiency 
which anticipates the death of God on the religious Good 
Friday. The question of the "remain(s)" is inseparable 
from the form of the Unhappy ('ungluckiche' - a 'gl' not 
disinterred by Glas) or the Comic consciousness. 
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In Hegel's account the very success of the Last Supper is 
its failure[35]: the divine morsel is interiorised and 
swallowed but, with no objective register of this 
penetration, there is left in the believer a feeling of 
the loss of God. In Glas the effect of the right-hand 
column is felt in this discussion of Hegel's Christ~ The 
seed of filiation gives way to an account which is 
informed by and echoes the Genet column's disseminative 
significance, the Last Supper is transcribed by Derrida 
according to the 'monkish' Genet, becoming a picture of 
fellation and a penetration that leaves not the 
impregnation of Spirit but the "gl" of the "remain(s)". 
Derrida focuses on the adventure of the "morsel" the , 
thing, insofar as it supports a general fetishism. In the 
terms of G1as the contract of filiation - the 
'autonomination' that is the naming of unity with the 
Father - is broken as the seal or signature of that union, 
the morsel, acquires an undecidable status. Derrida 
translates the Hegelian account of the insufficiency of 
the love-feast into the 'logic' of undecidability, the 
seal into the Genetic "gl": 
"Consum(mat)ed without remain(s), the mystical object 
becomes subjective again but ceases thereby even to be the 
object of religious adoration. Once inside, the bread and 
the wine are undoubtedly subjectivised, but they 
immediately become bread and wine again, food that is 
digested, naturalized again; they lose their divine 
quality. They would lose it as well, it is true, in not 
being digested. Their divinity stands, very precariously, 
between swallowing [eng10utissement] and vomiting; and it 
is neither solid nor liquid, neither outside nor in."[36] 
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What this excavates is the occupancy, in the very site of 
filiation, of the feeling of Godlessness (Gottlosigkeit). 
The undecidability of the contract-morsel (that which 
would be the guarantee, the condition of possibility of 
the union) contrives, by virtue of its very 
internalisation and assimilation by the finite subject, to 
release what it sought to bind to that subject. Derrida 
alights upon Hegel's account of "the mourning, the feeling 
of loss, of regret (Bedauern), of split (Scheidung) that 
seizes the young friends of Christ when the divine has 
melted in their mouths"[37] and this is, for Glas, the 
"gl" of the Son - a 'lost' semination, a familial seed 
which does not germinate but falls 'to the tomb' (tombe). 
Restaged according to these directions, la cene - the 
primal scene of filiation, signification, the Lacanian 
"Symbolic" - is, however, the 'site' of the "remain(s)" 
and differance. In this construal, therefore, Hegel's 
account of the Last Supper bears with it the 
deconstruction of ontotheological self-presence, 
exemplified in the family-economy. The seed falls: the 
"gl" of the Son describes how the self-identity of "the 
family economy", the oikos, stands over a grave, a tomb -
the oekesis - that is its condition of (im)possibility. 
The question of the "remain(s)" circles the grave, the 
'transcendental tomb' which acts as the sign of the 
constitutive trace or flight of the ontotheological self-
proper. 
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As such, Glas is always at issue with the Hegelian 
construal of Good Friday. As announced in Of 
Grammatology, logocentrism cooperates with a 'negative 
theology' which would contrive to recapture the loss of 
the absolute dialectically, in its negative presence[38] • 
Thus, Derrida's occupation of the transcendental oekesis -
the refurbished "grave of life" - will never be entirely 
continuous with the Hegelian Unhappy Consciousness for, as 
was described in the discussion of the voleur in Genet, 
embracing this 'loss' without nostalgia, the funerary glas 
echoes the 'abyssal' laughter of the comic consciousness -
for this reason the 'gl' of 'das ungluckiche Bewusstsein' 
is unremarked., Not nostalgic, the comic consciousness, 
dissolving the divine in the irony of its absolute 
personality, is therefore akin to the consciousness into 
whom "all divine being returns" but as "the complete 
alienation of substance"[39]. Reconstructed along these 
lines, the "remain(s)" is, then, the indication of the 
comedy of personality - it is the embrace or affirmation 
of the (transcendentalized) loss of substance, that is the 
possibility of essential identity, the possibility of the 
Setzung as only ever an Ersetzung. The construal of the 
speculative Good Friday as the ontotheological 
reappropriation of loss is countered (in terms whose 
'transcendentality' would nevertheless seek to refuse such 
an oppositional stance) by the grave, the "remain(s)", 
which registers the flight, loss, theft of the self-proper 
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- the alienation of personality - and this, in turn, 
cooperates with comic consciousness. The deconstructive 
telos is this alienation of substance, substance conceived 
as subject - the proprietorial subject of bourgeois 
political economy - and, thus, this religious oikesis will 
inhibit the achievement of the subject in Absolute Knowing 
conceived as Sa~ 
........ 
In the Derridean reconstruction of Spirit "the remain(s)" 
and "the grave of life" come to the fore~ Glas maintains 
that the arrival at Sa - the return of the seed - can be 
effected by way of the releve of two occasions of loss, 
what Derrida describes as "Aufhebung first in the heart 
[sein] of Christianity, then Aufhebung of Christianity, of 
the absolute revealed religion in(to) philosophy that will 
have been its truth"[40]. The insufficiency of the Last 
Supper is the need for an object of worship, the necessity 
of religion, whilst the 'figurative' nature of religion -
its infatuation with the alterity of its object - is the 
need for its "relief" in philosophy~ In the terms of 
Glas, only apparently does the seed twice fail to arrive: 
in the philosophical comprehension of this failure - a 
comprehension that is its rescue and success -
conclusively, the seed arrives.· Sa, in the self-
achievement of Spirit, is constructed as the conclusion 
in that Kojevean "perfect Man", that "God-Man", as the 
divine filiation unadorned with the deckings of 
- 173 -
representation, understanding or mere feeling. It is the 
arrival of the seed in its germination of the subject of 
absolute self-possession~ "The Last Supper", Derrida 
writes, "is not yet religion~ Its remains - that is, a 
corpse - are yet to be relieved"[41]~ This is the 
division that the communion gives rise to - instead of a 
return-to-self as the divine morsel, following the course 
of the seed and expressing in itself as much the whole as 
the part, the morsel is lost except as a swallowed 
glutinous substance or, rejected, a globule of matter. 
Glas proceeds to follow the Hegelian overcoming of this 
"gl", this resistance to - or dehiscence of - the 
assimilating subject of Ie propre., It follows the failure 
of feeling and the love-feast to the conclusion of 
religion and the point of arrival of the seed in 
philosophy~ The failure of Jesus to found a conception of 
ethical life, the criticism made by 'The Spirit of 
Christianity', is reread by Derrida as the advent of a 
"new morselling"[42]~ Glas repeats Hegel's account of a 
Christianity compromised in its political entanglements by 
an absolute refusal of mundane ethical ties and 
compensated in its passivity and disappointment by a unity 
with the absolute, the Father, either unthinkably 
primordial or of distant futurity~ The grave of life, 
what recurs throughout Hegel as the expression of a se1f-
consciousness debarred from the thought of the absolute, 
is the place where the disciples are left. In an 
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assertion that is more a remark upon its own schemata than 
a case of exegesis, Glas declares "everything happens 
around a sepulcher"[43]. What the question of Glas 
intends, therefore, is that the Unhappy Consciousness be 
made fundamental to 'the system'. As the registration of 
the dehiscence of an infinite self-presence it takes 
thought from oikos to oekesis and (to repeat), refusing in 
turn the nostalgia of a 'lost' propriety, it converts to 
an Hegelian comic consciousness~ Everything, for 
deconstruction, happens around a sepulchre - this is the 
significance of the "remain(s)" - and thus, within the 
terms of the strict division of infinite and finite, for 
all the attendance upon God, the believers spend their 
time among the remains: "no doubt the memory of the 
rotting body was first effaced in the intuition of the 
glory, but it has returned, was insistent, to the very 
extent the split continued its work"[44]~ Derrida 
continues this transcription, and the concern with the 
remains - as with the unHegelian focus upon 
transubstantiation in its strict figuration - installs a 
faint Roman Catholicism to the discussion: the effect of 
Genet is thereby registered as the Spirit is held back in 
its ascent as the "concept" and philosophy and is detained 
in the reliquary. The transcendental tomb, the index of 
the voleur, is inscribed within Hegel's grave of life and 
gathers around it Genet and the Jews in its expression of 
the dehiscence of the absolute subject, the failure of 
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Christ. From 'The Spirit of Christianity' Derrida 
recounts the sundering of infinite and finite that leaves 
the disciples unable to grasp the immanence of the 
absolute and, adhering to the memory of the sensuous 
presence of the God, they are seen to be thrown back upon 
this very 'empiricalness' in their faith~ Thus is the 
Spirit inhibited, its wings clipped. Glas describes this 
Spirit as the exhalation of death: "[t]he dead body 
resting there in the interminable decomposition of relics, 
the spirit never raises itself high enough, it is retained 
as a kind of effluvium, of gas fermenting above the 
corpse"[45]~ 
Hegel's account of the fate of Christianity, the failure 
of Christ to found ethical life and the consequent 
oscillation of the absolute religion between a degraded 
present and an unpresentable absolute, 'beyond', is 
rewritten by Glas such that it cooperates with the 
familial model of 'Spirit'~ Derrida follows the schema of 
the trace in Glas: the "remain(s)" as the transcendental 
tomb, the no-place that the restricted fetishism of one 
phallic column seeks to deny - these are the directions 
for a restaging of the phenomenological self-inadequation 
of religion. The Father, Spirit as 'filiation', the 
logocentric values of propriety, lucidity and the 
statecraft that they inform (one recalls the production of 
Antigone), all these are to be 'undermined' by the hole, 
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the abyss, upon which this family home is built. The 
insufficency of religion is rewritten as the effect upon 
the Holy Family of the trace of woman and castration and, 
in accordance with the schema of the trace, this effect 
persists as the indefinite - and in(de)terminable -
deferral of Sa. The occasion for this 'sexualization' of 
the passage from the absolute religion to 'Absolute 
Knowing' - the clue - is Hegel's analogy~ Glas cites the 
ultimate paragraph of the Phenomenology's 'Religion': 
"Just as (so wie) the individual divine man [einzelne is 
underscored: ~is Jesus, the historical individual] has a 
father existing in(it)self (ansichseienden Vater) and only 
an actual mother (wirkliche Mutter), so (so) too the 
universal divine man, the community (die Gemeinde), has 
for its father its own proper operation (ih! eigens ~) 
and knowing (Vissen), but for its mother, eternal love 
which it only feels (die sie nur fuhlt), but does not 
behold in its consciousneSS-as-in actual, immediate 
object."[46] 
The opposition of faith and knowledge - the dehiscence of 
the ontotheological subject that is (in the 
grammatological reconstruction) the source of the 
'unhappiness' of consciousness, what is anticipated in the 
abyssal engloutissement of the Host, the flight of the 
infinite which informs "the grave of life" - this is what 
Derrida rewrites, in a sexualization of the text, with the 
aid of the Phenomenology's familial analogy. This 
opposition, for Glas, is to be releve in Absolute Knowing. 
The overcoming of the antithesis of faith and knowledge is 
thereby '(en)gendered'; it becomes the act of masculine 
conceptuality and results in the explication of the 
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hitherto-implicit father - the realization of the paternal 
law, the Name-of-the-Father. 'Spirit' is the Aufhebung of 
the division of infinite and finite and is so in the 
explicit acknowledgement of itself as filiation. As the 
arrival at Sa - complete self-propriety through cognition 
of its unity with the paternal transcendental guarantor -
Spirit brings to light the light, it presents presence: 
Absolute Knowledge as ~, ~ as philosophy (rather than 
religion) is the fulfilment of a phallogocentric family~ 
Derrida sets the scene for the (de)construction of the 
sublation of the division of infinite and finite and the 
passage from religion to philosophy: 
"Now this ultimate split between presence and 
representation, between the for-itself and the in-itself, 
has the form of an inequality between the father and the 
mother, in the relation to the father and the relation to 
the mother., The passage from absolute religion to Sa is 
brewing as the relief of this inequality."[47] 
Glas rehearses this "relief" in its impossibility and 
returns philosophy to 'religion' as the return of 
ontotheology to the the attendance upon the grave of life; 
the self-proper of the family-economy to the tomb - oikos 
to oekesis. The 'virtual', seed-logic of Spirit is also 
the expression of the absolute religion as implicitly 
absolute knowing: philosophy is the truth of religion and 
religion is the representative - before its arrival - of 
philosophy~ Derrida construes the union of religion and 
philosophy in Spirit, a unity conducted, nonetheless, very 
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much by philosophy: the end is the logocentric se1f-
presence of Sa, of which religion must show itself the 
figurative/representational precursor. To excavate the 
"remain(s)" of this implicitly-philosophical religion Glas 
scrutinises its temporality. Derrida magnifies the 
"temporal grammar, [ ••• ] the syntax of adverbs of time and 
negation" [48] which deconstruction's Hegel would permit 
only as figurations - representations of the absolute 
unity of "an eternal or intemporal circle"[49], 
representations which, their particularity grasped, will 
return to that circuit to which they already belong. 
However, the magnification of the time-sense of the link 
of religion and philosophy, focusing on the familial -
that is, Christian-religious - will prevent this return 
and will layout the "remain(s)" of Spirit and Sa through 
the unfulfilled time of religion. Whilst the circle of 
reappropriation is by definition "of the spirit's word, 
its economy, of the property law of the spirit"[50] and 
this is properly 'familial', the alignment of the family 
with the absolute religion (the Holy Family: the 
revelation of a loving Father in his Son, their relation 
in Spirit) nevertheless places the family within the 
sphere of "Vor-stellung". Thus, the family's self-
proximity is affected by division and, in its capacity as 
the religious "anticipatory representation" [51] , it is not 
the expression of Ie propre but rather the index of 
differance. Inasmuch as its 'imp1icitude' expresses the 
- 179 -
absolute-a1ready-there of that which is not yet, or the 
absolute no-more of the yet, this means that 
"the not-there [~-la] cannot be reduced to the circle of 
a family about which what it is and means-(to say) would 
be already familiarly known. On the contrary, the 
absolute essence of the family can be reached only in 
thinking the absolute of the not-there."[52] 
Glas moves stealthily towards the image of a religious-
familial 'completion' or realization occurring only in an 
absolute that is not there, a phantasy of union. Which is 
to say that religion and the family preclude an 'end of 
history' through their maintenance of representation. The 
lesson of the absolute religion is that presence is 
possible only as representation, the representation is 
contained in the absolute that is already not-yet - that 
is, reconciliation 'is' but is not present, self-complete. 
"Presence is present as representation"[53], the family is 
not at one but "has a double focus, a double home, a 
double hearth"[54]. This doubling is the effect of 
differance, it is the registration of time, a 'spacing' 
evoked by the 'step', the 'pace', the trace, of the ~-la 
wherein the incompletion of self-presence betrays the 
necessity of time, constitutive of signification. What is 
underway here is the dehiscence of the logocentric subject 
which would concur with a Kojevean-Hegelian 'end of 
history' as it determined to have "annuled time"[55] in 
absolute knowing. What the magnifying operation of Glas 
seeks to expand and, like cinders after the explosion, 
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reduce to its "remain(s)" is the constitution of the self-
present Spirit and Sa. Through attention to the familial-
religious 'fascination' by the unassimilated object (that 
infatuation with alterity which prevents the Last Supper 
taking place as religion), by way of the time-sense of 
familial-religion in its bearing on ~ and through the 
question of representation in contrast to logocentric 
parousia, Derrida restores philosophy to religion. Sa is 
restored to a religion, moreover, which, resident at the 
grave of life, will hold off from any recognition.of 
absolute Spirit but will dwell 'this side' of the division 
of infinite and finite - will maintain the insuperable 
barrier of faith and knowledge~ Derrida restates this as 
the rescue of religion from ontotheology - the persistence 
of the object in religious Vorstellung enables even the 
Unhappy Consciousness, that is, a negative theology 
elsewhere refused, to take on a "critical" role, to join 
the side of deconstruction: "because it yet has an object, 
a desire, or a nostalgia, absolute religious consciousness 
remains in the opposition, a split. Reconciliation 
remains a beyond~"[56] The Holy Family reflects this, its 
structure of division - actual mother and implicit father 
- has the effect of expropriating the philosophical self-
proper: 
"This dehiscence of the family proper forms an ellipse 
that parts [ecarte] the religious focus from the 
philosophical focus, Christianity from Sa. And if 
philosophy - Sa - was considered to be the myth of 
absolute reappropriation, of self-presence absolutely 
absolved and recentered, then the absolute of revealed 
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religion would have a critical effect on Sa. It would be 
necessary t~ keep to the (opposite) bank,-rhat of religion 
and the fam1ly, in order to resist the lure of ~."[57] 
The trace of the family, then, as in the case of Antigone, 
would be for Glas the preclusion of the success of the 
concept: as familial "religion saves by/from itself"[58]~ 
The division of representation and philosophy, the 
preclusion of the passage into 'presence-proper', thereby 
leaves thought on the side of Vorstellung and this - in 
accordance with Hegel's analogy - would permit its 
'textual sexualization' as the side of the "actual 
mother"~ Derrida rereads the division of the parents of 
the God-child, then, according to the representation of 
presence, according to the religious picture of the 
production of the immanent absolute and the realized union 
of infinite and finite~ The representation of the 
division of the maternal empirical, sensory, finite and 
the paternal ideal, infinite, beyond is translated into 
terms which not only reflect Glas's psychoanalytically-
engendered reading but, in addition, mirror the 
paradigmatic role played by legal personality for Glas. 
The difference of mother and father is taken to be 
"opposition itself"[59] for Hegel - the very structure of 
representation - and, in the maintenance of each term in 
its opposition by a third which would be their 
comprehension, this conceptuality ("conceptuality itself") 
would be "homosexual" just as the structure of this 
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Aufhebung - philosophy out of representation's strict 
duality - describes the paradigmatic role of the 
"Immaculate Conception": "indispensable to the Hegelian 
argumentation, to speculative dialectics, and to absolute 
idealism, it commands what could be called the approach of 
~."[60] Derrida interrogates the Aufhebung of religion 
and representation according to the logic of the 
Immaculate Conception and this figure of maintenance and 
production of independence is inscribed as the siglum 
"IC". As such, it alludes to the imperatif categorigue 
and the sexual difference constructed as opposition is 
regulated by the notion of autono.y. Absolute knowing is 
a masculine phantasy of Ie propre, of union in the Father 
and (thus) self-production: 
"phantasmatic would be the effect of mastery produced by 
the determination of difference as opposition (and up to 
the value of mastery itself), of sexual difference as 
sexual opposition in which each term would secure itself 
the domination and absolute autonomy in the IC: the effect 
- the son (rather than the daughter) comes back to me all 
by myself."[61] 
This is the conclusion of deconstructive Spirit. Its 
construction as 'filiation' registers a self-presence not 
as achieved but as a phantasy of autonomy and unity in 
self-paternity. Glas finds Absolute Knowing and 
Sittlichkeit as produced and patterned by this "IC" - as 
determined by and concluding with this bourgeois-economic 
conception of 'autonomy'. The deconstruction of "aigle" 
maintains that logocentric closure is only possible as 
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Vorstellen, the representation of presence, and thus the 
philosophical conclusion recoiling upon religion, feeling, 
signification, permits the elision of 'philosophy' as ~ 
with the IC - "a phantasm of infinite mastery"[62]. The 
phantasmatic character of the Immaculate Conception and 
its elision with an 'Hegelian' autonomy is, then, the 
logocentric phantasy of self-filiation - truth as self-
presence, adeguatio, Ie propre. Glas can assert (having 
excoriated "the imperialism or the colonialisms or neo-
colonialisms of the .!.Q."[63]) that "truth is the phantasm 
itself. The IC, sexual difference as opposition (thesis 
against thesis), the absolute family circle would be the 
general equivalence of truth and the phantasm. Homosexual 
enantiosis.·"[64] Derrida pushes the impasse of Christ's 
parentage to the point where it chimes with the parodic 
virgin-birth of Our Lady - "virgin born of a virgin, who 
announced himself - he is an archangel - and who says to 
us, in sum, 'I conceive myself without a father, I am 
generated [~ nais as Genet] of myself or of the operation 
of the Holy Spirit', I am my father, my mother, my son and 
myself~ •• "[65] This is the 'conceptuality' that sublates 
the sexual opposition but it is also the effect of Genet, 
the "bastard course" and the affirmation of a general 
fetishism which substitutes for the 'hole', the no-place 
of the mother; it restates the maternal side of feeling 
and biological immediacy, it hands back the child from the 
linguistic-significant-conceptua1 father to the mother. 
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Even as the Immaculate Conception affirms the self-
filiation of the infinite family, then, it registers at 
the same time an absent father (phantasmatic, pas-Ia) and 
thereby displaces the logocentric legitimation that comes 
from paternity (which must always be 'announced', 
nominated)~ Spirit is filiation, the "remain(s)" of 
Spirit bear witness to a phantasy of autonomination. 
Delegitimated, expropriated, Absolute Knowing is returned 
by Spirit to the 'unrelievable' oppositions of religion 
and from there to the Judaeo-Kantian 'sublime mastery' as 
to the "figureless" Lichtwesen that draws a travestied Sa 
towards Zoroastrianism~ 
ii~ Geist or Gesetz: 'The Spirit of Christianity' and the 
law of the "remain(s)" 
Throughout the above reconstruction of Glas I have argued 
that 'Spirit' is patterned according to the metaphysics of 
Ie propre which, in turn, is modelled on private property 
law and its subject, the person. Derrida reconstructs 
Spirit as an identity sealed by contract. Spirit is an 
identity formed according to the logic of the "family 
economy". The notions of 'love' and 'life', evident in 
Hegel's 'Spirit of Christianity', are regarded as 
witnesses to the paternal-familial logic of insemination 
whereby alterity is ultimately returned to identity~ The 
'seed' - the example of the acorn - permits the non-
identical to be designated as particular and swept into 
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the circular self-justifying course of the whole, the 
universal, "the concept". The deconstructive construal of 
Spirit as personality has already been rehearsed, then, 
and the "remain(s)" have been figured as the constitutive 
alienation of this self-propriety, the dehiscence of the 
subject formed by the contract. Indeed, as constitutive 
it is regarded as the contract and as such it is 
"undecidable" - as such is it "the condition of 
(im)possibility"., Finally, the deconstruction of Spirit 
in Glas precludes any closure in absolute knowing as it 
registers the differance of the self-proper in the 
impossibility of eradicating the difference, the time, the 
"spacing" necessary for signification~ This failure of Sa 
is reinscribed as the dehiscence of the absolute identity 
of Spirit by religion: in Glas, Derrida modifies the 
Grammatology's refusal of "ontotheology" by finding in 
Hegelian 'Religion' a "yearning" that enacts a perpetual 
deferral (rather than a dream of completion) of parousia. 
This is the "grave of life" as the means whereby "religion 
saves by/from itself". The eschatological humanism of the 
Kojevean Hegel is prevented from realizing its end - the 
realization of religion in the "God-Man", citizen of the 
bourgeois-revolutionary, Napoleonic State - by the 
impossibility of overcoming 'Vorstellen', by the perpetual 
flight of presence into the beyond, by the impossibility 
of the immanence of the absolute, by the death of God. 
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'The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate' is Derrida's 
main focus. Here is where Spirit can be most easily 
configured as the third term of the Trinity, the relation 
of Father and Son as 'filiation'. From this, the family-
economy - the Derridean oikos - can be explicated as the 
union and indissociability of infinite and finite. In the 
rereading of the essay Hegelian "love" and "life" -
construed as admitting of no alterity - can be aligned, by 
Glas, with speculative identity and contrasted with the 
Judaeo-Kantian law that permits and maintains difference. 
Spirit, as the "pleroma" of law, 'love', and thus as the 
law that fulfils law, is constructed by Derrida as the law 
maintained in accordance with "the concept" - the 
prevailing principle, the prior universal - yet with the 
extension of the jurisdiction of that previous 
'unrelieved' law~ As 'love', the law now governs interior 
space, its commands bear on the internalisation of the 
law. In this context, then, Glas - even as it parodies 
and parades the Kantian law as "IC" - yet shows some 
preference for the legality that restricts itself, that 
resists an internal-policing, that acknowledges the non-
coincidence of duty and inclination. Hegel is configured 
as 'carrying through' the autonomous Kantian subject by 
means of the "annunciation" of the Father, of oneness in 
Spirit. As such, the family economy represents the 
'infinitization' of that autonomy as an "autonomination" 
sanctioned by a divine paternity wherein the unity of 
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finite and infinite takes place by virtue of Spirit-as-
filiation. In short, Derrida nowhere releases "aigle" 
from the cage of positive law. The confrontation of 
Jesus-Hegel and the Judaeo-Kantians (such as Glas directs 
it) will be that between a 'restricted' or 'differential' 
law and one which - acting in the name of the supreme law-
giver - acknowledges no such differences except to annul, 
'fulfill', 'relieve' them. 
Ironically, this deconstructive reading seizes upon a text 
which is concerned with determining and re-reading the 
'spirit' and 'fate(s)' of Christianity as a means of 
avoiding the dichotomous and impositional positive law. 
As I have sought to emphasise, Glas repeats the construal 
of Spirit and Sittlichkeit found in its account of 
Antigone - the "reign of law" constructed according to the 
imposed unity of masculine Gesetz; a Hegel of Setzung and 
"regIe" - even as it reads the Hegelian attempt to think 
ethical life beyond the fixed oppositions of positive law 
and the discourse of Setzung. In his reading of 'The 
Spirit of Christianity and its Fate', Derrida enacts a 
certain protection of positive law whilst reconfiguring 
Hegel as the champion of an absolute statism. As it 
addresses an essay whose concerns - crystallised in 
'Spirit' - are to think beyond the positive legal 
determinations which culminate in 'personality', Glas 
remains unaware of 'Spirit' except in accordance with the 
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elevation of the Kantian moral subject~ Thus, Spirit is 
"autonomination" whilst Sittlichkeit and absolute knowing 
(as ~) are elided with IC. The deconstructive reading 
collapses Hegel into positive law for it possesses an 
incapacity to think other than according to the concept 
(that is, the positive law) of private property, an 
incapacity represented in its generalisation of Ie propre. 
By means of attending to this schema wherein thought would 
be always subsumed under the concept of self-property and 
differance would be the 'contractual' binding and 
alienation of such an identity, one notes that the 
deconstructive Ersetzung does not depart from the logic of 
the Setzung but rather that the latter is in its effects 
an Ersetzung. This is merely to say that a 'positing' 
that is the imposing of a universal remains faithful to 
'difference' inasmuch as it thereby (in its impositional 
character) preserves opposition and substantial non-
identity. Thus does Derrida maintain a certain vigilance 
over the question of law: its fictionality, its personae, 
its representational character all accord with the 
dehiscence of the absolute subject that the Setzung 
(against itself) would promise~ Positive law is the 
enactment of the Ersatz, its Aufhebung in the 
deconstructive-Hegelian "ethical life" would appear to be 
the dream of self-lucidity and the annulment of non-
identity. As such, for Glas, Gesetz must be defended 
against its fulfillment. 
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"Life" and "love" in 'The Spirit of Christianity' are 
received by Glas as shapes of Ie propre - the tree, the 
acorn, self-identity in otherness, etc - yet for Hegel 
they are not metaphors of law but rather ways of re-
uniting the fixed oppositions of duty and inclination, 
mind and nature, freedom and necessity~ They reflect an 
attempt to rethink 'law' such that the social whole is no 
longer regulated according to a principle that, abstracted 
from and representing one aspect of life, is, in turn, 
imposed upon society as 'absolute', as the whole. "Life" 
and "love" are not construed as new 'principles', are not 
to be identified with a new positive law, but are thought 
in the context of Jesus' efforts to found an ethical 
community - one which would eschew the strict legalism of 
the Jews and the 'given', positive or uncognizable law. 
The mistaken identification of ethical "life" with Ie 
propre is clear when one recalls that the propriety which 
Derrida's concept evokes is one that gathers in its 
meaning a "cleanliness"[l] that is a purifying or purging. 
The metaphysics of the proper evokes a 'cleansing' that 
presupposes structural oppositions of the order of 
essential/inessential and this is fundamental to the 
Aufhebung as Glas conceives it - the elevation of the 
"aigle" and the revelation of essence in the stripping 
away of the veil of appearance. ThiS, however, is the 
very structure of positive law - determined by a 
Sittlichkeit that is not, itself, posited and in this 
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context of 'love' and 'life', that is the 'ethical order' 
of Jesus' teachings. As it determines law as the 
imposition of one region of the ethical whole, that of 
possession, over the totality of relations and in the name 
of universality, so Hegel's account describes how all that 
falls outside the designation of 'right' is, in turn, 
experienced as immoral and a source of shame. The 
Phenomenology's account of the passage from the legally 
posited 'absolute self' of abstract personality to the 
Unhappy Consciousness split between a corrupt nature and a 
sense of unity with an inviolate 'beyond' bears witness to 
this path of 'purification' and anticipates discussion of 
propriety and phantasy. "Consciousness", writes Hegel, 
"is aware of itself as this actual individual in the 
animal functions. These are no longer performed naturally 
and without embarrassment [ ••• ] instead since the enemy 
reveals himself in his characteristic shape, they are 
rather the object of serious endeavour, and become 
precisely matters of the utmost importance~"[2] 
This opposition is perpetuated in Ie propre inasmuch as 
the latter bears that 'impropriety' as its self-disgust. 
The Phenomenology describes this scenario wherein "the 
enemy [~ •• ] renews himself in his defeat" as "a 
personality confined to its own self and its own petty 
actions, a personality brooding over itself, as wretched 
as it is impoverished"[3]~ This is the mutuality -
transcendentalised by the priority of one term - of "the 
proper" and the "remain(s)": it is the scenario of Glas. 
However, rather than endorsing the proper-subject and 
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maintaining its domination over the non-identical - the 
scatological construction of what 'falls' from the circle 
of propriety and the methodological deployment of the 
"disgusting" [4] - Hegel seeks to determine it. Equally, 
rather than seek to generalise this 'difference' as a 
means of precluding the self-completion of such an 
'absolute' subjectivity, Hegel seeks to grasp the process 
of abstraction that posits - in Gesetz - such an identity. 
In the 'Spirit of Christianity' "love" is Jesus' response 
to the law of the Jews. Love is the pleroma - fulfillment 
- of the law inasmuch as it is an attempt to take law 
beyond its sheer objectivity and to carry it to the point 
where it is returned to the ethical whole, where it is 
redissolved in the concrete social relations whence it was 
derived. Although in error in its reading of Hegelian 
philohellenism as the erection of a "reign of law", the 
Derridean account is not mistaken when it reconstructs the 
discussion - in particular, the confrontation with 
Jerusalem - as guided by Athens. Jesus' teaching is 
ethical inasmuch as it seeks to found law as "fate". 
Departing from the abstract, positive law where punishment 
remains alien to the transgressor and is imposed upon her 
as a preceding law, this "fate" evokes the Fates - the 
Eumenides - and the law of Antigone. Just as Antigone's 
acknowledgement of her crime and of the ethical whole, the 
"life", sinned against came not through the penalties of 
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the law imposed upon life as an 'absolute' external to it 
but rather through that life, so does the "fate" of 
Christianity in this sense mean an attempt to break with a 
law imposed upon life as a Sollen and to conceive the 
ethical whole such that its 'law' is immanent. Thus, in 
the echo of Antigone's "Because we suffer we acknowledge 
we have erred"[5] one hears the Christian "fate" whereby: 
"When the trespasser feels the disruption of his own life 
(suffers punishment) or knows himself (in his bad 
conscience) as disrupted, then the working of his fate 
commences, and this feeling of a life disrupted must 
become a longing for what has been lost. The deficiency 
is recognised as part of himself, as what was to have been 
in him and is not~ The lack is not a not-being but is 
life known and felt as not-being."[6] 
This is punishment that permits the recognition of the 
ethical whole in that it enacts the re-cognition of self 
and one's relation to that whole in the distress of 
separation, in the agony. Contrary to the elision of 
Antigone's law and differance, this non-identity is not an 
unknowable or transcendentalised state of affairs 
abstracted from the ethical whole and (against all 
Derrida's protestations[7]) thereby itself a concept, a 
'positive law'. The aporia is, rather, determinate - it 
is a 'difference' in life that is felt as such and compels 
the re-cognition of the self and that ethical whole. 
Rather than foreclose on the possibility of self-
determination by imposing a Sollen, "fate" relentlessly 
returns one to oneself and the social whole in the 
consequences of the deed - "the man recognizes his own 
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life, and his supplication to it is not supplication to a 
lord but a reversion and an approach to himself"[8]. 
Punishment as "fate" means, then, that the one who 
transgresses arouses in the damaging of the ethical whole 
as life, life as a "hostile power"[9]~ The machinations 
of this fate are the very actions of the trespasser and 
recognizable as such in that no abstract legal order has 
removed the individual from that whole, fixing her within 
a prior 'identity' and occluding the totality and 
substance of her relations with that social whole. This 
is as the contrast of Gesetz and Sitte. The 'law' as 
customary is consequent upon the deed and not an 
overarching principle which, only conceptual - an 'ought', 
a Sollen - is thereby nowhere existent, alive. Instead of 
the perpetual opposition of the Sollen - an opposition 
inscribed in Ie propre as that ceaseless 'self-cleansing' 
of propriety: the attempt to maintain 'autonomy' at the 
expense of 'heteronomy', purge freedom of necessity -
punishment as "fate" permits the determination of freedom 
insofar as it enacts 'necessity' in and through the free 
act of the trespasser as it returns to her. Thus, in the 
trespasser's suffering in her separation from "life", 
punishment as "fate" effects the re-cognition of the 
inseparability of freedom and necessity: the immanence of 
the ethical in the community. This reconciliation is 
possible because in the opposition of the trespasser and 
the injured there is, nevertheless, a 'communality', 
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"life", and on account of this community the recognition 
of self and the ethical whole is one which does not imply 
the submission of the actual self to a moral imperative 
(the perpetuation of the dominating concept in the 
moralism which submits the 'is' to the 'ought') just as it 
does not evoke the submission of the self to the community 
(the domination of an abstract state, a repressive 
legalism)~ Jesus would evade positive law in that the 
ethical community of Christianity is forged in the common 
feeling of love~ Hegel writes: 
"it is in the fact that even the enemy is felt as life 
that there lies the possibility of reconciling fate. This 
reconciliation is thus neither the destruction or 
subjugation of something alien, nor a contradiction 
between desert in the eyes of the law and the 
actualization of the same, or between man as concept and 
man as reality.· This sensing of life, a sensing which 
finds itself again, is love, and in love fate is 
reconciled."[lO] 
Derrida would conceive this 'love' in strict accordance 
with a 'fulfilled' positive law that is its 
internalization - the subsumption of all difference under 
the proper - and its further determination by Hegel (the 
very inadequacy of Christian love) is appropriated by 
deconstruction as the "morselling" of Ie propre. Whilst 
the "family economy" of love remains to be considered, one 
notes that Glas questions the pleroma of law only in order 
to return it to a 'Law of the Father'. With the further 
dimension provided by its inability to detach Hegel from 
Jesus ('love' in Derrida's estimate is both the principle 
of a Christian Gesetz and paradigmatic for Hegel), Glas 
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considers the restricted economy of love whereby the 
undecidability of two phallic columns - the castration-
structure of 'antherection' evident in the equivalence of 
the Jews' law of 'an eye for an eye' - is overcome by the 
supreme subject, the Father, in the promise of an infinite 
recompense for loss. "Pleroma, the rupture of the 
principle of equivalence"[ll] yet returns to that 
principle at a profit: "forgiveness of sins is also raised 
above the law, that is, above the principle of 
reciprocity"[12]. Punishment as fate cannot be thought by 
Glas except as the dream of appropriation, a profit that 
is conditioned by the transcendental paternity of the 
Hegelian system, the supra-legal Father~ 
This fulfillment of the law in accordance with a divine 
paternity that is revealed - 'nominated' - is also, then, 
for Glas the fulfillment of Judaic law in Spirit. The 
latter's dissolution of positive law in the ethical whole, 
the totality of relations from which the law is 
abstracted, is constructed rather as the participation of 
the particular in the universal - the immanence of the 
absolute - proceeding from the phallogocentric model of 
the 'seed' of the Father~ Within this schema, the 
revelation and recognition of divine paternity is that 
which overcomes the antinomies of law, which, indices of 
'cuts', 'separation' and incision, are interpreted 
according to the logic of castration. Spirit as 
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"filiation" is the 'repair' of damaged integrity, the 
regain of absolute loss by way of the revealed God. Glas 
reads the determination of positive law, submission to the 
'alien' command, according to the loving Father who does 
not threaten castration~ The positive, alien, given, 
unknowable law is, by contrast, the mark of a loss of or 
threat to self-propriety - the threat of castration borne 
by a jealous (zelos, envious and unrevealed) God to whom 
Kant and the Jews would submit[13]., In other words, as 
Spirit is conceived by Hegel as the re-cognition of the 
individual and the ethical whole (rather than the 
sUbsumption of the individual under the alien 'absolute' 
of a given, undeterminable law) it is precisely at odds 
with a 'contractual' identity or relation. As the 
recognition of the partiality of legal categories and of 
the relativity of positive law's 'absolute', Spirit 
eschews the contract as the construction of the self just 
as it does not permit the latter to be thought in strict 
accordance with legal personality~ Rather than identity 
formed by means of any 'contract', therefore, Spirit is a 
structure of social recognition and herein lies the 
connection with the "fate" of Christianity. Just as fate 
permits the ethical whole to be conceived and the very 
relativity of the hitherto 'absolute' law to be grasped, 
so is Spirit the Aufhebung of the Sollen inasmuch as its 
'recognition' is that of the immanence of the absolute in 
place of any supervising concept or 'ought'. Spirit 
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breaks with the antinomies of legalism and moralism -
construed by Glas according to 'castration' and the 
antherection - in that the ethical order does not rely on 
the (im)position, Setzung (or Ersetzung) of the concept 
but, as with Jesus' community of love, self-recognition is 
acknowledged to be possible only through recognition of 
the other and of the totality of relations this implies. 
This is travestied by Derrida in line with a return of 
Hegel to a positive law with a theological bent - the 
construal of divine 'revelation' given the Lacanian-Iegal 
twist in the Name-of-the-Father. By contrast, Spirit, in 
its 'comprehension' of positive law departs from the 
dominating concept, wherein the object would be subsumed 
beneath the practical-rational subject, by way of a mutual 
re-cognition: 
"The hill and the eye that sees it are object and subject, 
but between man and God, between spirit and spirit, there 
is no such cleft of objectivity and subjectivity; one is 
to the other an other only to the extent that one 
recognises the other; both are one."[l4] 
Glas, configuring Spirit as a 'synthesis' of universal and 
particular - themselves rigorously maintained according to 
representation's Father and Son - retains it as 
conceptual, as the dominating subject, the infinite 
personality understood by Ie propre. Derrida, it will be 
recalled, defines Spirit as a "knowledge relation"[lS]. 
That this is the eye which sees the hill, the construction 
of infinite freedom via 'appropriation' of the object, 
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nature, is further underlined by "autonomination" - the 
emphasis placed upon nomination, consequent upon the 
schematic construal of a Hegel in line with the Name-of-
the-Father'. Again, that which 'The Spirit of 
Christianity' seeks to re-think in its 'givenness' is 
reinstated by Glas as the word of the Hegelian seminar. 
In the emphasis on the nomination of paternity Derrida is 
at odds with the essay which, throughout, records love's 
antipathy for naming, judging, ruling~ Glas would return 
Jesus to a positive law elevated as 'the Father's' even as 
this flies in the face of what Hegel describes as Jesus' 
refusal of all 'reflectiveness' in love~ Against the 
(traditional) methodological Hegel in Glas - the 
deconstruction of Hegel registered in the 'gl' of a Roman 
"aigle", upholder of "regIe" - "the living unity" of 
ethical life "will never be able to afford a rule, since 
it never has the force of a universal opposed to a 
particular"[16]~ Against the 'naming' of a Father that 
would return the ethical order to a Symbolic/patriarchal 
order - phallogocentrism - Hegel's essay contains the 
resources to refuse this legalism and 'nomination'. Hegel 
writes that 
"it is a sort of dishonour to love when it is commanded, 
ie when love, something living, a spirit, is called by 
name~ To name is to reflect on it, and its name or the 
utterance of its name is not spirit, not its essence, but 
something opposed to that~"[17] 
The Name-of-the-Father would be a new positive law. Jesus 
does not establish a new law - this is what "fate" 
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signifies. Equally, Hegel does not endorse Jesus' 'love' 
or 'life' as paradigmatic - he no more posits love as a 
new prinCiple than recommends a return to Antigone's law. 
What is adumbrated in the "spirit" and "fate" of 
Christianity is, rather, the re-cognition of positive, 
given, law such that it is determinable in the diremption 
of Spirit: out of the totality of social and ethical 
relations is abstracted the 'absolute' freedom of 
personality - the right of private property - and, with 
this, the antinomy of freedom and necessity, autonomy and 
heteronomy. This latter law is not, therefore, to be 
assimilated to Spirit - even with the aid of a restriction 
of Hegel to religious Vorstellen and divine "filiation". 
Hegel's Spirit is not the submission to a 
renovated/extended ('infinitized') law but the 
possibility, in the philosophical register of 
phenomenological inversion, of the determination of that 
'absolute' positive law in its incompletion and in its 
self-inadequation.· This is to say, Spirit is the ethical 
totality, although not posited in the stead of a 
'relative' law (private property) pretending to 
universality but, in the inversions and contradictions of 
legalism's antinomies, that whole is both illumined and 
obscured as the (non-)identity of 'subject' and 
'substance' is re-cognised and misrecognised~ 
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However, Derrida does not so much present 'love' as 
Hegel's positing of ethical life as establish it as 
paradigmatic for the Hegelian s'entendre parler: "love has 
no other" - its site is identified as the family's and 
"the family economy" permits it to be generalised - whence 
'love' becomes the route of an assimilating Sittlichkeit. 
In the context of Glas, the family is the image of the 
conservative system and - from the 'law of the family' as 
set out in the transcendentalized figure of Antigone to 
the Holy Family that is expressed in the "filiation" that 
is Spirit - 'the family' is the same~ Once more, the 
discourse of "spacing" and "~" - of differing-deferring 
- nevertheless reduces, in a panoptical gaze, the 
difference of the shapes of consciousness to overarching, 
conceptual or ideal types, just as it collapses the 
phenomenological witness that is for-consciousness into 
the philosophical reconstruction that is for-us~ For 
Hegel the family is not the paradigm for speculative 
identity and is not, when grasped in its 'infinity' and 
according to the 'seed', Sittlichkeit~ The family is not 
a general paradigm but - with 'love' - natural ethical 
life~ Furthermore, this does not imply either that the 
family is primary - that it precedes the state - nor that 
it somehow 'emanates' from the state, even if Derrida 
manages to construe it as both. The binocular view of a 
Hyppolitean vitalism and Kojevean humanism[18] means that, 
as in the former case, for Glas the family is the approach 
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to ethical life - the son in the ethical order, Derrida 
writes, "goes into politics"[19] - just as, in the latter 
case, in accordance with its 'seed-logic', the state 
precedes and permits the family. In place of this 
characteristic marriage of the panlogical and the 
anthropological readings, the family qua "the ethical 
spirit in its immediacy"[20] is the attempt to reassert 
the 'reality' of ethical relations in the context of the 
dominance of the concept of abstract law: this 'natural', 
most immediate, bond of family is, for consciousness, the 
most immediate and concrete existence of the ethical 
community. Nevertheless - contrary to the panlogical and 
anthropological readings - Hegel does not represent 
"natural ethical life" as somehow 'detachable' from the 
state, from the totality of social and political 
insitutions, for it cannot be thought without them., 
Indeed, the very presupposition of the latter by the 
family is acknowledged in Glas: "the family economy" 
leaves no doubt that Sittlichkeit is to be thought 
entirely within the horizons of the institutions of 
private property and abstract right. Focusing on this 
unconscious congruence of Glas with Hegel, one can 
reconsider the transcendental turn earlier described as 
'oikos to oekesis', the deconstruction of Hegel as the 
"remain(s)" of "an aigle", as Derrida's attempt to 
excavate of the social relations suppressed by positive 
law. Excluded by Roman legality from the 'true', 'proper' 
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position - not persona but ~ - the position of woman, of 
the sister, of the mother, is seen as a legal 
'apositionality' that permits transformation into its 
conceptual correlate - the transcendental "trace" - just 
as woman as ~, the thing, the property that is the 
'truth' of metaphysical proprietorship, transcendentalised 
is the Ersatz matrix of "general fetishism". Glas turns 
the suppression of the non-legal to its advantage, 
transcendentalising those relations (or rather, those 
'figures' - not sorority but 'the sister') in their 
sitelessness and thereby rendering the legal Setzung 
dependent upon the Ersetzung, upon a fundamental 
inessentiality and 'proper-placelessness'~ The suppressed 
relations - the figures of the feminine - are 
transcendentalised~ The "family economy" is the 
inscription of a Hegel of bourgeois right~ Ethical life 
is assimilated to positive law and - the result - "the 
remain(s)" is Sittlichkeit conveyed to its grave~ 
For Glas, the Last Supper, the primal cene of filiation, 
is the place where patriarchal love is vouchsafed (once 
more the nomination of the Father) and where the route of 
ingestion, introjection, devouring, is confirmed as the 
Hegelian path of infinitization-through-assimilation. The 
insufficiency of (paradigmatic) love is then attended to -
registered by Hegel in the aspect of 'failure' in the Last 
Supper, in love, which resides in the need of alterity, 
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objectivity, and the anticipation in this failure of the 
impossibility of Absolute Knowing as "figureless" Sa. 
Grammatology finds its logocentric Hegel confirmed in that 
"remarkable reflection" whereby the consumption of the 
Host is likened to a reading which reappropriates all 
exteriority, even the written mark~ This appropriation of 
the gramme is constructed as the telos of the 'familial', 
revealed, religion and the insufficiency of love alone is 
regarded as the need for its pleroma - the Aufhebung as 
relever - in a religion whose 'object' prepares it for 
completion in philosophy, self-recognition in Absolute 
Knowing. 'Religion' is configured, then, as the moment of 
difference, enacting love's need of alterity in the object 
of worship and implying the return to an elevated 
loving/familial figurelessness in the comprehension of 
that 'difference'~ Again, Derrida takes the attempt to 
evade the concept of positive law - Jesus' 'love' - to be 
its extension and confirmation~ Again, projecting the 
figurelessness of the love-feast onto Sa, reading the 
"remarkable reflection" as an Hegelian recommendation, 
Glas constructs the inadequation of the absolute to itself 
- here in the shape of love - as a failure of philosophy. 
This is to open the way to the "arche-trace", the 
"condition of (im)possibility", the fundamental Ersatz, 
etc, by collapsing the philosophical determinate negation 
into untutored consciousness' absolute negation and to 
seek out the "remain(s)" by asking after the justification 
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of (that is, construing as 'constitutive') that 'nothing'. 
Once more the one-dimensional, identitarian collapse of 
phenomenological witness and philosophical reconstruction 
conforms with Glas' inability to think other than 
juridically.-
The insufficiency of love, therefore, grasped by Hegel in 
the reconstruction of 'The Spirit of Christianity', is the 
failure of the most immediate community of "feeling" on 
account of its conjoining a sheer interiority on one side 
and an attachment to unmediated sensuousness on the other.· 
On the matter of logocentrism and the appropriated letter, 
Hegel's account is not a 'recommendation' but is the 
implicitly phenomenological account of the necessity of 
the religious object - this is the criticism of 
Christianity and 'feeling' wherein love is not to be 
assimilated to positive law but equally is not to be 
preserved as the philosophical alternative to Gesetz. 
Indeed, it is only as the latter that an Hegelian 
logocentrism - and a Derridean legalism - can be 
maintained in the "remarkable reflection": Hegel would be 
elided with the ethical life of Jesus that he criticises 
for its dissolution of all determinacy (Hegelian 
"figureless" ~), just as Glas would remain faithful to an 
equally indeterminable positivity of the letter. 
Furthermore - and to anticipate - when the Sa, by means of 
the ~, communicates with the 'Es' of the Heideggerian Es 
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gibt Sein, when Derrida travesties 'Absolute Knowing' as 
an ultimate and originary figurelessness and as the 
Zoroastrian Lichtwesen, the sheer interiority of "feeling" 
is brought into coalition with the positivity of the 
'given' law or letter~ This occurs insofar as the 
indeterminability of both establish a transcendental and 
sublime mastery - one which the thought of ethical life, 
the re-cognition of formal-legal identity, will not 
tolerate~ This - as Derrida knows well - is for Hegel the 
collapse of Jesus' "fate" into the antinomies of the Jews, 
the failure to grasp the immanence of 'divine law' such as 
Athens (or Thebes) knew it~ Hegel writes that the 
disciples' 
"relation to the world was bound to become a dread of 
contacts with it, a fear of every form of life, because 
every form exhibits a deficiency (as a form it is only one 
aspect of the whole and its very formation implies fixed 
limits), and what it lacks is a part of the world~ Thus 
the community group found no reconciliation of fate but 
only attained the extreme opposite of the Jewish spirit 
not the middle course of beauty~"[21] 
In the flight of all determinacy, in the sundering of 
infinite and finite, the return of Jesus to the Jews, is 
"the grave of life" that haunts revealed religion and -
need it be repeated? - is registered by the death-knell as 
differance~ The Last Supper, as Glas declares, 
anticipates this 'dehiscence', and is attended by Derrida 
because of the 'undecidable' status of the bread and wine 
as the consequence of the 'interiority' of the experience. 
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In its anticipation of the death of God, the Last Supper 
thereby effects an alienation of that which - according to 
the "New Testament" drawn up as "the new contract entered 
into with religious pomp"[22] - it was intended to 
appropriate., The Hegelian Last Supper concurs with 
deconstruction insofar as it is the love-feast concluding 
with that antithesis of "faith and the thing"[23]~ The 
'materializing' effect which Derrida assigns to the 
'morsel', whereby it fails to be entirely 'spiritualised' 
even in the context of absolute appropriation (the 
"remain(s)" in the "gl" of the swallowed, rematerialized 
thing), is one which, nevertheless, perpetuates the 
opposition of 'matter' and 'spirit', of nature and 
freedom~ In addition, and as the subsequent flight from 
determinacy displays, this not only reintroduces, despite 
Jesus' ethical "fate", a dichotomous structure such that 
freedom is cast into the void but also returns to the 
dominating concept of positive law~ Thus, the embrace of 
the grave of life by Glas - even as it reckons itself a 
'materializing' effect [24] - replays within the structure 
of the Setzung and Gesetz the sundering and fixing of 
finite and infinite, nature and freedom, matter and 
spirit~ This - rather than any respect for alterity and 
non-identity - is to return to the Unhappy Consciousness 
and its experience of a 'spiritless' nature of shame and 
degradation and an indeterminable, abstract, divinity 
commanding a perpetual self-cleansing. Of course the 
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Unhappy Consciousness undergoes a certain transformation 
in the pages (and columns and niches) of Glas. The 
Setzung of a structural opposition of infinite and finite , 
with its - albeit unattainable - telos of their union, is 
discarded by a thought too sophisticated for such 
"nostalgia for presence", for a negative theology~ For 
this reason, the 'concept' of the opposition, its 
positing, itself is never present but, holding the 
fixation of the aporia to its word, this non-identity is 
nominated (conceptualised) only as 'substitutive' - not 
Setzung but Ersetzung~ Within Hegel's discussion itself, 
this structure of general fetishism is exhibited in "faith 
and the thing" and it is its emergence in the context of 
the left-overs at communion that keeps deconstruction on 
the side of religion, that keeps it this side of the 
river, safe from "the lure of Sa" [25]., In 'The Spirit of 
Christianity' the Last Supper, concluding with faith -
where Spirit is present but is in antithesis to the bread 
which 'remains', chewed and swallowed as unassimilated as 
if it were vomited, matter - reveals the incompletion of 
the communion-in-Iove to be its impasse in an unreconciled 
empiricism~ "The love made objective, this subject 
element become a thing, reverts once more to its nature, 
becomes subjective again in the eating"[26]: this echoes 
the general fetish insofar as 'presence' - Spirit as 
'faith' - is incomplete due to the thing and, conversely, 
the thing is not exhausted by the 'concept' of Spirit as 
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~ propre. In this way does a general fetishism cooperate 
with a "radical empiricism"[27] and do both find a certain 
'confirmation' in the Last Supper. Unreconciled and 
'empirical', as the glutinous "remain(s)" the thing 
escapes though configured as the interiorizing, 
appropriating route of identity - auto-affection, love and 
the "family economy". At the same time and according with 
the general fetishism, thought itself (its 'presence' 
unempirical, unrealized) can present itself only as re-
presented, substitutive - within a structure of Ersetzung 
without any non-Ersatz. 
Inspired by the "family economy", Jesus - according to 
Glas's reconstruction of 'The Spirit of Christianity' -
would attain to ethical life, achieve the pleroma of the 
Judaic law, by replacing a Jewish sublime master with a 
Christian father., Grasping this filial relation is the 
fulfillment of the law, the entrance into love. Hegel 
writes that "to the Jewish idea of God as their Lord and 
Governor, Jesus opposes a relationship of God to men like 
that of a father to his children"[28]. The implications 
for Glas of this "filiation" have already been considered, 
yet absent from Derrida's account of the opposition of Jew 
and Jesus is the filiation of this 'filiation'. Glas 
would remove the Jews from the discourse of the familial -
the jealous God would preclude the 'loving father'; the 
father who does not threaten castration and guarantees 
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integrity in that annunciation of paternity in Jesus, a 
"strict fetishism"~ Yet 'The Spirit of Christianity' does 
not embrace an infinite paternity in the way that 
Derrida's schema maintains~ Rather, in the reconstruction 
of Jesus' attempt to found an ethical community not 
subservient to the positive law, Hegel reads the 
relationship of filiation as one that chimes with the 
family as "natural ethical life" - that is, it would 
'rescue' the concrete totality of social relations from 
abstraction or suppression in the categories of law. 
Furthermore, in contrast with the subsumption of this 
'familial' Jesus beneath the family-economy of Ie propre, 
not only is this an attempt to wrest the whole of social 
and political life from the grip of legal 
(mis)representation - and as such at odds with the 
construction of the family according to the law of private 
property - but the source of Jesus' 'familialism' is his 
very re-cognition of the ethical life of the Jews~ The 
filiation of 'filiation' is Jewish. In a passage that 
merits quotation at length, Hegel writes: 
"The most commonly cited and the most striking expression 
of Jesus' relation to God is his calling himself the 'son 
of God' and contrasting himself as the son of God with 
himself as the 'son of man'~ The designation of this 
relation is one of the few natural expressions left by 
accident in the Jewish speech of that time, and therefore 
it is to be counted among their happy expressions. The 
relation of a son to a father is not a conceptual unity 
(as, for instance, unity or harmony of disposition, 
similarity of principles, etc), a unity which is only a 
unity in thought and is abstracted from life~ On the 
contrary, it is a living relation of living beings, a 
likeness of life. Father and son are simply modifications 
of the same life, not opposite essences, not a plurality 
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of absolute substantialities~"[29] 
Of course, just as attending to the Trinity in strict 
accordance with Vorstellen - each term understood in its 
isolation, 'three persons' - will bear out the construal 
of a Hegel of positive law, so the deployment of The-Name-
of-the-Father, whilst schematically indispensable for 
Glas, cannot be seen to be confirmed in Hegel's essay. 
Indeed, Hegel's reading of Jesus' employment of the 
relation of filiation is the attempt to escape that 
sublime law: the 'figure' of the father and of paternity 
is not the invention of Jesus - this is not a case of 
Setzen - but is taken from the patriarchal social order of 
the Jews. The filiation that is Spirit is, then, the 
attempt to think the 'circulation' of the ethical whole 
whereby the 'universal' and the 'particular' are not 
frozen in opposition - to be joined only in the 
unrealizable Sollen or the concept of positive law - but 
rather are each the condition of possibility of the other. 
Again (and contrary to the "fate" - that is, historical 
destiny - of Jesus' teachings) this is to eschew a 
"freedom only in the void"[30] - the absolute without 
determination - and its corrollary, a 'nature' that is a 
region of compulsion and degradation~ The Trinity is the 
attempt to refound ethical life as inclusive of the 
absolute such that the particular, the 'object', 
appearance, is not simply a limit, a restriction, but is, 
rather, essential to the whole as its mediation. 
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The immanence of the absolute as announced in the Trinity 
expresses 'Spirit' as it expresses the re-cognition of the 
relation of the part, the individual, to the (ethical) 
whole - not the primacy of the whole in a suppressive 
legalism (the imperial "aigle" of the Kriegstaat) nor that 
of the individual in an interminable moralism, but the 
mutual acknowledgement of individual and ethical whole.-
Indeed (and again unmentioned by Glas), in contrast to the 
flight of the imperial aigle - the advance of the Kojevean 
Roman-Napoleonic State - and against the construal of a 
Hegel whose Hellenism fuels an eschatological history of 
Recht, 'The Spirit of Christianity' explicates the unity 
of the Trinity and of the "filiation" that is Spirit not 
in accordance with positive law and 'the West' but rather 
in terms which not only censure the occident but, with the 
example of the Arabs, underscore the consideration of a 
region and people that Glas will maintain as schematically 
possible only as objects of hostility for Sa~ Derrida 
writes of Genet who is "among the Palestinians at war", 
who is in a region where "what interests me always takes 
(its/his) place" - a Genet, who "no longer inhabits the 
Judeao-Christian West"[31] and "leaps wherever that 
explodes (~ saute) in the world, wherever the absolute 
knowledge of Europe takes a blow"[32]~ Arabia - or the 
Palestinians who Genet loves because of their 
statelessness, sitelessness, absence from the state-
bUilding march of history[33] - thereby rings the glas of 
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>a. Yet, departing from the aigle of legend, one reads a 
legel who wri tes: 
'Even in the expression 'A son of the stem of Koresh', for 
~xample, which the Arabs use to denote the individual, a 
3ing1e member of the clan, there is the implication that 
this individual is not simply a part of the whole; the 
iho1e does not lie outside him; he himself is just the 
ihole which the entire clan is. This is clear too from 
the sequel to the manner of waging war peculiar to such a 
natural, undivided, people: every single individual is put 
to the sword in the most cruel fashion. In modern Europe 
on the other hand, where each individual does not carry 
the whole state in himself, but where the bond is only the 
conceptual one of the same rights for all, war is waged 
not against the individual, but against the whole which 
lies outside him~ As with any genuinely free people, so 
among the Arabs, the individual is a part and at the same 
time the whole." [34] 
This does not present the advance and elevation of the 
nation-state; this is not the Kojevean-Napoleonic standard 
raised over Egypt~ Hegel contrasts the modern, 1egal1y-
defined relation of individual to the socio-political 
whole, 'person' to the state, to that of the Sitte of the 
Arab~ Overlooking the historical veracity of Hegel's 
construal of this 'custom', what can be noted is that 
despite the attention to the practise of war this is not a 
celebration of the Kriegstaat for this would be, 
precisely, to fall back into a strict 'legalism' - the 
'whole' apart from and dominating the individual. Indeed, 
that this is the experience of the contemporary 'West' (to 
reluctantly remain within the geography of Glas) is 
reflected in this century's practise of war whereby the 
individual - contrary to yet confirming Hegel's estimate -
in accordance with the 'suppressive state', does become 
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identified with 'his' state and, thus, a target. The 
aside that takes in the Arabs is germane to the attempt to 
rethink the fixed, abstract terms of 'individual' and 
'whole' rendered sclerotic by modern, conceptual law and, 
most significantly, to return the figurative and 
representational relation of Father and Son in the Trinity 
to its 'ethical truth'~ This is to grasp the Trinity as 
the triune structure of recognition: Spirit, the 'third 
term', is not a detachable "ligament" nor to be confined 
to religious representation as "filiation"~ Vorstellen 
would keep the universal as the indeterminate abstraction 
of the Father, the particular as itself - sensible 
representation - and the Spirit as the reconciliation of 
God with his creation., In the Trinity is contained the 
comprehension of the 'essentiality' of the particular, the 
finite, its identity-in-difference with the infinite and 
universal in contrast to any domination of the former by 
an indeterminable, 'given' universality~ It is the re-
cognition of the whole by the particular which is part of 
that whole but which, in cognizing its relation to the 
whole and its lack of identity with it, both further 
determines that universal (which thereby ceases to be a 
'sublime' or unknowable abstraction) and is driven by 
the failure of adequation of its concept to its own 
existence - to re-cognise itself (and thus cease to be 
split between nature, heteronomy and freedom, autonomy). 
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Glas, in its attention to "the tree of life", the "acorn", 
and all the metaphors of the family-economy, resolutely 
adheres to Vorstellung.' Indeed, Derrida restricts Hegel 
to representation, construes Absolute Knowing in 
accordance with Verstand - the eskaton of a 'logocentric' 
utopia of sheer (self-)lucidity and abstract identity -
and thus, from this impossible philosophy 'returns' Hegel 
to religion without having once 'departed' from it~ The 
"tree" - as with the family and its metaphors - reflects, 
once again, the contemporaneity of Jesus: within the 
language of nature and 'natural' ethical life is the 
fulfillment of the law expounded. Indeed, this attention 
to Jesus' time, invoking the second meaning of the 
eponymous "fate" - that of the historical destiny arising 
out of the contradictions of the ethical whole - is 
underlined when Hegel addresses Jesus' teachings on 
poverty and the contempt for riches~ The insufficiency 
and distance of Christian love 'for-us' is explained as 
the historical-institutional force of private property 
law, yet at the same time - by a reconstruction of that 
'love' - the contemporary power of property law is also 
recognised: 
"The fate of property has become too powerful for us to 
tolerate reflections on it, to find its abolition 
thinkable~ But this at least is to be noticed, that the 
possession of riches, with all the rights as well as all 
the cares connected with it, brings into human life 
definitive details whose restrictedness prescribes limits 
to the virtues, imposes conditions upon them, and makes 
them dependent on circumstances. Within these 
limitations, there is room for duties and virtues, but 
they allow of no whole, of no complete life, because if 
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life is bound up with objects, it is conditioned by 
something outside itself, since in that event something is 
tacked on to life which yet cannot be its property. 
Wealth at once betrays its opposition to love to the 
whole, because it is a right caught in a cont~xt of 
multiple rights, and this means that both its immediately 
appropriate virtue, honesty, and also all the other 
virtues possible within its sphere, are of necessity 
linked with exclusion, and every act of virtue is in 
itself one of a pair of opposites~"[35] 
This lengthy quotation permits one to reply to Glas for it 
refuses to support a Hegel of Ie propre just as it reveals 
the tacit Derridean schema of disrupting that identitarian 
loving/familial, statist, Hegel with the 
'inessentializing' effect of the thing of property~ One 
recalls Marx's dictum - "where money is not itself the 
community [Gemeinwesen] it must dissolve the 
community" [36]., In keeping with the method of a general 
fetishism that is, rather, the dehiscence of the self-
proper subject according to the logic of commodity 
fetishism, the assimilation of 'love' with Ie propre 
thereby permits the introduction of the the object of 
private property and with it the fracturing of the ethical 
whole into structured and abstract opposition as well as 
into relations of competition maintained by contract~ The 
Derridean general fetishism and radical empiricism propose 
an 'object' - secretly pre-determined by property Recht -
which would be prior to and disruptive of thought qua 
self-propriety~ This is the 'thing' which would escape 
determination (the latter construed as 'appropriation') 
and leave the proprietorial dream of self-presence always 
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operating according to a structure of 'Ersatz-ownership', 
representation instead of presence - a 'substitute-thing' 
which would both suppress and declare the impossibility of 
full propriety~ This is the deconstruction of Sa 
prefigured - as Glas reflects it - in Christian 'love' and 
the "remain(s)" of the Last Supper~ 
Derrida would turn the 'failure' of Jesus' attempt to 
refound ethical life to his own ends - the glas rings for 
the death of God.- Nevertheless, the reconstruction of 
this "fate" of Christianity remains in continuity with the 
deconstruction of infinite personality, Ie propre. The 
mediation of Jesus is figured as 'contractual': he is the 
means of exchange between finite and infinite life~ For 
Glas the infinite and finite must be set forth such that 
their identity is formal and, in consequence, can be de-
constructed by attendance to its formality, to the 
signature on the contract, to the ligament or thread (fil) 
that binds the pair.- The law of this contract remains 
unquestioned - it is transcendentalized - and, as the 
"condition of (im)possibility" (it binds but is the 
dehiscence of the identity), it remains within the 
discourse of Verstand, thinking finite and infinite (and 
reconstructing their union in Hegel) as opposed~ Jesus is 
entombed within the confines of the law he seeks to 
fulfill - and this occurs twice, so to speak. First it 
occurs as the second "fate" of Christianity as Hegel 
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constructs it - the destiny of Jesus' 'love' in its 
inversion through 'infection' by the corrupt actuality of 
the social institutions of his day; faith's assimilation 
of the antinomies of Roman law~ Secondly, it occurs as 
Glas collapses the Hegelian reconstruction into that 
"fate", repeating it as the demonstration of the 
impossibility of escaping the oppositions of abstract 
property law, and these oppositions (in particular the 
effect of res upon persona), concurring with the general 
fetish, will keep thought from straying across the border, 
marked by that river which would divide religion from 
philosophy[37]~ Yet, in contrast to 'love' as the 
'economic' pleroma of the law (a maximization of profit in 
the kingdom of heaven), Hegel's account presents a Jesus 
who commends not the exchange of finite for infinite but 
the "kingdom of God" as the union of finite and infinite -
the immanence of the absolute in the community of love as 
a "living harmony of men", "what is common to all is life 
in God" and "this is not the common character that a 
concept expresses but love, [.~~] a living bond which 
unites the believers"[38]~ This is as close as 
Christianity comes to the law of Antigone - that "middle 
course of beauty"[39]~ As Glas is aware - and upon which 
its 'critique' of Spirit depends - 'love' is insufficient, 
yet, whilst Derrida would render this an epistemological 
and semiological question (the question of an impossible 
'closure': how can signification be possible without an 
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object, knowledge without alterity?), in 'The Spirit of 
Christianity' the impossibility of love's interiority 
bears on the ethical community - bears on the "fate" of 
Christianity and the oppositional structure, the 
Verstellen, of religion~ 
The ethical life of the kingdom of God sees spirituality 
as a "friendship of soul"[40] - the possibility of the 
recognition of each in his/her wholeness in contrast to 
the abstractions of personality and positive law - and the 
unity of the community is found in the love of God., This 
love, according to Hegel, as that which 'binds' the 
community, is to be distinguished from the love between 
individuals., Extending across a community, 'love' is 
weakened both by its new generality and - because Jesus 
has taught the shunning of all ethical ties other than 
this loving union in God - by the absence of all other 
communal institutions., The consequence of the flight from 
determinacy already noted: the inversion of Jesus' attempt 
to depart from the Sollen of the 'concept' of law and to 
find the principles of the ethical in the 'is', in 
actuality, "life", with the "fate" of a sundered 
infinite/finite in the death of God and the return (noted 
by Derrida as a Jesus "decidedly too Jewish"[41]) to a God 
of indeterminable sublimity and of substantial freedom 
only in the void - "phantasmatic"~ This 'love' and its 
fate not only bear witness to the Derridean repetition of 
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Christianity's collapse into positivity, it also evinces 
the generalizing strategem of Glas whereby, beneath the 
concept of a "family economy" is subsumed not only the 
family law of Antigone but also the Holy Family.' 
Similarly, 'love' - identified with this law - would apply 
equally and without distinction to the family in general 
and to the communi ty., Leaving aside the inappropriate 
application of 'love' to Antigone ("True Spirit", 
immediate substance, has no experience of the subjectivity 
of love: "because the ethical principle is intrinsically 
universal, the ethical connection between the members of 
the Family is not that of feeling or the relationship of 
love"[42]), one notes 'love' in its very 'application'~ 
That is to say, love - as the law of the oikos - is 
transformed by Derrida's reconstruction into a general law 
of the text, a concept to which the elements of the system 
must conform, a Sollen designated The-Name-of-the-Father. 
This is the positive law which Jesus attempts to determine 
and sublate but which, owing to his refusal of the ethical 
institutions of his day, is Christianity's fate~ The 
return to this positive law is, moreover, not only a 
'reversion' to Judaism but, more importantly in this 
context, the effect of Rome. Whereas Derrida would find 
the failure of Christian Sittlichkeit to indicate the 
effect of a 'Jewish' differance - the failure of an 
Aufhebung of positive law understood as the impossibility 
of complete self-presence, parousia - and further 
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determine this failure as 'sexualized' in that "Jesus also 
suffers from the divorce of his parents"[43] - that is, 
the split that opens between the "actual mother" and the 
"implicit father" - the influence of Rome upon the fate of 
Christianity goes unmentioned~ Embracing the structure of 
commodity fetishism as 'the effect of impropriety' - the 
"remain(s)" in the Jew and the woman - Glas maintains its 
elision of Hegel and "the metaphysics of Ie propre" by 
gliding over the fatal influence of Rome upon 
Christianity., Derrida thereby restrains the 'dehiscence' 
of the eschatological aigle (the forced identity of Hegel 
and the Roman-imperial "absolute person") as of the "God-
Man" (the blurring of Hegel and Jesus such that the 
absolute person purchases 'infinite life')~ Like the 
text's bad conscience, Rome bears no mention for, although 
Glas arranges matters such that the woman and the Jew 
alienate the self-proper subject, Rome removes Hegel from 
the Kojevean imperium and reminds Glas of its own 
complicity and confinement within private property law. 
In 'The Spirit of Christianity' 'love' produces the split 
of infinite and finite - but not because it is structured 
from the outset as a positive law., As already seen, 
Derrida, despite noting the pleroma of law, never escapes 
from 'love' understood as a commandment. As an attempt at 
complete self-propriety and self-production it is 
identified with IC as both autonomy and Oedipal auto-
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insemination. Similarly, love is seen as annulling all 
positivity, all discrepancy between 'outside' (duty) and 
'inside' (inclination), by an interiorization of the 
former~ Derrida's reading of this move is in line with a 
Hegel subsumed beneath an ('infinitized', 'self-
conscious') categorical imperative. Glas examines Jesus' 
releve of divorce in love: ethical life would train desire 
to be "a desire that no longer desires what it cannot have 
or only desires what it can have", which is translated 
into the demotic "nothing coming from the outside prevents 
you from cheating on your wife, but you no longer want to 
since you love her"[44]~ To return Hegel to positive law 
is - of course - to stage a 'Kantianized' Hegel and the 
repressive 'love' which Derrida here constructs is the 
internalized mastery that Hegel finds loathe some in Kant 
and which 'The Spirit of Christianity' itself takes note 
of as the "partial subjection under a law of one's own, 
the self-coercion of Kantian virtue"[45]~ Hegel writes 
that 
"between the Shaman of the Tungus, the European prelate 
who rules church and state, the Voguls, and the Puritans 
on the one hand and the man who listens to his own command 
of duty, on the other, the difference is not that the 
former make themselves slaves and that the latter is free 
but that the former have their lord outside themselves 
while the latter carries his lord in himself, yet at the 
same time is his own slave.," [46] 
What Hegel finds in Jesus' 'love', in the reconciliation 
of 'fate', is, however, precisely an attempt to overcome 
this 'divine' sublimation of the distress of self-division 
- 222 -
- a sublimation which nevertheless, as an 'ought', 
perpetuates the opposition and its violence - and to find 
a way to afford the recognition of the individual's social 
relations and activities in their completeness, precluding 
the oppositions of universal and particular arising from 
Recht~ The contradictory rights of duty and divorce bear 
witness to the antitheses preserved in the 'union' of 
marriage: 'love' is not the decision in favour of duty (as 
Glas would imply) but rather the recognition of the 
disregard that the positive law pays to the social, extra-
juridical context of the divorce and the promotion of vice 
and injustice that this right compells~ In fate 
punishment falls differently than in right, but there it 
reveals - in the broken whole that is the contradiction of 
duty and right - the substance of an abstract law, its 
injustice. Equally, Hegel does not propose that this fate 
should be 'resisted' by a Sollen, commanding - in 
opposition to the right to divorce - the 'internalized' or 
subliminal duty to love, but rather that the one-sided 
nature of the concept of the positive law should be re-
cognised within the ethical whole, a recognition that 
brings with it the acknowledgement of a justice 'greater' 
than that of the law. Despite Derrida's attempt to 
configure this love as masculine-identitarian by the 
citation of Jesus' qualification of the husband's right to 
divorce "when the wife has bestowed her love on 
another"[47]), Hegel's reading of the pleroma of the law 
- 223 -
is the possibility of determining Recht as vicious - the 
positive, 'undeterminable' law is yet recognised as unjust 
on account of its very masculinity: 
"To cease loving a wife who still loves compells love to 
sin, to be untrue to itself; and a transfer of its passion 
to another is only a perversion of it, to be atoned with a 
bad conscience.· To be sure, in this event it cannot evade 
its fate, and the marriage is inwardly sundered; but the 
support which the husband draws from a law and a right and 
through which he brings justice and propriety onto his 
side means adding to the outrage on his wife's love a 
contemptible harshness~"[48] 
Contrary to Derrida's estimation, 'Ie propre' is 
emphatically included in the account of the absolute 
religion - indeed, it is the 'fate', the destiny, of 
Christianity.· Moreover, this fate of Christianity not 
only enacts that 'dehiscence' of the forced identity of 
the Kojevean Hegel, in addition it repeats the 
deconstruction of Christianity as 'love' - its collapse 
into the antitheses of the Unhappy Consciousness. 
Furthermore, it reflects the second column of Glas: the 
effect of Genet is in evidence. 'Love' fails because, in 
its name, Jesus' 'fulfillment' of the law ultimately takes 
the course of the refusal of all contemporary ethical 
ties: "love" turns against "life" as Jesus teaches an 
indifference to all contemporary institutions - the 
refusal of family and a passive relationship to the state. 
In addition, as this indifference is promoted by a 
revulsion towards the corrupt institutions of Rome[49] , 
the very abstract individualism of the legal order is 
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absorbed by faith: instead of re-cognising the substance 
of existing formal, legal relations "the citizens of the 
Kingdom of God become set over against a hostile state , 
become private persons excluding themselves from it"[50]. 
This flight from determinacy that is the response to 
property's dissolution of the community in Rome - the 
response to the fragmentation and atomisation of right and 
'virtue' in Roman law - echoes the glas of Spirit, it 
chimes with the constructions of the Genet column. 'Love' 
becomes siteless as it turns against mundane ethical 
relations, "life", and in turning against those relations 
such as the ties of family, the fate of Christianity finds 
itself on the "bastard course"~ Equally, in the rupture 
with the world is that 'holiness', already noted in 
connection with the parodic saintliness of Genet's text -
the Ersatz-monkishness that echoes, upon its expiry, the 
message of an impossible community., What was constructed 
in the voleur Genet as the flight/theft of Absolute 
Knowing and Sittlichkeit - the propriety of logocentric 
Hegel - emerges, in a reconsideration of Hegel's 'ethical 
life' and Spirit, as the embrace of the "fate" of 
Christianity as Hegel describes it~ The attempt to found 
substantial, immanent freedom stands inverted such that 
the unknowable law is restored in an indeterminable 
freedom, subsisting 'beyond', whilst the mundane -
divorced from the absolute - is a site of flight or 
yearning, of degradation.- In this Unhappy Consciousness, 
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Genet finds his fiction: here all pretence to 'propriety' 
finds its truth in that 'natural' condition of shame and 
abasement and - in conditions where degradation is, thus, 
the site of spirituality - so, in imitation of Our Lord , 
does a religious text situate itself among the 
"remain(s)", the corruption of the finite, the improper, 
among those who shun the 'ethical ties' of a decadent 
world., 
Finally, religion saves itself from philosophy as the 
result of a 'sexualization of the text'. The divorce of 
Jesus' parents - the "actual mother" and the "implicit 
father" - would repeat a psychoanalytic structure already 
adumbrated by the deployment of the Name-of-the-Father in 
the construction of Hegel's Spirit as "filiation"~ That 
is, just as the Father permits access to signification, to 
the Symbolic, so does this give rise to the escape of the 
sign from the control of the speaking subject: the 
Hegelian seed-logic of a "loving" father who would not 
castrate or cut up, seeks to prevent this 'flight' and to 
maintain the logocentric subject in its integrity.' With 
implicit reference to Lacan's account of Freud's 
'Schreber' Glas addresses the unresolved antinomy of , 
religion - that of faith and knowledge. Derrida attends 
to the 'feeling' of divine presence, of the absolute, and 
the barrier to its realization, to its actual presentation 
in knowledge and constructs this antinomy within the 
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context of the Holy Family in accordance with the 
Phenomenology's analogy., What Derrida finds is that the 
father as "implicit" is, thereby, phantasmatic - there is 
an identification with the father such that I produce 
myself, the hole (castration-anxiety) that is constitutive 
for signification is filled or, more precisely 
'(un)covered'~ The "phantasmatic" Father is therefore 
announced in Spirit, a phantasy of logocentrism, of 
"autonomination": the implicit-father of religion evokes 
Hegel's Sa as a phantasy of self-production which effects 
an Oedipal congress with the mother (I am my own father) 
as it displaces the mother (in "filiation" it is the 
father who is privileged, the mother is "mere 
matter"[51])~ Lastly, this phantasy is the progenitor of 
'difference' as opposition-awaiting-synthesis, the 
identification itself achieved in that active paternity. 
What this construal relies on, of course, is the telos of 
an infinite personality., The 'infinitization' of Kant is 
undertaken as the elision in the ".!.£" of the 'autonomy' of 
the categorical imperative with the Immaculate Conception 
and the amalgamation of the two sigla, Sa and IC, in the 
production of a Hegel for whom there is no theoretical 
correlate to a practical reason now more than 'primary' -
the 'in-itself', the object, is simply 'for-consciousness' 
inasmuch as the latter has posited it., The Setzung, for 
Glas, is thus the infinite annunciation, the Name-of-the-
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Father, the law (Gesetz) of the subject enacted by Spirit 
as filiation.· It has already been seen both that this 
positive law is not germane to Hegel's Spirit and that the 
Ersetzung that Derrida would privilege is the obverse of a 
proprietorial positing. Similarly, in the paternal law 
which posits difference as opposition one does not find 
the synonym of Spirit or Sittlichkeit but rather the 
consequence of positive law: all difference is structured 
according to opposition, according to a prior (legal-
posited) 'concept' to which "life" - the multiplicity of 
ethical relations from which that concept is abstracted -
must conform. Glas would regard this law of the Setzung 
as that of Ie propre and the Father whilst the general 
fetishism of an Ersetzung is the alienation of that 
property in the dissolution of all phantasies of self-
propriety according to their substitutive structure: their 
'truth' is the (un)concealment of constitutive lack, of 
that 'hole', of differance.· Thus, deconstruction turns to 
religion as Vorstellen and finds in the opposition of 
feeling and knowledge - wherein the absolute can only be 
represented, where even the revealed religion fails the 
accomplishment of divine parousia, persisting as a 
fetishism in the presence of an unreconciled object of 
worship - the glas of philosophy, an unpresentable God, 
the repetition of a Jesus "too Jewish" who, instituting a 
Father who nevertheless withdraws from his creation, 
thereby re-establishes a sublime mastery. This 
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construction of a phantasmatic father is the erection of a 
sublime mastery that accords with the Jewish Lord (from 
whom, it will be recalled, the ethical Vorstellen of the 
Christian 'paternity' derives) as it does with the 
undeterminable positive law. 
Inscribed within legal right, Derrida's "phantasm" is a 
sublime mastery which chimes with the Roman "absolute 
person", "the lord and master of the world"[52]. Within 
the telos of Glas this phantasm would restrain the 
positing of Ie propre, maintaining it as the symptom of an 
ontotheological paranoia., However, structured such that 
it speaks as a Sollen (to this end are devoted the textual 
exertions of "IC"), the phantasmatic infinite unity, 
whilst not possible as 'realized', nevertheless guarantees 
a perpetual violence of appropriation as it is imposed 
upon actuality., The rigid adherence to the letter of the 
text - the fixation upon the opposites of an actual mother 
and implicit father - accords with the strategem of Glas 
in that the paternal Sollen will appear impossible by 
virtue of the inversion suffered as it is imposed upon the 
- maternal - actuality~ The logocentric father, 
dependent upon the woman, is nevertheless rendered 
unrealizable by the latter, configured as his "remain(s)", 
his "condition of (im)possibility"~ Derrida's 
'reification' of non-identity - his refusal of all 
determinate negation or speculative identity due to its 
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construal as a quasi-Cartesian restoration of that which 
was negated - achieves a restoration of that which was 
'deconstructed'~ In place of a formal, 'absolute' 
identity is established its condition of (im)possibility: 
in the stead of the subsumptive concept of practical 
reason (wherein the Ego prevails) is the 'concept' of non-
identity~ The fixation of difference - trace, 
transcendental 'nothing', differance - would imagine 
itself in the break with metaphysical opposition, yet just 
as a general Ersetzung is not the discoherence but the 
obverse of practical-legal Setzung (and demonstrates a 
tacit awareness of the inversions of 'positing'), so a 
phantasaatic Sollen does not overthrow the formal subject 
but rather enlightens it as to the 'inescapable' 
oppositions of its condition, inducts a naive voluntarism 
into the oscillations of "undecidability". Concluding in 
the phantasm, differance responds to Ie propre with the 
Sollen: the discourse of positive law has never been left 
and its deconstruction - the "remain(s)" of a 
'proprietorial' Spirit - has served to entomb thought 
perpetually in an ironic self-disgust at that which it 
bears within itself and which it is unable - by definition 
- to comprehend~ Non-identity is set frozen - as if "in 
ice and frost, glass and gel"[53] - as a principle which, 
therefore, cannot preserve itself from conceptuality for 
its very 'flight' (vol) - the "trace" that would remove it 
from its 'proper' place - is the concept's movement of 
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'indetermination' wherein it is detached from the 
agonistics of ethical life - from the totality of social 
relations - upon which it can then only be reimposed even 
if as an aporia made constitutive. The deconstructive 
Sollen of differance - the perpetuation of a 'yearning' 
without hope for presence, an 'ought' under erasure - will 
be only confirmed by pursuing the discussion of the Jews 
in Glas. The consolidation of a Kojevean ~ - the 
absolute knowing that is the citizenship and propriety of 
the absolute state - is witnessed in the deconstructive 
deployment of the "remain(s)" of the Jews as the 
inadmissable of that knowledge/state. However, in concord 
with the dynamics of the fetish of the commodity, this 
'personification' of the Jews as expropriative of that 
propriety evinces - in its embrace of the anti-Semitic 
archetype in response to the 'anti-Semitic' Hegel - the 
very incarceration of the schema of Glas in its own hall 
of mirrors. 
iii. 'On the Jewish Question': Glas, Hegel and the trace 
of the Jews 
In its construal of a Hegel for whom 'Spirit' is the 
phallogocentric seed nurtured by the Christian family, 
Glas follows 'The Spirit of Christianity' in its 
construction of a Jesus "too Jewish". As absolute 
religion cannot be 'relieved' in absolute knowing, so the 
inhibiting element of the Jews is held responsible. 
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Derrida excavates 'the spirit of Judaism' as an absolute 
resistance to the logocentric telos of istoria and 
episteme, as a catastrophe which Hegel attempts to 
contain. Traversing the deployment of the Jew in Glas 
--' 
the reader is drawn to the Derridean construal of Hegel's 
Greece - realm of Ie propre - whose displacement the Jew 
effects. The Hegelian contraries of Jew and Greek are 
exploited by Derrida to refuse the abstract state and its 
'infinite' subject. Nevertheless, the scrutiny of the 
deconstructive misrepresentation of the polis and the 
Jew's "alienation" discloses the manner in which Glas's 
construction of the pair elides with the division of state 
and civil society. Inspection of the contrast of Jew and 
Greek confirms this essay's argument that Derrida enacts 
the refusal of formal universality without its 
comprehension; a refusal expressed in an embrace of the 
sphere of difference - civil society - and the pursuit of 
the course of the commodity which, as "absolute 
alienation", is transcendentalised. Thus, "the Jew" 
expropriates Ie propre - occupies civil society as the 
personification of the commodity - and this dwelling in 
civil society then elides 'alienation' and the inversion 
of formal property law with the resituating of Hegelian 
Absolute Knowledge (as ~) in religion - not parousia but 
the representation of presence, autonomy possible only as 
the "phantasmatic" union of Ie. 
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Hegel-critique has always found the Unhappy Consciousness 
to accord with the construal of Judaism and a monotheism 
without incarnation: subject divorced from substance[l]. 
Glas continues to work within this tradition as it twists 
the tale to accommodate a "grave of life" reconfigured as 
trace, differance and "remain(s)". The echo of the fate 
of Christianity that is heard in the Derridean death-knell 
- the repetition of the 'failure' of love and then 
Absolute Knowledge to achieve complete self-presence - is 
the unfolding of the text as it returns to a divinity 
sublime and non-present, the conclusion of a Jesus 
"decidedly too Jewish"[2]. The absolute religion seeks 
the Aufhebung of Judaism yet cannot get over it. 
Furthermore, for Glas the attempt at the releve of the 
Jews and Hegel's construal of the latter - as 
unreconciled, contrasted with the "beauty" (Schone) of 
Greece, unethical, unfamilial, without right or freedom, 
etc - not only disgorges an anti-semitism of recognisably 
traditional-Teutonic hue but, in addition, expresses the 
telos of speculative dialectics such that its twin goals 
of state-building and infinite parousia are clearly in 
evidence. The Jews, in Derrida's reconstruction, are 
foreigners to the system and, whilst expulsion is not in 
order - the system does not know of an exterior - a 
conceptual conversion must be sought: 'The Spirit of 
Christianity' (still the text that supplies the evidence) 
teaches that the Jew can become free only by becoming 
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Christian[3]. In face of this, for Glas 'the Jews' will 
not permit configuration according to a dialectical 
opposition but will rather refuse these terms whose end is 
the synthesis of infinite self-propriety. Just as the 
"remain(s)" has been seen to reconstruct the Unhappy 
Consciousness according to the deconstructive trace - no 
nostalgia for presence but the indication of a 
transcendental 'nothing' - so the Jews will both confirm 
their traditional site within the system and, furthermore, 
bring the latter to ruin. The Jew, like Antigone and 
woman in the family or proper name, is a figure inscribed 
within Hegel's system yet refusing dialectical opposition 
and, according with the trace, registering the oscillation 
of undecidability. 
'The Spirit of Judaism' - part one of 'The Spirit of 
Christianity and its Fate' - is reconstructed by Derrida 
attending to an identification of the Jews as the spirit 
of non-reconciliation and aligning this with the 'cut' of 
castration. In contrast to the beauty of Greece and the 
reconciliation of Christianity, the Jew is hard-hearted 
and ugly. In contrast with the creation-myth of the 
Greeks - the story of Deucalion and Pyrrha who "made a 
peace of love"[4] and "invited men once again to 
friendship with the world, to nature"[5] - the Jewish 
figures of Noah and Nimrod testify to a "prodigious 
disbelief in nature"[6] resulting in the fixing of an 
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opposition of man to nature and both placed beneath the 
sublime mastery of a God: "both made a peace of necessity 
and thus perpetuated the hostility"[7]. Glas reads this 
Jewish 'ugliness' as the opposition of Hellenic integrity 
to the Jew who is both erect and incised - "stiff, on 
edge, taut in his opposition to maternal nature [ ••• ]. He 
remains cut in two, and the very tragedy of his cut 
[coupure] is ugly, abominable"[8]. Thus does Derrida 
frame the opposition of Athens and Jerusalem within the 
discourse of castration: the opposition of a Greek 
'appropriation', Setzung, law and strict fetishism to a 
Jewish 'expropriation', Ersetzung, the remains of law in 
general fetishism. In addition, therefore, deconstruction 
refers to the Hegelian verdict concerning the difference 
of the Jewish tragedy to that of the Greeks with the 
intention of sounding, in Hegel's unfavourable comparison 
of the former with the latter, the shocking echo of 
contemporary barbarism. Glas cites 'The Spirit of 
Christianity': 
"The great tragedy (Trauerspiel) of the Jewish people is 
no Greek tragedy; it can arouse neither terror nor pity, 
for both of these arise only out of the fate which follows 
from the inevitable slip of a beautiful being (schonen 
Wesens); it can arouse horror (Abscheu) alone. The fate 
of the Jewish people is the fate of Macbeth who stepped 
out of nature itself, clung to alien Beings, and so in 
their service had to trample and slay everything holy in 
human nature, had at last to be forsaken by his gods 
(since these were objects and he their slave) and be 
dashed to pieces on his faith itself."[9] 
For Glas the concept that marches under the eagle-standard 
cannot waste pity on the unnatural Jew and in strict 
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contrast to the Jewish thought of absolute loss - the 
transcendent God - is the tragedy of the Greeks that 
expresses the teleology of an infinite humanism. In this 
reconstruction man is reconciled with nature, the polis 
reconciles man with man, the self-lucidity of Ie propre is 
consequent upon the sufferings exacted in now-recognised 
'fate'. In the conflation of postive law (Ie propre) with 
Greek ethical life, therefore, (and all conducted within 
the terms of "the family-economy") the analogy of Macbeth 
can be maintained as the condemnation of a Jewish refusal 
to abide with self-presence and the proper in contrast 
with the commended Greek state, the "reign of law" that 
embraces the integral subject. Glas, however, does not 
refer to the essay's further citation of Macbeth. There 
the tragedy of the Jews is considered as that of a 
subjectivity - more 'Roman' than the abstract imperium of 
the deconstructive Hegel's Greece - unaware of the arousal 
of fate in its actions, unaware of the consequences of its 
sheer self-centredness. Hegel writes that 
"The illusion of trespass, its belief that it destroys the 
other's life and thinks itself enlarged thereby, is 
dissipated by the fact that the disembodied spirit of the 
injured life comes on the scene against the trespass, just 
as Banquo who came as a friend to Macbeth was not blotted 
out when he was murdered but immediately thereafter took 
his seat, not as a guest at the feast, but as an evil 
spirit."[lO] 
This is to say that, "it is the deed itself which has 
created a law whose domination now comes on the 
scene"[ll]. This is 'punishment as fate', this is the law 
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of Antigone which Macbeth - by contrast - does not 
acknowledge. Macbeth - as the Phenomenology's allusion 
maintains - never learns the duplicity of the command of 
law issued by "the equivocating sisters of Fate"[12]. He 
does not acknowledge the 'hidden' law, custom, in its 
effects of inversion but adheres resolutely (with the 
stiffness and tautness of the Jews or, one might add, with 
the unyielding rectitude of the legal personality) to the 
positivity of the command. Thus, in contrast to an 
'Hellenized' positive law of Ie propre it is this latter 
that most resembles the Jewish coupure. Instead of the 
'cutting' which Derrida would identify with the ex-
propriation of the integral self-present subject of 
Hegelian Greece it is, therefore, the register of that 
'propriety' which not only is determined in the 
dissolution of Greek ethical life - abstracted from it and 
reimposed over the totality of 'life' as a universal - but 
is found to accord with the legalism of the Jew's law. 
Derrida reads 'the Jew in Hegel' as the effect of 
castration, yet the figure "cut in two", instead of 
enacting a movement of oscillation that would thwart the 
appropriative infinite subject in an economy of 
undecidability, is, rather, the one who maintains a rule 
of law against all fatal equivocation. Glas equates 
Hegel's 'fate' with the (ultimate) reconstruction of an 
absolute subject whilst, in the case of the positive law 
of the Jew, transcribes and transcendentalises the 
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inversions of a legislating consciousness, its alienation. 
Hence, in this construal 'the Jew' would be the self-
propriety that in its self-constitution - its cutting 
itself off - shows itself to be no such thing. This 
becomes clearer as one follows Derrida's reconstruction , 
governed as it is by this 'coupure'. 
The coupure of the Jew is - according to Glas -
fundamentally the adherence to a nonmanifest God. The 
absolute that cannot appear, that is cut off from the 
finite, enacts the 'unspiritual' nature of the Jews as it 
does their self-separation, and this exclusivity -
dictated by a 'nothing', a 'dead God' - slips from secure 
self-propriety to absolute expropriation. This is to draw 
the connection between the Unhappy Consciousness and 
castration. The familiar 'return' to the Unhappy 
Consciousness - from the Jews to the Christians with the 
interlude of divine incarnation[13] - is rewritten such 
that attendance to the 'cut' (the transcription of the 
fixed difference, its 'reification') will remove all 
suggestion of the Unhappy Consciousness' absolute 
'recuperation' of lost presence: differance, to repeat, is 
not negative theology~ In its construction of the Jews, 
therefore, parallel to the movement of 'Antigone' in the 
text, Glas sends ethical life from the family-economy to 
the grave of life - from oikos to oekesis. In a reading 
of 'The Spirit of Judaism', the echo of this glas can be 
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heard in the ringing silence of the tabernacle, the Holy 
of Holies, hearth and home of the Jewish people. In 
Hegel's terms, the divorce of infinite from finite in the 
cutting-off of the transcendent God renders all thought of 
the absolute, of the unlimited, as that of sheer 
sublimity: God can 'inhere' in no finite form and, thus, 
that form remains simply matter. For this reason the 
holiest place and centre of Judaism is 'nowhere': there 
can be no present, visible 'site' for the divine. Hegel 
writes, 
"after Pompey had approached the heart of the temple, the 
centre of adoration, and had hoped to discover in it the 
root of the national spirit, to find indeed in one central 
point the life-giving soul of this remarkable people, to 
gaze on a Being as an object for his devotion, on 
something significant for his veneration, he might well 
have been astonished on entering the arcanum to find 
himself deceived so far as some of his expectations were 
concerned, and, for the rest, to find himself in an empty 
room."[14] 
A reflection no doubt as 'remarkable' in Derrida's terms 
as that concerning the ingestion of bread analogous to the 
interiorization and erasure of the letter in reading. 
Indeed, this account appears to confirm a Hegel 
definitively Roman: the "experience of powerful Pompey at 
the end of his greedy exploration"[15] cut short by the 
ungraspable Jewish essence; tearing aside curtains and 
covers, the aigle pentrates the defeated opponent, seeking 
to appropriate, in its difference, the essence of that 
other yet confonting - quite literally - nothing. 
Equally, this 'nothing' would do no less than describe, 
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within 'The Spirit of Christianity', the structure of the 
trace, differance, truth as aletheia, general fetishism, 
etc. In the "arcanum" - translation of 'Geheimnis', for 
Glas "secret, [ ••• ] the family and secret intimacy"[16] _ 
what is supposed to be "the most familiar, secret, proper, 
near, the Heimliche of the Geheimnis presents itself as as 
the most foreign, the most disquieting (unheimliche)"[17]. 
For the Jews the familiar is uncanny; where one might 
expect to find the fullness of the nation's self-presence 
is found sheer vacuity. In Glas, therefore, the Jewish 
temple is reconstructed from Hegel's hostile account as 
the home of differance: the tabernacle is "a signified 
without a signifier"[l8]. The Jewish hearth - its oikos -
is evidence of expropriation which is, in turn, aligned 
with a grave - oekesis. 
The coupure effected in/by the transcendent God - the 
conceptual connection of a nonmanifest absolute and 
castration - is then joined, as ever, to the 
presupposition of private property. This is a conjoining 
which, nevertheless, does not depart from Hegel's account 
but rather confirms that account in its criticism of 
positive, abstract, law~ Derrida concludes from his 
reading of the trace-structure of the tabernacle that "the 
Jewish essence is totally alienated. Its ownness, its 
property would be infinitely foreign to itself [ ••• ], what 
the Jew enjoys is under the seal of expropriation."[19] 
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The Jews do not possess their 'secret': this is no 
negative theology wherein the non-present would, thereby, 
be dialectically presented. Rather, "absolute 
expropriation makes the secret of the sacred inaccesible 
to that very one holding its privileges"[20]. In the 
tabernacle one is returned to a general fetishism, for 
where the object is 'nothing' it cannot be a matter of 
deciding as to its reality or untruth but rather, naming 
the 'hole', the structure where the possibility of 
positing the true thing is obviated, one can only be 
always already engaged in the business of substitution 
without any original non-Ersatz. The trace, truth as 
aletheia - (un)concealment - is the expropriation of Ie 
propre whose law is that of the self-certain Setzung, 
positive law of Gesetz. The tabernacle, wherein the 
uncovering is ceaseless, never arriving at the unveiled 
'true thing itself', is the perpetuity of differance 
whereby the 'whole truth' never appears except as 
deferred, under erasure, as 'a venir', yet-to-come. Just 
as the deconstructive reading of Heidegger follows a 
'trace' which describes how in the ontico-ontological 
difference "all is not to be thought at one go" but is 
derived from "differance, an economic concept designating 
the production of differing/deferring" [21] so the Jewish 
tabernacle leaves a trace to be followed which is the 
trace of/as its truth - a truth which is structured 
according to the oscillation of undecidability, an 
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Ersetzung. This is all configured within the terms of 
"absolute alienation" and "absolute expropriation"[22] _ 
the law of private property: the significance of the Jews 
in Derrida's reading of Hegelian Sittlichkeit is, then, 
that their abstract law assures differance. For Glas it 
is the Greek spirit and ethical 'fate' that posits an 
absolute 'I' whilst the (positive) law of the Jews 
maintains the frustration of that Hellenic eschatology of 
self-appropriation. Indeed, that Hegel is construed as 
'legal' - that is, methodological, applying the afore-
mentioned "regIe" of the text[23] - is witnessed when the 
law of the Jews goes to work on the system. The same 
procedure is adopted by deconstruction as in the case of 
its seizing upon Antigone: having encountered this figure 
of differance - here registered in the general fetishism, 
the 'undecidability' and 'trace' of the tabernacle -
Derrida constructs the Hegelian system as the attempt to 
restrict its effects. In 'undecidability's excess of the 
strict oppositions of determinate negation - for Derrida 
always 'positing-by-negation' - the Hegelian system 
displays a conservative method as it behaves other than it 
'should', as it contravenes its own Sollen, its devoir: 
"One cannot even decide the expropriation, cut through to 
a decision regarding castration, or run after its truth. 
A system's undecidability is here more powerful than the 
value of truth. Like the text of Hegel, Das Unheimliche 
should de-border, should have de-bordered-rdevrait, aurait 
du deborder] the opposition, verily the dialectic, of the 
true!nontrue." [24] 
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Derrida's construction is of a Hegel who modifies his own 
textual law or executes it such that it compels certain 
recalcitrant subjects to conform; the "remain(s)", the 
figures unrecognised - "inadmissable" - by the law. Glas 
deals with Hegel in accordance with the law just as the 
construal of the system's bearing towards the Jew is 
described in terms imbued with the language of the legal-
political. In this construal, Hegel must prevent the Jews 
breaking their defined bounds, leaving their enclosure and 
threatening the construction of Spirit and Sa conceived as 
the maintenance of the economy of decidability's 
"true/nontrue": "Hegel [ ••• ] and his discourse, depends on 
truth" - a dependence which is behind Hegel's trial of the 
Jew - "[w]hence the political accusation hurled against 
the Jew. The Jew cannot become a citizen, he cannot have 
any true laws of State"[25]. A nonmanifest God deprives 
the Jew of truth and with it comes the deprivation that 
equates to the impossibility of proprietorship: everything 
is on loan from God. In the Jew (as Derrida reads 
matters) truth, freedom and ownership are elided. Again, 
Glas alights upon Hegel's deployment of the contrast with 
Greece: the impossibility of ethical life for a people 
dependent on the unknowable command of a transcendent God 
is contrasted with a people whose legality is customary, a 
second nature, and whose ethical institutions are their 
own creation. Nevertheless, in the deconstructive 
transcription of this contrast the focus is upon "property 
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rights"[26] such that the polis is rebuilt by Glas as the 
union of legally-defined property bearers, the polis is 
composed of 'persons'. 
To produce this verdict Derrida alights upon the 
discussion in Hegel's essay of the difference in the 
similarity of the Greek and Jewish restrictions upon 
property-ownership. For Hegel (holding the Derridean 
construal in abeyance for a moment) this is, on the one 
hand - with regard to Greece - a people for whom each 
individual is substantial in his immediacy, a 'citizen' 
(and, one must add, in her immediacy - guardian of the 
family). In the polis each considers the ethical whole as 
transparent and his or her work, whilst conflict and 
transgression are justly punished in a 'fate' recognised 
as one's own action and an avenue back to the violated 
whole. On the other hand - with regard to the Jews -
Hegel conceives of a people for whom the world is 
insubstantial, being dependent on the favour of an 
unknowable master whose prior, codified law is imposed 
from without. The Jews are subject to a God who 
institutes the individual as inessential yet - by virtue 
of his 'command' and the oppositions in which it sets the 
individual to suffer - subjective; a 'particular' 
structurally unreconcilable with the 'universal' to which 
it must neverthelss conform. It is in this context that 
Hegel can contrast an equality based on citizenship with 
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an equality of subjection. A citizenship - one hastens to 
add - that is not (contra Derrida-Kojeve) the one 
informing the citoyen of the Napoleonic-Roman aigle, not 
one defined a priori by abstract law, for it is this - in 
its affinities with the positive law of the Jews - to 
which Greek ethical life is in contrast. 'Citizenship' is 
not posited, is not legislated in advance, but springs 
from substantial ethical life: "[t]he Greeks were to be 
equal because all were free, self-subsistent; the Jews 
equal because all were incapable of self-subsistence"[27]. 
Yet Derrida's account of Hegel characteristically 
maintains the opposition of polis and tabernacle 
(although, construing the Jews according to the 'arche-
trace', as 'abyssal' and within a general fetishism, Glas 
will dispute any 'oppositional' configuration of the two) 
and the Greek is allocated a place on the side of Ie 
propre, of abstract property law~ If Hegel conceives that 
the ethical Spirit of Greece "perish[es] in the condition 
of right or law, ie in the proposition: 'The Self as such, 
the abstract person, is Absolute Being'''[28], Derrida's 
reconstruction remains unaware. Not only does Glas assert 
that "the Greek process founds right and politiCS, 
constitutes family subjects as citizens"[29] but also 
underscores this depiction of the polis as 'legislated 
Sittlichkeit' when the abstract law of private property is 
rendered the sine qua ~ of Greek ethical life: "every 
subject has to have his own proper goods [~ bien 
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propre]"; "if one follows this value of the proper, of 
property (propriete, Eigen, Eigenheit, Eigentum), one must 
conclude that the free citizen's independence and quality 
go on a par with private property"[30]. Glas, self-
consciously scrutinising the Hegelian letter with an 
unrelenting rigour, seems nevertheless (and yet again) to 
find departure from the language of private property law 
impossible. This is to reiterate the irony unconsciously 
attendant upon Glas. The book seizes upon works of Hegel 
whose intent is the determination and evasion of positive 
law and its violence and, reading those works in 
accordance with a schematics of 'Ie propre', Glas 
resituates Hegel within Gesetz whilst, for its part, 
offering "the remain(s)" as that which defies abstract law 
as its undeterminable condition of possibility - what this 
essay has previously characterised as a positive law 'sous 
rature'~ The prior definition of Hegel as exponent of a 
'metaphysics of the proper' means that in Derrida's 
account a 'juridical prejudice' always remains and serves 
to collapse the distinctions such as Consciousness and 
Self-consciousness, Subject and citizen, ethical life and 
right in order that a Hegel of Ie propre might be 
repeatedly justified. 
From this property-right - according to Derrida's reading 
- derives the capacity for statehood which the Greeks 
possess and the Jews lack. Self-propriety, guaranteeing 
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"right and politics", is therefore the possibility of 
self-legislation. Just as the transcendent God of the 
Jews removes the possibility of knowing the law according 
to a model of 'autonomination' (this is Glas's 
'legislating Sittlichkeit' which leads to the elsion of 
"ethical life" with the 'Oedipal' phantasm of union as 
self-filiation in the "1£"), so does the contrast of Greek 
and Jew conform with the confrontation of logocentrism 
with the gramme. It is, writes Derrida, a "question of 
the letter"[31]~ In this reconstruction of Hegel's 
account, as a religion that is the revelation of law, 
Judaism is concerned with the externality of a letter 
oscillating between the poles of a transcendent beyond -
unknowable, it "prescribes acts but enriches our knowledge 
with nothing" [32] - and a Godless world which leaves the 
application of law to a pragmatics of the finite, whereby 
"the scribes are not guided by the spirit of a law. They 
obey empirical rules, precepts and commandments. This 
writing is heteronomic and as this literality remains 
empiric, the prescription can always be violated when the 
situation of forces permits or requires it"[33]. 
This is that "radical empiricity" to which the absolute 
religion gave way: the acknowledgement of the 
impossibility of justifying the Setzung; the devolvement 
of the authority for positing ('deciding') onto a general 
Ersetzung; the ~ priori transcendental condition of 
possibility of signification left to a 'nothing' of 
difference-deferral. The Unhappy Consciousness - as the 
feeling of Gottlosigkeit, the registration of the loss of 
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the incarnate absolute, a 'flight beyond' of truth _ 
inheres in this deconstructive structure and can be noted 
as Derrida describes the 'disincarnation' (so to speak) of 
law: "there is an abyss between the divine all-
powerfulness and the empiric unleashing of forces. No law 
comes to schematize the abyss that leaves the dead letter 
to the scribes"[34]. 
No law, that is, as long as "radical empiricity", "economy 
of undecidability", "general fetishism" are not the names 
of such a law' schematizing' the "abyss".' Indeed, this 
construal relies on the 'alegality' of the letter based on 
its occupation of a finitude divorced from infinite 
justification., In a startling passage which - even again 
- confirms the 'Romanized' Athens of Glas, Derrida 
contrasts an abstract legal order with a social order 
without codified law. Yet this is not, respectively, 
Jerusalem and Athens but vice versa: the subordination of 
the Jews beneath the unknowable command of a sovereign is 
rendered a matter of simple - unlegalized - 'force', 
whilst the customary, substantial and unformalized freedom 
of the Greeks is rendered juridical. 
"So the Jews are all slaves of an invisible sovereign, no 
legal and rational mediation, only heads of tribes 
appearing or disappearing according to the state of 
forces. The powers are real, not juridical."[35] 
Again, the juridical prejudice: Glas cannot conceive of 
ethical life except as mediated according to abstract 
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legal categories. However, here it bears with it the 
significant addition that the radical empiricism grounded 
upon 'justification' - its impossibility - thereby lends 
itself to an extra-legal violence, gives itself over to 
following "the state of forces". Refusing to shore up the 
formal universality of the law, of Ie propre, of the 
state, Derrida's (mis)reading nevertheless drives him into 
an anarchic and opportunistic embrace of a supposedly-
'alegal' and empirical 'force'. What appears to occur 
here is an unconscious adherence to positive law in its 
inversions - this is the celebration of the "letter" of 
the law, adopted due to its expropriative 'effect' upon Ie 
propre - and a conception of that effect as thereby 
'beyond' legality inasmuch as, transcendentalised, it is 
constructed as the non-identity upon which self-propriety 
is founded. The inability to acknowledge Hegel's 'ethical 
life' (its simple elision with the abstract state) means 
that Glas dwells in civil society as a means of excavating 
the "remain(s)" construed as the elements suppressed, 
unrecognised, buried by the formal-legal identity and 
rectitude of Hegelian regle~ The Jew, like Genet, like 
Antigone, would be the "figure inadmissable in the 
system"[36] as the substantial individual suppressed and 
unacknowledged by the abstract universality of prior, 
positive law. The "remain(s)" personify that "abyss" that 
represents the non-coincidence of custom and law, "divine 
all-powerfulness and the empiric unleashing of forces": 
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the former is identified not with an unpresentable (in 
Hegel's terms) ethical whole but with a formal, legally-
defined universal and is thereby collapsed into what Hegel 
means by the latter - the imposition of an abstract law 
upon the whole of life., Equally, wi th custom and law 
conceived not as agonistic but as fixed either side of 
their difference - "the abyss" - the 'empiric' letter is 
reduced to the effect of a positive law which cannot 
recognise itself. 'Radical empiricism' or 'general 
fetishism' fix the unstable difference such that it comes 
to ground their enactment of an ironic Setzung -
fetishism's Ersetzung - and the consciousness of inversion 
in legislation, judgement, Ur-teilung, division, decision, 
cutting, is enroled in a logic of 'castration' and 
'undecidability'~ 
Glas draws the Hegel of a legislating Roman aigle into 
line with the impossibility of the subsumption - all 
conceived within the terms of ascent and 
'spiritualisation' - of the Jews beneath its "concept". 
In addition, for Glas this Judaic departure from legality 
alludes - by attendance to the associations of a certain 
Hegelian simile - to the coupure of castration~ Once 
again, the Jews refuse incorporation into the eschatology 
of ~ and their refusal is the sign of castration and its 
effects. Derrida quotes Hegel's citation of the aquiline 
metaphor from Deuteronomy wherein Moses 
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"compares (vergleicht) the way in which his God had led 
the Jews, through his instumentality, with the behaviour 
of the eagle (de~ Adlers) which w~shes to train its young 
to fly - it contlnually flutters lts wings over the nest 
takes the young on its wings and bears them forth ' 
thereon"[37]. 
Hegel extends this metaphor which - for Glas - brings with 
it not only the meaning that "the logic of the concept is 
the eagle's, the remain(s) the stone's"[38] but also 
echoes the economy of castration and fetishism. Hegel 
writes, 
"the Israelites did not complete this beautiful image 
(Bild); their young never became eagles~ In relation to 
their God they rather afford the image of an eagle which 
by mistake warmed stones, showed them how to fly and took 
them on its wings into the clouds, but whose weight can 
never become flight [vol], whose borrowed warmth never 
burst [eclate] (aufsciiIUg) into the flame of life."[39] 
The 'stoniness' of the Jew is the static and unliving 
character of a people strangers to the vitality of Spirit; 
it is the expression of the ethical exclusivity of the 
Jews, once again the registration of their being cut off, 
their cutting themselves off., The effect of this coupure 
is in line with the Greek analogue that Hegel introduces: 
like the Jews "the Gorgon's head transformed everything 
into stone" [40]., Where Hegel gives an account of the 
removal of the Jews from their neighbours and their 
attitude of hostility to all that was not their own -
"outside the infinite unity in which nothing but they, the 
favourites, can share, everything is matter (the Gorgon's 
head turned everything to stone)"[41] - Derrida exhumes 
the mark of 'castration' by attendance to the associations 
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of the Gorgon. In a supplementary column alongside this 
account in Glas, Freud's discussion of the Medusa's head _ 
conceived as both an expression of the castration anxiety 
and an Ersatz-phallus mitigating the horror - serves to 
situate the Jews within the economy of general fetishism 
and undecidability. In addition, the Freudian verdict 
reconstructs the unspiritual, 'materializing', Gorgon-
effect Jew as a threat of castration. Circumcision - in 
Derrida's view - Hegel glides over, yet 'The Spirit of 
Christianity' regards it as continuous with Jewish 
exclusivity: "[Abraham] steadily persisted in cutting 
himself off from others, and he made this conspicuous by a 
physical peculiarity imposed upon himself and his 
posterity"[42]. For Derrida this convergence of ethical 
exclusivity/hostility and genital mutilation introduces 
the strategem of castration-anxiety and renders the Jews 
explicitly and generally fetishistic: they play out and 
'magnify' the "ruse" of castration. Their exclusivity is 
a self-maintenance in separation from or subjection to a 
transcendent master and this subjection or cutting-off 
grants, in turn, the power of subjection~ The lesson is 
Freud's: "[w]hat arouses horror in oneself will produce 
the same effect upon the enemy against whom one is seeking 
to defend oneself"[43] and thus, 
"the Jew effects (on) himself a simulacrum of castration 
in order to mark his own-ness, his proper-ness, his 
property, his name: to found the law he will suffer in 
order to impose it on others and to constitute himself as 
the favourite slave of the infinite power. By first 
incising [entamant] his glans, he defends himself in 
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advance against the infinite threat, castrates in his turn 
the enemy, elaborates a kind of apotropaic without 
measure~ He exhibits his castration as an erection that 
defies the other"[44]. 
Tracing the role of the Gorgon to Freud's account of 'Das 
Medusenhaupt' enables Derrida to characterize the Jew as a 
threat to systematic integrity. Nevertheless, whilst the 
"ruse, simulacrum and violence"[45] that stave off the 
threat of castration are assigned to the Jews, this is for 
Glas the very method of the Aufhebung; "renouncing life 
and mastery in order to secure them"[46], cutting and 
dividing in advance in order to maintain the whole. The 
Jew would fall short of the latter's success for he can 
secure mastery "only in petrifying the other, only in 
becoming stone himself. Playing so not too badly, he has 
become Medusa to himself"[47]. The Jew would maintain a 
general fetishism against the strict fetishism of the 
Aufhebung.' Whereas the former is always impelled by the 
unrecuperable loss, an event which nevertheless has never 
taken place - the 'absent' God was never present - the 
latter is the identification of the infinite in the 
finite, granted by virtue of an incarnate absolute; a 
'good' loving, uncastrating, unfeared and present Father. 
Thus, against the logic of the eagle - spiritualising 
ascent - is the logic of the stone - petrifying and 
fetishistic. The latter will discohere the dialectical-
oppositional situating of the two terms for instead of the 
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decidability of true/non-true, the stoniness of the Jew 
testifies to a perpetual 'hole' - the transcendent , 
jealous God - which impels a perpetual substitutionality 
and representation without the possibility of absolute 
immanence. The petrifying-effect is the effect of that 
'original' coupure of God from his people, his people from 
their world, their language from its truth., The Derridean 
reconstruction of the Jews within Hegel's thought pursues 
the metaphor of the stone through its associations with 
Medusa - thus is the Jew a threat to the system - up to 
the 'impossibility' of its elevation, whereby the 
"abyssal", alienating character of the Jews renders 
impossible their conscription into the march of history 
and politics understood as the construction of right, of 
Ie propre. Derrida quotes Hegel's view that "all the 
subsequent circumstances of the Jewish people, up to the 
mean, abject, wretched circumstances in which they still 
are today" are the consequences of "their original fate" -
"an infinite power which they set over agianst themselves 
and could never conquer" - thus, "they have been 
maltreated and will continually be maltreated until they 
reconcile it by the spirit of beauty and so relieve 
(aufheben) it by reconciliation"[48]~ Yet, doing so the 
Jews would become Christians; that they have not (and that 
the fate of Christianity is, in a certain way, Jewish) is 
the "remain(s)" of the Jews. It is their expropriative, 
petrifying effect and, as such, the Jew is for Glas 
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"what does not let itself be raised - relieved perhaps but 
denied from then on as Jew - to the height of the Begriff. 
He holds back, pulls the Aufhebung toward earth. The case 
of the Jew does not refer to a past event. He is even 
what as such resists history, remains paradigmatic". [49] 
The eagle is the concept of Ie propre, undertaking the 
ascent to an absolute ethical life grasped as the 
Kojevean-Napoleonic state. Sittlichkeit is interpreted as 
the polis refracted through the prism of Roman property 
law and a bourgeois-revolutionary republicanism~ The 
stone is the refusal of this elevation and the 
gravitational downfall of the eschatology of 
proprietorial, 'personal', Spirit. That this construal of 
Hegel relies on a presupposition of private property law 
with "ethical Spirit" as its justification need not be 
repeated., However, the 'stone' occurs elsewhere in 
Hegel's discussion of Greece and, indeed, Derrida attends 
to it in his transcription of Antigone~ This stone 
concurs with Derrida's yet it demonstrates not the 
frustration of a dominating and abstract universality, but 
rather the refusal of ethical action in and through which 
the very duplicity of 'the law' might be acknowledged. In 
the context of the Phenomenology's discussion of Antigone, 
Hegel describes how the individual, acting in accordance 
with her law, is split; no longer at rest in a "simple 
certainty of immediate truth"[50] but now divided between 
self-affirmation and the external world, the consequences 
of the deed~ Moreover, this 'external world' now reveals 
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to the one who acted her guilt: the law obeyed nonetheless 
infringed the right of the other law - the rectitude of 
the divine law is the errance of the human law. No prior, 
codified principle or command, this hitherto-obscure or 
unacknowledged law is therefore recognised not as imposed 
upon the individual (and thereby perpetually violent and 
antinomial) but arising in the individual's own deed. 
Furthermore, this recognition of the other law, the 
feeling of guilt and estrangement from substantial ethical 
life, comes as a re-cognition of the social whole and that 
which the obeyed-law suppressed. In the context of this 
equivocating fate, wherein ethical action is also guilty 
and where the aspect of 'life' that the law damages gains 
its right - is neither buried under a formal universality 
nor 'contained' in a persistent violence of domination and 
inversion - Hegel is not proposing a teleology of 
appropriative subjectivity by way of 'decision'~ Instead, 
the ethical 'decision' results in that which was other 
than its intention coming to light and, rather than the 
individual recoiling into a 'general undecidability' - the 
'application' of its law has failed or produced the 
contrary result, removed the agent from power and self-
propriety - this other law, the life damaged by decision, 
the legally-unrecognised aspect of the ethical whole, is 
acknowledged., In these terms, guilt cannot be removed 
from the 'right action', as the latter renders explicit 
the equivocation of the ethical. Thus, duplicity and 
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self-separation are avoided only in the pre-defined self-
adherence of the categories of positive law. Here, where 
one is fixed, defined in opposition to the inessential 
'thing' devoid of right, the 'opposition' - the "abyss", 
the difference - is undeterminable for it is obscured by 
the formal identity proclaimed in the subject and rendered 
abstractly 'perpetual' in the structural impossibility of 
reconciliation or re-cognition of (for example) the 
'thing' by the subject. In this sense, then, does Hegel's 
metaphorical stone reflect a certain conception of ethical 
life. Hegel writes that "[i]nnocence, therefore, is 
merely non-action, like the mere being of a stone"[51]: 
the stone 'materialises' - the Jew's "Medusa'ing 
power"[52] - inasmuch as it freezes, catches "as in ice 
and frost, glass and gel"[53], the 'other law', what 
abstract law suppresses~ It accords with positive law 
insofar as its fixity is that of the imposition of the 
universal, the perpetuation of opposition in the 
impossibility of reconciliation - of re-cognizing the 
'hidden law', the life infringed - and the persistent 
sense of arbitrariness and injustice~ Glas transfers to 
this violence and perpetual antagonism the generalised 
'alienation' of self-propriety, the title of "hidden law", 
yet it emerges as the undeterminable command of the 
sublime divinity of the Jews~ The hidden law, rather than 
recognise the relations of positive law, of Ie propre - as 
it does in Hegel's account and as Derrida would have it do 
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in the "remain(s)" conceived as all that is "inadmissable" 
in court - is, nevertheless, for Glas dependent upon 
abstract law. It is not the recognition of the injustice 
of the state's right but rather the hypostatization of the 
discrepancy, and its generalization such that all 
'justice' is to be expropriated, dissolved in the 
transcendentalised lack of identity~ Derrida alights upon 
the Jews for the unknowable command of God most closely 
approaches the nearest that deconstruction can come to an 
'ethical life'. The Jewish coupure that institutes 
obedience to a sublime, separated, God as well as founding 
Jewish self-identity, thwarts logocentric propriety for 
the divine guarantee of self-identity is - on account of 
that 'cutting off' of God - nevertheless, the 
expropriation of self-propriety. The ethicality of the 
Jews for Glas lies in the 'undecidability' of an ego that, 
asserting itself as such, lays itself open to radical 
heterogeneity and an 'ethical' alterity. The ethical is 
contained in this "de-bordering": the ethical is the 
difference, the abyss, the tabernacle where Ie propre -
positing law - is frustrated by the emptiness that is the 
space of the difference between the undeterminable posited 
command and its execution and consequences~ Appropriative 
and dominating-legislating subjectivity would be sent into 
the abyss by an unknowable law. The tabernacle would show 
this law to be the frozen, spatial difference lying 
between the absolute and the finite: the experience of a 
- 258 -
Roman Hegel entering that space is one wherein self-
propriety is expropriated by an 'original' difference that 
one now recognises as the agonistics of Sitte and Recht 
-.;.-....;;..;..;.' 
glassified and rendered transcendental and expropriative. 
Expropriative, the Jew is the resistance and refusal of 
Sittlichkeit as the abstract state., He "remain(s)" for 
that state does not recognise him as he is, the Jew is 
inadmissable for he is incapable of spiritualisation~ 
Strung between a transcendent God and a Godless world, an 
absolute 'nothing' and a "dead letter", the Jew can be 
rescued only by an incarnate absolute and the 
spiritualised letter - which is to say of the Jew's 
spiritualisation: "[i]f he became capable of it he would 
no longer be Jewish. When he will have become capable of 
it, he will have become Christian"[54]~ Consider this 
construal of Hegel: the Jews refuse the telos of state-
building, refuse absolute Spirit as the "reign of law", 
their 'uncanniness' discoheres the 'homeliness' of the 
proper, the self-identity of the ethical citizen and it 
takes effect as an "absolute alienation" of Ie propre. 
The contrast of Athens and Judentum takes shape in 
Derrida's text as the polis is conceived as the conflation 
of the bourgeois state and "ethical life"; Greece unfolds 
the metaphysics of Ie propre according to the formal 
universality of private property law and upon this is the 
citizen's 'homeliness' constructed., At the same time, the 
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Jews are unsubsumable by this law - they are barred as 
such from its jurisdiction - and yet, outside the 
Heimliche polis they would be its condition of 
(im)possibility, trace of the difference upon which 
logocentric identity is constructed. In this 
construction, one notices the architectonics of Young 
Hegelianism~ Through the lense of Kojeve and a left-
Hegelianism whose radical method is devoted to the 
erection of the revolutionary state, Glas reflects the 
concerns of Bauer as Marx's 'On the Jewish Question' 
represents and answers them and it projects those concerns 
onto the facade of Hegel. The state cannot tolerate the 
Jew, the Jew cannot be granted emancipation except upon 
his own emancipation from Judaism - the source of his 
cutting off of himself from the community. Once 
conforming to a Christian state he can then, with his 
fellow citizens, be emancipated from religion tout court. 
Crudely and roughly, this is the deconstructive-Hegel's 
passage from Judaism to the absolute religion to Sa. The 
"remain(s)" of the Jew is the latter's unacknowledgement 
by the state~ In its turn, Glas plays a variation on 
Marx's theme whereby the state, supposedly incapable of 
absorbing the Jew, would be itself absorbed by the Jew -
the formal universality and self-mastery of the citoyen 
would be displaced by the "remain(s)"; gaol-bird, woman, 
Jew, are all those excluded from citizenship yet revealing 
the incompletion of the universal in~. Already it has 
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been seen that the deconstruction of Ie propre pursues the 
suppressed moment of 'alienation' contained in the formal 
universality of the 'person', the appropriative subject of 
private property law~ Already it has been seen that 
Derrida underscores what is taken to be the line between 
the self-propriety of the polis and citizenship and the 
metaphysics of Ie propre., The 'trace' of this propriety -
metaphysical and legal-political - is, thus, the fractured 
echo of the Marxian 'presupposition' of civil society by 
the state: the formal universality of the latter whereby 
"far from abolishing these factual distinctions [of birth, 
rank, education, occupation, property, etc], the state 
presupposes them in order to exist, it only experiences 
itself as political state and asserts its universality in 
opposition to these elements"[55]. Marx responds to 
Bauer's attack on Jewish demands for emancipation -
obviated by their religious incapacity for freedom, a free 
state - with an account of the formality and vacuity of 
union in the state and of the consignment to civil society 
of that for which the anti-semite excoriates the Jews., 
Glas refracts this criticism of Left Hegelianism's state-
worship - brought to its apotheosis for the contemporary 
Hegel-reception in Kojeve - and does so in the freezing as 
the "remain(s)" of the elements of civil society. 
Nevertheless, associating the abstract state with 
Sittlichkeit, Derrida is unable to think further than the 
legality refused - the "reign of law" - and, thus, Glas 
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pursues the frozen figures representative of civil society 
to the point where they assume an 'abyssal' status. Glas 
thus considers that it displaces a 'dialectical' 
opposition by rendering the figures of civil society 
radically expropriative. The "remain(s)" are 
"inadmissable", nothing of Hegelian legality 'should' 
survive them, for Derrida transmutes the fact of civil 
society's 'presupposition' by the state to one of 
transcendental constitution.- The condition of possibility 
of Ie propre lies in the sphere of isolation, mutual 
hostility and estrangement: which is to say, that the 
legal-political Setzung discovers its truth as an 
Ersetzung - the legal 'person' discovers himself as the 
substitute-commodity, is recognised solely as its 
personification~ The echo of Marx sounds in Glas as the 
transcendental alienation of the "remain(s)" configures 
the 'real' individual presupposed by formal law to be, 
itself, illusory, yet - with that law unknowable in its 
generality - this illusoriness must be put down to a 
general undecidability which is 'exemplified' in 
castration-anxiety and fetishism whereby the loss is both 
acknowledged and disavowed - but never determined as the 
fate of positive private property law. 
The Jew, of course, is the figure of this exemplarity: his 
circumcision is the dwelling in an undecidable space - he 
cuts himself off to be 'proper', alienates himself to 
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maintain his integrity~ The undecidability of a general 
fetishism is the simultaneity of (legal) prorietorship and 
(concrete) alienation. The fetishism is that of the 
commodity whereby the right of appropriation is secured 
through self-separation, opposition to an alien and 
'inessential' object and - consequently - subjection to 
it. The exemplarity of the Jews is their personification 
of the self-exclusiveness of civil society and as one 
attends to the deconstructive 'Jew' reflected back through 
Marx's pages, the "remain(s) of a Hegel" are disinterred 
as the intention of Derrida's text to re-position Hegel's 
ethical life in civil society - an intention that would be 
fulfilled in the resituation of Absolute Knowing as 
religion. Personifying the commodity, then, the Jew is 
'expropriative' as the presupposition of the state - in 
the split of civil society and state, the Jew is 
bourgeois, the substance of citoyen~ For Marx - carrying 
through Bauer's criticism to the point where 'the Jew' is 
the bad conscience of the citizen, registration of the 
latter's abstractness - "the bourgois, like the Jew, only 
takes part in the life of the state in a sophistical way, 
just as the citoyen only remains a Jew or bourgeois in a 
sophistical way", adding, "but this sophistry is not 
personal. It is the sophistry of the political state 
itself"[56] Furthermore, this personification of the Jew 
accords with Derrida's attention to a figure of "errance" 
in Hegel, it responds to a nationalist aigle armed with 
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the Aufbebung (whose volkische credentials for Derrida are 
unimpeachable: "a people that has the Aufhebung in its 
throat denies itself as a particular people, strangles and 
depopulates itself, but in order to extend further its 
imperi um and deploy infini tely its range" [ 5 7] ) .' The Jews' 
inability to found ethical life - the fact that their land 
is on loan, is the sublime master's - is, for Glas, their 
expropriation of nationality., This is the significance of 
the tabernacle: there is no Jewish hearth, no self-present 
oikos., Once again, the polis mus t be configured as the 
abstract state and the Jewish "remain(s)" accord with a 
Hegel-out-of-Bauer., Nevertheless, this chimes with the 
Derridean embrace of the commodity and civil society as 
Glas installs the Jew as the personified commodity: the 
expropriative effect of the Jew is the effect of the 
commodity whose Ersatz (as its bearer) 'the Jew' becomes. 
The 'errance' of the Jew - his sitelessness, that desert 
wandering to which Derrida pays such heed - is the 
personification of the commodity just as is the concrete 
alienation of 'propriety' that 'errance' also suggests. 
When Marx writes that "[t]he chimerical nationality of the 
Jew is the nationality of the merchant, of the man of 
money in general" [58] , rather than a hackneyed anti-
semitism what is divulged here is the nationality of 
'errance' as the nationality of the commodity transferred 
to Judentum (the bitter double meaning Marx plays on -
Judaism and commerce), transferred in the personification 
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of the commodity, the reification of the 'person'. As 
such does the Jew in Glas cooperate with private property 
law, as such does the text - in its embrace of the 
universal alienation of civil society - cooperate, despite 
itself, with anti-semitism. That Glas does not recognise 
this - and that such a failure is continuous with its 
generalization and extension of formal property law to all 
conceptual thought as a 'metaphysics of Ie propre' - is 
displayed in its conviction that the "remain(s)" would 
"resist history", that the 'abyssal' structure of civil 
society (as we have transcribed it) would be the grave of 
the state as oikos - formal identity in appropriation~ In 
its pursuit of the expropriation of Ie propre 
deconstruction shadows the commodity, in its congealing in 
ice the Ersatzen of self-propriety - presupposed by formal 
law, substitutes without an 'original' insofar as they are 
the illusory 'persons' posited by the law - it dwells in 
but does not comprehend the alienation of Ie propre. 
Thus, whereas it would conceive the figures inadmissable 
to the system to be the ruin of self-propriety, they are, 
rather, its perpetuation for they are the 
personifica tion (s) of the commodi ty.' As such, the Jews do 
not "resist history" - in Marx's words; "Judaism has 
managed to survive not despite history but through 
it"[59]. Finally, as Derrida collapses Sa into absolute 
religion and returns Jesus to Judaism, Hegel 'remains' in 
civil society for - contrary to the telos of a stately 
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Sittlichkeit - restrained in religion, Hegel cannot attain 
to the realised (although dominating and oppressive) union 
but only to that "phantasm" of union, of autonomy, and he 
cleaves only to the "representation of presence"~ Glas 
rewrites the sundering of ethical life in private property 
law - its split into formal universality, "the idealism of 
the state" and 'personality', and the unacknowledged, 
concrete differences, "the materialism of civil 
society"[60] and the Ersatzen of personification - as 
deconstruction's own deed~ Conflating Sittlichkeit and 
abstract law in 'Ie propre' it then 'displaces' the 
identitarian Spirit by way of its constitutive difference. 
Nevertheless, civil society is imposed unacknowledged as 
the frustration of the abstract state, the violence of the 
former (evident as one considers the transcendentalisation 
of alienation and fetishism in commodity exchange) goes 
unmentioned~ Indeed, it is intimated only as the salutary 
'impossiblility' of parousia and is sanitised by the 
'conclusion' of Hegel in religion - by rewriting Absolute 
Knowing (construed as abstract, "figurelessness"[61]) as 
~ Lichtwesen, the Light Religion, the form of religion 
it would most resemble~ The perpetual, abyssal, 
alienation of Ie propre, the displacement of the self-
identical oikos, is achieved by resituating Kojeve-Hegel 
in "the essence of difference" (civil society) and 
reconfiguring familial-germinative Spirit as religion -
"the spirit of civil society and the expression of the 
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separation and distance of man from man"[62]. The Jew 
secures for Glas the deconstruction of a 'stately' Hegel 
and the 'transcendentalisation' of civil society: religion 
is prepared as the 'concluding' stage of Spirit and 
reconciliation and recognition are possible as only 
phantasmatic, represented, matters of 'feeling'~ 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
'Absolute Knowing' and ~; the Causality of Fate and the 
nremain(s)n of Gesetz 
i. Transfigured Night: from Absolute Knowing to differance 
G1as arrives at no 'conclusion' as such. Rather, it would 
play with the Phenomenology's 'Absolute Knowing' and 
simulate the Hegelian 'closure' in returning the end to 
the beginning - but as the return of impossible se1f-
presence to its condition of (im)possibi1ity. Derrida, in 
G1as, does not depart from the interpretation that 
deconstruction has always taken from Hegel and which has 
always founded itself upon a reception of the last chapter 
of the Phenomenology as enunciating the eskaton of 
metaphysical propriety.' Glas does not quit the construal 
of the "horizon of absolute knowledge" established within 
the terms of the Grammato10gy as "the effacement of 
writing in the logos, the retrieval of the trace in 
parousia, the reappropriation of difference, the 
accomplishment of [ ••• ] the metaphysics of the proper"[l]. 
Thus, the reading of Hegel's "absolute knowing" developed 
in G1as constructs this route of reappropriation as a 
circle in which all is "precomprehended"[2] and configures 
the "remain(s)" of the circuit as the attempt to think 
that which is not subsumed under - "re1evait de"[3] - this 
absolute presence. This remainder is intimated, for 
Derrida, in the very 'completion' of absolute knowing as 
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it renders the question of (its own) time - "annulled" [4] 
in the full self-coincidence of Spirit -
"indecipherable"[5]~ 
Derrida's point is that the Hegelian absolute cannot 
determine that which it depends on and thereby 
demonstrates the impossibility of its 'truth' as absolute 
self-presence. In this incapacity either to conceive of 
this dependence or to dispense with it, the deconstructed 
Hegel evinces the impossibility of this closure~ Glas 
attends to the temporal syntax of the Phenomenology's 
final chapter; the fatal discord of the 'already/not yet' 
which not only marks the refusal of difference to be 
quieted but also opens onto a difference that cannot be 
utilised by dialectical appropriation~ A 'difference', 
moreover, which would situate itself as constitutive of 
all presentation, signification, all 'absolute knowing' 
and, in so doing, render impossible any conclusive 
determination of such a 'site'~ This arche-difference, 
then, insinuated into the syntax of 'Absolute Knowing' 
through the evidence of its need of time, is the 
differance of 'absolute' knowledge., The effect is marked 
by Derrida in a breaking open of the spiritual self-
coincidence of the Phenomenology's conclusion with the 
force of a literality that the claims of Hegel's work (as 
far as deconstruction is concerned) cannot withstand. For 
Glas the Hegelian parousia can only be 'maintained' 
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(underscoring the temporal sense, its punctuality and 
completion in a 'maintenant' and by a 'main-tenant') as 
re-presented, as phantasmatic, as differing-deferred. 
It is in this manner, by way of this 'Vor-stellen' -
convened by Glas as "anticipatory representation"[6] in 
order to preserve that sense of deferral - that Derrida 
manages the 'return' of Hegel to religion: the 
Phenomenology's conclusion is displaced onto its 
penultimate chapter., Nevertheless, taking the course of a 
displacement of its original telos, this return or 
restriction will not - of course - retain unchanged the 
Hegelian determination of the shapes of religion but will, 
rather, adapt them to the ends of expropriation - that is, 
'expropriation' qualified by its generalization as 
effective differance so that such ends can claim no final, 
conclusive, position. Alighting upon the phantasmatic 
character of the absolute religion's logos - addressing 
its sitelessness in the fact of its failure to attain 
self-presence, its restriction to 'representation' - what 
Glas manages, therefore, is to revisit the Grammatology's 
elision of "absolute knowledge" and a Christian-divine 
"'transcendental' signified"[7] (an elision always 
presupposed in the subsumption of Hegel beneath the rubric 
of 'ontotheology') with the consequence of salvaging 
'religion' as the resistance to - the "remain(s)" of - the 
logocentric propre. This is the basis of the claim, made 
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earlier, that in Glas the deconstructive conception of 
religion undergoes transformation. Here 'religion' is 
less recognisable as the Grammatology's negative theology 
- the closest that it may accord with differance yet from 
which the latter must be rigorously distinguished; 
negative theology construed as the dialectical moment of 
'lack' that would be the ante-chamber to presence and 
philosophy [8] - for in the pages of Glas religion 
pertains to ontotheology less as its synonym than as its 
differance. The focus on the time of absolute knowing 
serves to effect the dehiscence of religion from 
ontotheology. The Hegelian releve of religion is the 
"triumphal moment of mourning" [9] regulated by the diurnal 
law: for Derrida it is the bringing-to-light of the 
unconscious, the passage from the darkness of the tomb to 
the pure light of parousia and self-transparency. This 
relief is made impossible by the necessity of time, a time 
that is constituted by and posterior to differance[lO]. 
Equally, the deathly 'nothing' of this transcendental 
condition of signification's possibility is respected in 
the (unrelieved) religious persistence in mourning. There 
is a maintenance of mourning insofar as death remains 
without the Aufhebung of philosophy and, thus, the 
abyssal, unfathomable tomb remains the focus - which is to 
say that there is nothing to sight. In this unrelieved 
religion, then, there is no negatively-present infinite 
being and hence the dislocation of onto-theo-logy is 
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effected as the return to religion from 'Absolute Knowing' 
and it is thus that "religion saves by/from itself"[ll]. 
This 'return to religion' is the return to and restatement 
of the condition of (im)possibility of absolute knowing. 
This return is the movement from absolute knowing as the 
completion of self-presence to the constitutive difference 
which permits its self-positing just as - unthinkable 
within the terms of that Setzen - this difference removes 
the security of Ie propre, leaving it mobile within the 
"infrastructure" [l2] of a conditioning and necessarily-
unpresentable 'iterability'; an Ersetzen that has 
dispensed with the strict-fetishistic opposition of truth 
and error known to dialectical self-positing. Indeed, the 
translation of absolute knowing, Savoir Absolu, into Sa is 
the reconstruction - mimetically, parodically, within the 
structure of the general fetishism that elides pastiche 
and Genet's 'postiche'[13] - of 'absolute knowledge' as 
the constitutive difference. Throughout Glas, Derrida has 
attended to what the it construes as the sheer sublimity 
of the Hegelian absolute - its aversion to representation 
or positivity, its very unpresentability. The 
deconstructive question to Hegel is always prompted by its 
construal of Hegelianism as an oscillation between this 
aversion to positivity and the imposition (through the 
ruse of relever) of an 'absolute' positivity, full self-
presence. This is the reiteration of the Grammatology's 
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dichotomous "thinker of irreducible difference" and 
metaphysician of Ie propre.- Recalling the account of the 
Last Supper as the "love feast", one notes 
deconstruction's construal of Hegelian-Christian love as 
paradigmatic in its independence of objectification. This 
is the adumbration of what, in the last pages of Glas and 
its account of the Phenomenology's 'Absolute Knowing', can 
be discovered as the uncanny continuity of absolute 
knowing with differance: a unity springing from the 
construal of absolute knowing as "signification fulfilled 
or voided"[14]~ The continuity - the transformation of 
Savoir Absolu into Sa - resides, therefore, in the 
figurelessness of the former (the full-self presence of 
the hearth, the proprietorial 'being-at-home-with-itself' 
that has removed any threat of alterity harboured in the 
Vorstellung) as it is dependent upon the figurelessness of 
the latter (the sublimity of a 'nothing' that is traced in 
its nomination as a 'constitutive' difference and which 
is, as such, the ruin of the pretence to figurelessness of 
the former)~ Sa is, therefore, oikos and oekesis for its 
'absolute knowledge' is that the propriety of the oikos 
(absolute knowledge 'as such') is found - that is, 
irrecoverably lost - in the nothing 'harboured' by the 
oekesis~ The 'closing' pages of Glas send absolute 
knowing to the grave of differance as Derrida finds that 
Sa - Hegel's absolute - 'is' nothing: the conclusion of 
Glas enacts the tracing of this sublime power to religion 
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as the only possibility of its presentation~ Moreover, 
attendance to the first and final shapes of religion and 
their identity according to the circular logic of Hegel's 
system, enables this represented-figurelessness (absolute 
knowing returned to religion) to reaffirm its character as 
differance as the focus shifts to its 'presence', to the 
ontological status of this absolute~ This is the 
insertion of Heidegger's account of the 'gift' of Being -
'Es gibt Sein' - into the reading of 'Absolute Knowing'. 
Heidegger is slipped into the Phenomenology: the absolute 
would be properly unthinkable whilst its being-posited and 
positing-being in the text of Hegel would be the receipt 
of the gift as it is sent from that unthinkable 'Es'~ Sa 
becomes the Ca of this 'It' this 'Es' and ultimately , - , 
absolute knowing is reengaged in accordance with the 
History of Being.' From this perspective its propriety -
'being-for-self' as formal identity - is admitted as the 
determination of Being as absolute positing subjectivity~ 
This passage from absolute knowing to religion as the 
insertion of the Heideggerian 'gift' into Hegel's system -
and its chiming with the pursuit of the "remain(s)" of the 
absolute - is carried out in Derrida's reading of "das 
Lichtwesen"~ This, for the Phenomenology, is religion in 
its sheer immediacy - the first shape of Natural Religion. 
Glas, identifying the continuity of signification 
fulfilled-and-voided - the diurnal brilliance of pure 
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identity with the nocturnal blindness of pure difference _ 
constructs a further twist to the circuitous route of 
Spirit such that "one might say that Absolute Knowledge 
(~) transforms itself into an It (~)"[15]., The 
"luminous essence" accords with Heidegger's unthinkably-
anterior 'gift' of Being~ This is the registration of the 
differance of absolute knowledge achieved through the 
deployment of Heideggerian 'Ereignis' - the gift of 
presence as "event of Appropriation"[16]~ Expounded as 
the granting of Being and time in their belonging-together 
- as prior to Being and so unthinkable as an existent[17] 
- the 'It' that gives, thereby "withdraws what is most 
fully its own from boundless unconcealment"[18]. Thus 
does the Ca takes up a 'siteless' place according to 
aletheia and in a fashion that echoes the oscillation of a 
general fetishism. Unveiling does not provide the 
conclusive grasp of the thing in its 'properness' - the 
unveiling is equally a veiling for what it depends on in 
its presence withdraws, 'is' not~ The constitutive 
difference is, then, the 'gift' of Being as presence, that 
which inaugurates the Hegelian circuit of speculative-
profiteering 'propriety' but which is unthinkable within 
that economy of exchange. The Lichtwesen effects this 
excess of restricted economy for it would mirror, for 
Glas, the figurelessness of absolute knowing. 
Furthermore, the luminous essence elides with the 'Es 
gibt' as the Phenomenology unfolds it as a "sacrifice 
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[Opfer] to being-for-self, so that from its substance the 
individual may take an enduring existence for itself"[19], 
a pure flame which "must determine itself as being-for-
self"[20]~ From this, Glas confirms the luminous essence 
as the giving of Being, and Sa, through this intervention 
of reconsidered Ereignis, is 'evinced' as differance 
inasmuch as it is "undecided" - 'unbestimmt'[21] - a 
figurelessness that absolute knowledge (as the dream of 
figurelessness in the Aufhebung of representation; the 
desire of a total reappropriation of alterity) is 
dependent upon and 'reflects'. Reading the sacrificial, 
unthinkable figurelessness of the Lichtwesen's "all-
burning [brule-tout]"[22] as a "holocaust"[23], Glas 
conceives of philosophy as the reflection of this original 
gift and an attempt to reduce it to the 'meaning' of the 
positing subject and thus the attempt to contain it within 
the structure of reflection's 'opposition'. "The 
dialectic of religion, the history of philosophy (etc.,), 
produces itself as the reflection-effect of a coup de don 
[the gift's blow, stroke, time, etc] as/in holocaust" 
[24]. As such, the Phenomenology 're-starts' and thus is 
the 'figurelessness' of Savoir Absolu the representation 
of Sa/Ca as absolute subject, the pure light of self-
--
propriety. 
The movement from absolute knowing to the Lichtwesen is 
that from parousia to differance., It is the 'encrypting' 
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of §! - the unthinkable anteriority, unilluminable 
obscurity, constitutive difference - into the full self-
presence of Savoir Absolu as the ruin of this latter~ 
This is precipitated by a particular reading of absolute 
knowing as 'figureless' - that is, the 
'deconstructability' of absolute knowing lies in the 
paradox of its identity as "signification fulfilled or 
voided". Here is the route to the "remain(s)" of a Hegel 
- the possibility of destroying the speculative circuit by 
never leaving it - and it resides in the arc described in 
the passage from one sublimity to another, from brilliance 
to blindness~ The pure light of parousia in this absolute 
knowing is the conclusive appropriation by the subject of 
that luminosity and transparency that the last stage of 
religion ascribed to its loving Father - "everything 
shines with his light"[25] - and through the fact of this 
'shining' can Glas describe the Lichtwesen as "the origin 
and end of religion"[26]~ This is, then, the elucidation 
of the Kojevean "God-Man"., The identity of the 
'objectless' religion of pure light and the self-knowledge 
of absolute knowing and Sittlichkeit as "pure sight"[27] 
depicts the "aigle" of 'the end of history' that equates 
to the complete self-knowledge of positing subjectivity -
the reappropriation of all alterity by way of the 
consciousness of the object as 'posited'~ As Glas 
describes the Lichtwesen as "abstract subjectivity, [ .•• ] 
figureless figure"[28] , it confirms the Kojevean 'Spirit' 
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as that of a universalizing, positing, legal subject. The 
'figurelessness' of absolute knowing and Hegel's aversion 
to Vorstellung are summoned by Glas as evidence of an 
eschatology of abstract identification and in the luminous 
essence, therefore, this telos is considered to be 
discohered. Whereas the Lichtwesen, for Derrida, mirrors 
the freedom from alterity in the notion of ethical life 
(the adherents of the light-religion, as Hegel writes, "do 
not adore the light under the form of the sun; their 
adoration is not, in the strict sense, a cult of nature; 
but the light directly signifies the Good"[28]), this lack 
of objectification is what necessitates representation, 
thereafter aligning itself with a dialectic of Ersatz and 
non-Ersatz~ The blazing of the light, however, cannot be 
thought in its own right~ In other words, it cannot be 
thought 'as such', only as re-presented and, thus, the 
dialectic of substitute and truth it inaugurates is 
originated by something that is 'itself' possible only as 
re-presented, substitutional~ As Glas conceives it, the 
paradigm of absolute knowing - the pure self-illumination 
of abstract subjectivity untroubled by non-identity - is 
thereby 'nothing'~ Differance is structurally parasitic 
upon Kojevean 'absolute knowing' as the vacuity of its 
plenitude - which is as much as to reformulate the 
sentence that delivered absolute knowing to the Lichtwesen 
and thence to Ca Sa and the "remain(s)": 'signification 
-' -
fulfilled as voided'. The encrypting of Sa in Savoir 
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Absolu, therefore, is the intimation that the nearer 
thought would approach its total reappropriation, the more 
evident would be its dependence upon difference and, thus, 
at the extremes of 'origin' and 'end' - with the 
concomitant intensification of the suppression of that 
non-identity - the more apparent is its incoherence. This 
is evident in Glas's treatment of the temporal syntax of 
'Absolute Knowing' as it clashes with the desire for 
closure in the "annulment of time" just as it is in the 
'origin' of a pure all-burning in the "luminous essence"., 
ii~ 'Signification fulfilled and voided': the vacuity of 
Ie propre, the blindness of differance 
Yet (to repeat) this construal of Hegel is Kojevean~ It 
reruns the victorious career of the universal concept 
wherein all non-identity is reappropriated as it is 
subsumed beneath the anterior law of the legislating 
subject (Ie propre)., Contrary to Kojeve, contrary to 
Derrida, the 'vacuity' of this plenitude is one that 
confirms - in adversity - Hegel's speculative 
(begreifenden) identity., It is the vacuity of the concept 
divided from intuition - suppressing it in the refusal to 
acknowledge a mutual dependence., It is the failure to 
carry out the speculative reading of Kant's dictum whereby 
"concepts without intuitions are empty, intuitions without 
concepts are blind"[30]. The 'unthinkability' of absolute 
knowledge is the apotheosis of the concept as it detaches 
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from intuition in the security of its concluding history: 
against Kojeve, this vacuity is carried through - from 
absolute knowing to the gift - as 'differance'. It 
emerges, therefore, as the acknowledgement of the 
'intuition' that absolute knowing cannot do without if it 
is to live up to its name~ Yet, persisting in the 
construal of the latter as formal identity, the 
subsumptive concept, this 'intuition' is 
transcendentalised - fixed as constitutive of absolute 
knowing - and thus, divorced from the concept, it resolves 
to reside in the blindness of sheer intuition~ The 
circuit of 'fulfillment' and 'void' - Savoir Absolu to Sa 
- is this passage from vacuity to sightlessness~ 
The 'return to religion' is, therefore, the restriction to 
intuition. Following what Glas reconstructs as this 
failure to secure the passage from religion to philosophy 
(the passage that is the construal of the 'speculative 
Good Friday' as the subjective appropriation of 
substance), there is the failure to effect the "triumphal 
moment of mourning"[31]~ The 'shift' from oikos to 
oekesis is the deconstruction of absolute knowing 
resulting in a maintenance in mourning; a 'mourning' 
deprived of the possibility of cognizing its loss lest 
this take the form of a denial of that loss by way of the 
"triumphal" concept - the compensation of a transcendental 
signified., Thus, the Unhappy - ungluckiche -
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Consciousness and the temptations of a negative theology 
are avoided and the work of differance - the ringing of 
the glas and the attendance upon the oscillations of 
general undecidability - maintains deconstruction within 
the structure of the comic consciousness~ This is the 
consciousness that echoes in Glas's construal of the irony 
and abyssal laughter of Antigone - the 'irony', moreover, 
that Hegel has written of as a vacuity, a formal identity, 
that would, alone, escape the 'need' of philosophy[32]~ 
Nevertheles, just as the Derridean reconstruction of the 
'nocturnal law' and the tomb of Antigone was the sightless 
night of intuition rendered constitutive - that is, the 
"condition of (im)possibility" - of the suppressive 
concept (Savoir Absolu as Kojevean identity), so is this 
return to religion the flight into the 'unknowable' 
substance of positing subjectivity., 
The communication of this divorce of substance and subject 
with the "remain(s)" has been reiterated throughout this 
essay's treatment of Glas~ In the Derridean reading of 
absolute knowing and our recognition of the echoes of this 
'Savoir Absolu' in the Sa of Antigone and the Ca of the 
- -
gift (as well as in the 'undecidability' of general 
fetishism, in the Jews as 'cut off' from God and in the 
collapse of the absolute religion into Judaism) this 
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splitting of substance from subject as the death of the 
'cognizable absolute' has been the occasion of the ringing 
of the death-knell~ This, then, is to rephrase the 
dehiscence - effected by means of their identical 
abstractness - of concept and intuition. Nevertheless, 
rather than invite this movement, the Phenomenology's 
'Absolute Knowing' enables one to comprehend it. In 
anticipation (such is Hegel's 'precomprehension'!) of a 
return to representation, multiplicity, difference, etc, 
as the response to a sterile and suppressive 'universal' 
concept - the adherence to the play of a radical 
empiricity frustrating abstract law - 'Absolute Knowing' 
notes that 
"[s]ubstance, just by itself, would be the intuition 
devoid of content, or the intuition of a content which, as 
determinate, would be only accidental and would lack 
necessity. Substance would pass for the Absolute only in 
so far as it was thought or intuited as absolute unity; 
and all content would, as regards its diversity, have to 
fall outside of it into Reflection; and Reflection does 
not pertain to Substance, because Substance would not be 
Subject, would not be grasped as reflecting on itself and 
reflecting itself into itself, would not be grasped as 
Spirit. If a content were to be spoken of anyway, it 
would, on the one hand, only be spoken of in order to cast 
it into the empty abyss of the Absolute, and on the other, 
it would be a content picked up in an external fashion 
from sense-perception~ Knowledge would seem to have come 
by things, by what is different from itself, and by the 
difference of a variety of things, without comprehending 
whence they came."[33] 
Substance devoid of subject is 'abyssal' whilst subject 
devoid of substance is thereby uncomprehendingly 
'inscribed' into the infrastructure of a general 
iterability and abandoned to a radical empiricism. 
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iii. Absolute Knowing and the agon of community: substance 
is (not) subject 
The dehiscence of substance from subject is, then, the 
refusal of the possibility of the comprehension of 
substance. Deconstruction seeks to dispossess cognition 
of the possibility of the determination of difference and 
the different for it cannot conceive of this except as the 
cunning, circuitous route towards non-identity's 
sUbsumption beneath a universal. Equally, therefore, the 
closed circularity of its Hegel is the imputing of formal 
universality to the absolute as it is always considered by 
Hegel - a result[34]. Constructed diachronically, 
synchronically and fused in the absolute presence of 
philosophical 'precomprehension', the Hegelian 'absolute' 
is, for deconstruction, the registration of the desire for 
full self-propriety and the intolerance and suppression of 
difference. Throughout Glas the Hegelian notion of the 
absolute conceived as a result is registered by Derrida in 
an attendance upon the Hegelian tense of future perfect: 
what reason "will have meant (to say)" - the syntagm of 
'already/not-yet', addressed throughout as the (Lacanian) 
time of desire[35], the mastery of a contingent futurity 
by its 'already' having been conceptualised. Just as 
differance from the outset was conceived with the 
strategic end of the destruction of this (so construed) 
'comprehended temporality' as the end of history - the 
union and, thereby, the abolition of all diachrony and 
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synchrony in the course of an inevitably- successful self-
reappropriation - so the question of the "remain(s)" in 
Glas is prompted by (and is the answer 'of') an impossible 
temporality. As we have seen, the figurelessness of 'time 
annulled' is transformed within Glas from the impossible 
atemporality of blinding parousia (which is to say, its 
emptiness) to the constitutive (a)temporality of vacuous 
differance (which is to say, its blindness). 
Neither blind nor empty, not dissolved into the shadowless 
noon of pure sight, the 'speculative' Hegel would concur 
in the construal of a time of desire but would neither 
exempt the recognition of that time from such 'desire' nor 
foreclose on the possibility of such recognition by 
harnessing thought to desire as disseminative duree. Glas 
constructs its eschatological Hegel upon the 
Phenomenology's affirmation that Spirit 
"appears in Time just so long [so lange] as it has not 
grasped its pure Notion, ie has-Uot annulled [tilgt] Time. 
It is the outer, intuited pure Self which is not grasped 
by the Self, the merely intuited Notion; when this latter 
grasps itself it sets aside its Time-form, comprehends 
this intuiting and is a comprehended and comprehending 
intuiting~ Time, therefore appears as the destiny and 
necessity of Spirit [das Schicksal und ~ie.Notwendigkeit 
~ Geistes] that is not yet complete w1th1n 
itseif[~ •• ]~"[36] 
Contrary to Glas and its fixedly-literal reading of the 
Spirit of Hegel, the paradox of 'Absolute Knowing's 
temporal syntax - the appearance of time unannulled "as 
long as" it remains uncomprehended - is not the evidence 
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of a breakdown in the communication of the 'already' and 
the 'not-yet' in the Hegelian absolute. It is not the 
scenario wherein "the already-there of the not-yet, the 
already-no-more of the yet cannot agree [s'entendre]"[37] 
- the breakdown that marks out the constitution of the 
model of 's'entendre parler' in a suppressed non-
coincidentality. Rather, the passage discloses that time 
for Hegel, is conceived within the terms of the causality 
, 
of fate~ Thus, contrary to Derrida's estimation of a 
temporality of the production of formal self-identity, the 
comprehension of time is the annullment of time not as its 
abolition (which would be the 'figureless' conclusion that 
serves Derrida so well, enabling him to resort to the 
'transcendental' figurelessness of differance) but as the 
cessation of the representation of time as 'pure form', 
the Kantian "inner form of sensible intuition"[38]. 
In the 'annulment' of time, therefore, what is at issue is 
the intuiting of the itinerary of Spirit as it is 
reformulated, subverted and inverted through the 
consequences of its own deeds.- This is to say that 'time 
unannulled' is the totality of this process as it appears 
to consciousness as occurring 'in' a formal structure and 
as the gathering therein of the 'whole' - such as the 
opposition of a positing autonomous, 'moral' subject and 
the brute, heteronomous nature it confronts and which, in 
turn, confounds it. For Glas the itinerary of Spirit is a 
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'process' inasmuch as it is the career of Ie propre - the 
history justifying and securing the establishment of the 
jurisdiction of the legal subject, personality, the 
concept~ Derrida asserts this with his insistent 
reiteration, throughout the text, of "proces", legal 
"processus"[39], yet this does not cohere with the 
'procedure' of Spirit for, conceived as the causality of 
fate and its recognition, Spirit permits the comprehension 
of the injustice of the legal concept in the positing and 
subsumption of its 'oppositions'. This means that this 
'comprehension' itself cannot follow the procedure of 
subsumption but that - seeking to escape the injustice of 
the formal-legal 'concept' - its 'concept' must include 
the universal and its oppositions, comprehending them in 
their mutuality. This is not legal process but the 
possibility of determining its injustice and cognizing 
what it suppresses - the 'procedure' first adumbrated in 
the "fate" of Christianity and presented in the tragedy of 
Antigone. 
Thus, Hegel's 'time' is not the victory of Ie propre - it 
is not the (fore)closure of the case of "the subject-in-
process"[40] by a presupposition or prior application of a 
law of identity~ Rather, it is the intuition (in 'time' 
as formal) of the gathering up of the diverse failures of 
such posited identity. Time is not processus but "das 
Schicksal und die Notwendigkeit des Geistes": it 'is' as 
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fate and need or necessity. Hegel's conception of time as 
the appearance of the destiny - the fate, das Schicksal _ 
of Spirit is, therefore, the preparation not for the 
dissolution of a non-coincidentality that is (as in Glas) 
the condition of possibility of such an attempt at 
dissolution, but the preparation for the movement away 
from a positing subjectivity of Ie propre and its 
'inessential' object. Time as fate as law is the 
preparation for the comprehension of the 'counter-effect' 
of that posited 'object' upon the subject that defines it 
and of the unity of the two in the difference of that 
recoil - this, then, is the identity of subject and 
substance. Indeed, just as Jesus' "pleroma of the law" in 
"love" and "life" was the attempt to evade the fixed 
antitheses of the Jewish law and their consequent, 
irresolvable, violence[41] so was 'punishment as fate' 
invoked as a "lawlfulness without law"[42] which, 
departing from the one-sided positing subject, sought to 
enable the re-cognition of the life, the ethical totality, 
offended against and thus the re-cognition of the 
individual in its need - its necessity [Notwendigkeit] -
of that whole., Herein lies the 'desire' associated with 
Hegelian time: in the discoherence, in the agony of the 
'difference' that is the sundering of subject and 
substance the desire for the whole compels consciousness 
(and without any 'systematic' guarantee of success) to re-
cognition. This is involvement and circularity, no doubt, 
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yet not as the secure foresight of a "precomprehension" 
synonymous with the stasis of 'absolute' self-presence but 
as its dissolution - the melting and motility of the 
frozen, glacial concept in the agon of thought's 
experience of its failure and the 'circuitous' route of 
re-cognition whereby, as Hegel describes in the Preface , 
"we discover by experience that we meant something other 
than we meant to mean; and this correction of our meaning 
compels our knowing to go back to the proposition, and 
understand it some other way."[43] 
If Hegel's 'setting aside of the time-form' is to mean 
anything - that is, if it is not to be construed as the 
supersession of intuition, alterity, contingency, etc, in 
the 'universality' of sheer abstraction, pure theory or 
"sight" - then it is this re-cognition of subject in/as 
substance. It is the determination of the partiality and 
the false-universality of posited law through the 
comprehension of the 'fatality' of the elements of life 
misrepresented as 'inessential', 'heteronomous', etc. 
This is the annulment of time inasmuch as time is the 
immediate intuited 'collection' of that whole as it 
develops at odds with itself. It is a 'whole' evident in 
its totality regardless of its structured antithesis of 
concept and its oppositions - that is, inclusive of the 
frustration of posited legality and moral subjectivity at 
the hands of the oppositions they define as such. Time is 
the intuition of the causality of fate. Thus, time is 
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'comprehensive' (begreifendes) and recognised as such _ 
recognised as the process or form of (re)formation wherein 
the misrepresented or denied substance, relegated to the 
status of 'object', reforms the 'subject' which maltreats 
it - time is grasped as the procedure of social 
(mis)recognition, Spirit~ If the latter is thereby 
"absolute knowing; [ ••• ] Spirit that knows itself in the 
shape of Spirit, or a comprehensive knowing 
[begreifendes]" [44] it is as this immediate 'inner form 
of sensibility' that it can therefore be described as "the 
Concept [Begriff] that is there [der da ist]"[45]. For 
Derrida this 'Da' confirms the identitarian 
precomprehension of the 'time of desire' as Glas aligns it 
with Freud's account of the game of Fort/Da - it repeats 
the manipulation and maintenance of a circuitous time as 
the return and reappropriation of absolute 10ss[46]. Yet 
remaining within the Freudian lexicon one can pursue this 
construal of Hegel and witness the communication between 
differance and the causality of fate in considering that 
psychoanalytic mode of temporality which is one of the 
most important resources of 'differance'. I am referring, 
of course, to the notion of 'delayed effect', 
'retroaction', 'Nachtraglichkeit'. With this borrowing, 
deconstruction reinforces the unconventional temporality 
of differance as one of an unthinkable anteriority that 
breaks with any successive, developmental time of 
'presentation' and 'bringing-to-light' - the "vulgar"[47] , 
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linear time whose monotony Hegel interrupts with the 
dialectical rhythm but whose progress to self-propriety he 
nevertheless confirms. Derrida writes that "the structure 
of delay (Nachtraglichkeit) in effect forbids that one 
make of temporalization (temporization) a simple 
dialectical complication of the living present as an 
originary and unceasing synthesis"[48] and, as the time of 
the unconscious, it is the ruin of all self-presence - the 
nonmanifest law of the oekesis that 'underlies' and ruins 
the law of the state. Nachtraglichkeit is therefore the 
temporality unmasterable by appropriative subjectivity. 
Nevertheless, this conception of Freud's offers no 
necessary resistance to 'time annulled' - and not for the 
reason that the supposedly abstract-conceptual vacuity of 
this anulled time would despatch it to the sheer darkness 
of the former as differance and transcendental tomb. One 
of Lacan's commentators, Malcolm Bowie, has written how 
"an entire dimension of Freud's work redramatizes the myth 
of the Furies: the past is revisited upon the individual 
in a series of violent incursions, and his future, if he 
has one, can be envisaged only as a prolongation of these 
and a continuing helpless desire to lift their curse."[49] 
Whilst this emphasises uncomprehending reception and 
repetition - and for that reason permits Bowie to construe 
Lacan as the supplier to psychoanalysis of a future tense 
- its enrolment of the Eumenides 'brings to light' (yes) 
the community of Hegelian 're-cognition' and 
Nachtraglichkeit. We have already witnessed the contrast 
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between Macbeth and the Greeks (summoned by Derrida in the 
prosecution of Hegel on the question of the Jews); the 
contrast between the former's single-minded obedience to 
his law that carries him to the conclusion of an 
uncomprehending destruction and the latter'~ obedience 
with its 'circularity' of subsequent return and 
recognition of that which was damaged in such pursuit[SO]. 
This is to say that the determination of the phenomenon of 
Nachtraglichkeit evokes the causality of fate: the 
therapeutic response is the need and necessity of re-
cognition[Sl]. The speculative reading of the identity of 
substance and subject, intuition and concept, permits one 
to refuse the (equally) 'abyssal' choices of formal self-
possession or transcendental difference. In the former 
case it was the 'application' of its universal law, its 
positing, that 'summoned' like a fate the return of the 
repressed - a return which is beyond positing, beyond its 
control and thus without the calculable predictability of 
linear (or 'punctual-circular') chronology. Yet - looking 
to the difference that "demands to be thought"; in this 
case, the agony of the discoherence that sends the patient 
to analysis - one might be permitted to ask where, 
therapeutically, does the transcendentalized 
Nachtraglichkeit leave the analysand? The comprehension 
of the causality of fate permits one to underscore the 
distance that absolute knowledge would be from the 
phantasy of self-mastery inscribed as Ie propre. As the 
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time that is the re-cognition of the recoil of damaged 
life upon the concept, the causality of fate acknowledges 
the recoil as delay and incalulable - indeed, as 
'irruptive' - yet where it departs from Derrida's 
conception is that it is a 'difference' not 
transcendentalised but felt as the incompletion and 
fragmentation of that which was hitherto 'proper' and is 
now determined in its inadequacy. In this manner, then, 
is Spirit to be considered a result and the identity of 
subject and substance configured not as the production of 
an identity guaranteed from the outset but an itinerary of 
(mis)representation and re-cognition. Absolute knowing 
therefore is not a sheer figurelessness assimilable to 
abstract subjectivity but the grasp of "the process in 
which Spirit becomes what it is in itself"[52]. 
The 'causality of fate' invokes the re-cognition of 
substance in its loss: in the aporia, in the cutting-off 
of the individual from the ethical whole and the suffering 
of the latter, is the substantiality of the subject 
recognised. Equally, in the recognition of the 
differentiation of this 'immediate' ethical substance as 
the dehiscence of the individual from the whole the 
subjectivity of substance comes to cognition. It is re-
thought not as a sheer alterity that is irreparably lost, 
as alien to cognition - the latter understood solely 
within the terms of a metaphysics of Ie propre and the 
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procedural appropriation of non-identity in subsumption 
beneath a concept. In the sense of pain and the agony of 
its loss, substance is, rather, cognised as lost; a 
recognition that recoils upon the 'subject' to announce 
its insufficiency and the very limitations of Ie propre -
its sheer formality and abstractness. This would bear on 
the absolute subject which supplies the exemplar of 'the 
proper'. The alienation of legal personality in 
appropriation, expropriation by way of the exchange of 
legally-defined 'equivalents', would be the loss impelling 
the re-cognition of the untruth, the insubstantiality of 
that self-propriety - it would express the 'identity' of 
substance and subject in the cognition of the 
misrepresentation of substance by subject: 'personality' 
permits no right other than that of possession and 
acknowledges as substantial no element of life save that, 
such as labour, which attends to propriety. In the 
substantial expropriation of propriety registered in the 
Ersetzung that is the 'effect' of the Setzen of this 
absolute subject - its transformation into a substitute-
thing in the phenomenon of personification/reification -
the substance-denied is glimpsed in its recoil upon the 
subject. The 'identity' of the two comes to light as the 
misrepresentation of substance as subject is grasped - and 
grasped through the agony of their difference. 
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The paradigm of legal personality guides the Hegel of Ie 
propre because deconstruction, Kojeve's bastard, convenes 
the Hegelian system as the justification of the bourgeois-
revolutionary state and subject and its Begriff as the 
'concept' that accords with positive, abstract law. The 
Hyppolitean heritage informs the transcendental difference 
of this infinite proprietor by way of the negation - death 
- that is the condition of possibility of the Setzung, 
perpetually re-enacted in the Aufhebung. The transfer of 
oikos to oekesis could be said to take place across the 
texts of the two great Hegel commentaries of France - the 
flight of HaigleR from the restricted economy of Kojeve to 
the transcendental tomb derived from Hyppolite. This is 
the passage from light to dark, from the diurnal law to 
the nocturnal, from Savoir Absolu (masculine Gesetz, full 
self-presence, absolute self-transparency) to cryptic Sa 
('Antigone's law' of woman and the tomb; the Ca that is 
the Es both as the unthinkable anteriority of Heidegger's 
'gift' and the unrelievable 'unconscious' of Freud; the 
movement from the brilliant figurelessness of parousia to 
that of the dark void of differance constitutive of 
meaning). The central argument of this essay has repeated 
this resonance of the 'glas' ringing over the tomb in its 
quotation of the "grave of life"; the transformation of 
the divorce of substance and subject has been traced in 
, h 'C . , deconstruction's gliding from the 'Unhappy to t e om1C 
Consciousness. Once again, this is the deconstruction of 
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Hegel as the sundering of substance from subject - the 
rendering of the 'difference' borne by the labour of the 
negative in speculative identity as glacial, frozen. 
'Difference' is reified in a transcendental structure that 
equates to the preservation and perpetuation of the 
violence of the subject by the unknowable, occluded 
'substance' of differance. Derrida's reading of Hegel 
collects the remains that are unrelievable and engraves 
its own epitaph when it addresses a Hegel for whom, 
"everything takes place around a sepulcher"[53]. The 
"remain(s) of a Hegel" - the slide from concept to 
(constitutive) intuition, from subject to unpresentab1e 
substance - is the transfer from the figure1essness of 
Kojevean absolute identity to the transcendenta1ized 
negativity of Hyppolite~ The shift from oikos to oekesis 
(the excavation of the former beneath the latter) is the 
retraversal of a course between the two great Hegel 
commentaries of France. This is the long day's journey 
into night that is the passage from parousia to differance 
(to speak as if the latter where a station en route -
rather than the very passage). 
Nevertheless, just as the community of all-burning and 
pure difference joins das Lichtwesen and differance in a 
way that evinces a Hegel of formal identity - thereby 
echoing the Hegelian criticism of such formality in the 
vacuity and blindness of, respectively, concept and 
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intuition - so does the refusal of a 'speculative' 
graveside enact the elision between concept (the victory 
and fulfillment of universal law, abstract identity, 
complete self-presence) and intuition (the 
undeterminability of this 'completion', its 
comprehensibility cast into the abyss). For Derrida, 
absolute knowing is the triumphal moment of mourning, the 
reappropriation of alienated self-propriety in 
resurrection. Differance is the registration of an 
interminable mourning but one without nostalgia, without 
any illusion as to the possibility of 'reappropriation'. 
In this resides its affirmation, its jouissance as well as 
its resignation: dispensing with a transcendental 
signified - even as 'negative' - there is no concept but, 
equally, no closure. Deconstructive 'mourning' would be 
that celebration of betrayal and treason that is enacted 
in Genet's Funeral Rites., The transcendentalized 
difference, the oekesis, forbids spiritualization - the 
happy conclusion of a self-disinterrment - except as 
represented, substituted or travestied and then the result 
(again, one might refer to Genet's work of mourning) is to 
repeat the confrontation with the cadaver in its 
singularity, its 'flight', its refusal to be subsumed 
beneath a universal. 
The diurnal law, therefore, revolves into the nocturnal 
and Derrida neatly plays through the chiming of pure sight 
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with differance, Savoir Absolu with Sa (or Ca - Antigone 
and the gift) as the etymology of pyramis supplies him not 
only with crypts and tombs, forms "guard[ing] the trace of 
death", but also with "a cake of honey and flour [ . . . ] 
offered as a reward for a sleepless night [nuit blanche] 
to the one who thus remained awake. It was also a cone-
shaped cake given to the dead"[54]. The blinded state of 
panopticism and pure sight[55] (returning concept to 
intuition) as the transfer from absolute knowing to the 
unthinkable alterity of the gift is, thus, the 
deconstruction of the (con)fusion of night and day in the 
'white night' of an insomniac system. There is a gift for 
Hegel - he is no doubt receiving a reward for his work at 
the graveside, his "thinking of irreducible difference" -
yet the sleeplessness inevitably mirrors (or attempts to 
reflect) that 'rest' which is the mourner's domesticating 
name for death. Hegel must oscillate between obscure 
night or brilliant day and can be configured as the 
thinker of difference by way of the blindness of both. 
Yet contrary to the construal of a Hegel for whom night is 
abolished, the 'night' of absolute knowing - "the night 
of [Spirit's] self-consciousness" [56] - repeats the 
speculative comprehension of subject and substance, 
concept and intuition, and maintains that comprehension as 
structurally one of mourning. This is to say, the 
speculative Good Friday can be witnessed neither as the 
prelude to parousia nor, as in the stalled system of Glas, 
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as restriction to mourning without end. We return to the 
mutuality of night and day - of the hidden and manifest 
'laws' - and its re-cogition by way of the causality of 
fate. What is at issue in the difference enunciated in 
both the "Calvary of absolute Spirit"[57] and the 
causality of fate is its agony: it does not take up an 
unknowable constitutive site but rather as experienced, as 
the feeling of total loss, it demands cognition - it 
impels the re-cognition of the whole from the perspective 
of the dissolution of that which had hitherto passed for 
it. It is the re-cognition of self that is impelled by 
the agony of its diremption, whence springs not a simple, 
restored self-propriety in the brilliance of the 
resurrection but a comprehension - in its being thrown 
back upon itself in its 'inessentiality' and incompletion 
- of the becoming of Spirit through (and as) the 
agonistics of its reformulation at the hands of that which 
it misrepresented, sought to master and define, and to 
which it must now return and seek to re-cognise. This is 
to return 'difference' from a transcendental site whose 
'unknowability' carries itself through to the logical 
conclusion whereby (as 'trace', 'differance') it cannot 
even be conceived as such, to one that refuses 
assimilation to the fullness and void of abstract identity 
but which 'is' conceivable only determinately - in the 
agonistics of 'subject' and 'substance'. A recent 
commentator, responding to deconstructive a/theology, 
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succinctly addresses the question of the 
'transcendentalized' difference from the perspective of 
the speculative Good Friday~ The speculative difference , 
Rowan Williams suggests, is not the prelude to conclusive 
plentitude but a demand of re-cognition. Contrary to the 
Derridean account of 'Hegel's semiology', the Hegelian 
negative is not a detour, the 'difference' merely an 
interlude dividing self-presence, rather 
"the negative, as it appears in the cross, is the 
destruction of human valuation, and so the collapse of 
communicative practice itself; more than a formal polarity 
set against affirmations of presence, etc. In a sense, it 
is just as much a breach in language, an interruption of 
exchange, as the 'trace' in Taylor's aesthetic; what is 
different is that it cannot, in Hegel, stand as a timeless 
space for the holy. Because it is the negation of the 
human itself, it demands to be thought if the project of 
communication is to continue."[S8] 
Conclusion: Differance and the agon of the community 
Contrary to the deconstructive 'transcendental' difference 
- the unthinkable 'nothing' which, like the void white 
spaces, makes signification possible and unending - this 
is a difference that, offering no assurance (neither of 
inevitable success nor of inevitable failure[S9]) 
nevertheless, demands to be thought. A demand that can be 
refused, Hegel has noted, only through the self-
involvement of irony, for him the refusal of alterity by 
an abstract subjectivity[60] - the transformation of the 
Unhappy Consciousness into the Comic consciousness. 
the 'figurelessness' of this demand, then, is not the 
In 
- 305 -
phantasm of a Sollen - an Hegelian kingdom of ends, 
borrowed from Creon's polis, elided with the aquiline-
imperial states of Rome and Napoleon and somehow already 
realized by virtue of the 'implicitness' of its Concept. 
The figurelessness, rather, is that provided by a refusal 
to posit or legislate: 'Absolute Knowing' is not the 
systematic full(filled) stop~ Rather, it evinces the 
presentation of the absolute in its negation - the 
kaleidoscopic re-view wherein "our own act here has been 
simply to gather together the separate moments"[6l]; it 
presents the 'shining' of the absolute not as final 
parousiac lighting but in the necessity of the appearance, 
the Erscheinung, of the whole in its misrecognition and 
denial. The absolute shines in the 'recoil' of the 
causality of fate, which is to present 'the absolute' in 
the tragedy of its fragmentation and not to posit it in 
its inviolate integrity. Hegel is not grasped if he is 
construed as the thinker of the Setzung, of Aufhebung 
translated as 'subsumption' (relever de). The 
'figurelessness' of "a Hegel" is not the blinding light of 
complete self-transparence, or of a flame whose sheer 
self-consumption would leave remnants of cinders, 
supplying to a supposedly-complete system the reprimand of 
an unrecuperable residue. Otherwise than Derrida 
conceives it, the 'law' of the text is 'figureless' as one 
which is not representational - one which does not 
conclude with the fixing of the manifold of intuition 
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beneath the exemplary figure it expresses. The 'law' of 
the text is 'figureless' for there is no prescriptive 
regIe 'as such': the difference that is determinate, the 
flux respected by the speculative proposition, comprehend 
(include) that single-minded application and pursuit of 
principle and learn from its reformation at the hands of 
"the equivocating sisters of Fate"[62]. In 'Absolute 
Knowing's rehearsal of the non-posited law encountered 
elsewhere as 'the causality of fate', one is witness to 
the fact that the resistance of this law to criticism is 
not equivalent to the abstract self-identity, the self-
completeness, of a universal concept - a law to be 
applied. The resistance of Hegel's 'law' to criticism is 
that that law seeks not to foreclose on non-identity by 
the construction of a positive law and - furthermore - it 
seeks this for the very reason that it grasps the fate of 
positive law: its perversion by that which it deems, and 
excludes as, perverted. The resistance of Hegel to 
criticism, however, is dissolved in the construction of "a 
Hegel" convened under the eagle-standard. An "aigle" 
whose wingspan would enfold a Romanized Hellenism, the 
heroic bourgeois-revolutionary subject of Napoleon and the 
sinister shadow of Prussia: an aigle, therefore that 
inscribes into the system a politics to which numerous 
commentators have previously joined it and which here 
reflects a Hegel of "the imperium of the Aufhebung"[63]. 
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Hegel, therefore, grants reading a critical purchase once 
he has been 'regulated' - subjected to the construal of 
his 'law' as conceptual, universal, posited, one-sided. 
This is as much as to say that Hegel is reconstructed 
within the schematics of "the metaphysics of Ie propre" 
and that the "remain(s)" of Glas carry out this 
'critique'. (One might add, however, that deconstruction 
would disavow self-description as 'critique' just as it 
would baulk at its rigorous construal as 'transcendental': 
the very fact of a 'constitutive' difference would be 
enough to divide it from the critical enterprise, the 
latter still wedded to an ideal of self-presence.) 
Previously, this strategy was described as conveying 
Sittlichkeit to its grave: Derrida's case is predicated on 
the construal of Hegel's 'ethical life' as the modern 
state. The 'metaphysics of the proper' take philosophy to 
market - thinking, on this account, is entwined with the 
formal legal subject of property - just as the formality 
of that identity, its concept, takes philosophy into the 
business of state- and empire-building. However, Glas 
finds as an element in the very system of Hegel the 
configuration of an obstacle to this process of 
construction. Alighting on the Phenomenology's account of 
the tragedy of Antigone - the confrontation of the divine 
law of woman and the family with the human law of man and 
the state - Derrida renders the latter synonymous with Ie 
propre (which is to say, with the eskaton of the work and 
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eskaton of the work and its author) whilst construing 
Antigone as (thereby) the ruin of the system, inadmissable 
and indeterminable. As the "irony of the community" 
Antigone is convened as the differance of a statist Hegel. 
The discourse of the "remain(s)" seizes on this 
confrontation in media ~ (characteristic of Derrida: the 
oppositions are fixed and 'paradoxical' from the outset), 
it excavates the law of Antigone - of woman, the 
unconscious, the obscure, mourning and the dead - and 
establishes it as the transcendental difference of the 
textual propriety of community, state, masculinity, the 
manifest, etc. Antigone is thereby a figure of absolute 
expropriation intolerable for the system of Ie propre and 
the exchange economy of dialectical being-for-self. In a 
move whose pedigree was recognisably Kojevean, Glas 
arraigned Antigone against a Hegel enroled as Creon, that 
is (and contrary to Hegel's reading of the part) as the 
personification of the abstract state. 
Constructed on the presupposition of a Hegel of abstract 
subjectivity, the "remain(s)" are collected as the 
elements which are suppressed by the systematic concept. 
Convened according to differance, this is therefore to 
configure both the sine qua ~ of the system as well as 
that which perpetually defers its self-coincidence and is, 
as such, its ruin. This is the "remain(s)" of a Hegel: 
that which departs from the law of Ie propre, the remains 
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are discovered as the elements "inadmissable to the 
system". As 'exemplified' (and refusing subsumption to a 
positive law - differance "is not a concept" - they 
thereby would discohere any sense of the 'exemplary') in 
the deployment of a reconstructed law of Antigone, G1as 
undertakes an expropriation of Hegelian property. Guided 
by the 'method' of a general fetishism, this attendance 
upon the "remain(s)" is the excavation of that which would 
occupy a site of 'general undecidability'. The propriety, 
self-presence, the 'concept' of the element (which is to 
say, its 'necessity'; its interiority to the system) is 
simultaneously expropriated by a transcendental 'nothing', 
difference. The loss of self-mastery in the constitutive 
differance is the slide into a general substitutability: 
the loss of a transcendental signified engages nomination, 
etc, as a general Ersetzung without a non-Ersatz, it ruins 
a self-identical positing. Yet this notion of the 
alienation of property occurring by means of the law 
instituting propriety washes a 'general' fetishism onto 
the shores of commodity fetishism. The differance of the 
metaphysics of the proper is the embrace of a radical 
expropriation, an alienation contained in the inscription 
that guarantees property. In the alienation of the 
proprietor - his passage from essential subject to 
substitute-object by way of the law that formally secured 
his propriety: the result being the reification of the 
property-bearer and the personification of the commodity -
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in this process can be recognised the procedure of 
differance and 'writing'. Written law is the displacement 
of the totalitarian concept of Ie propre: whilst its 
abstractness and anteriority appear as the guarantee of 
that self-identity (and thus at one with it), that law 
nevertheless perpetuates and fixes oppositions and 
definitions which, in turn, bear on the essential legal 
subject and thwart its self-definition and desire. 
Derrida appears to follow Marx insofar as the abstract 
(written) law of private property is the law of its 
alienation and, furthermore, the law of the recogition of 
Ie propre as an Ersatz - what the law defined as the 
secondary and inessential thing of property assumes 
mastery and the (written) law of propriety is a law of 
universal alienation. It appears to sanction the power of 
that which the law of appropriation suppressed. As such, 
the significance of a general fetishism, when read through 
the prism of the metaphors of economy and state, lies in 
its elision with commodity fetishism and in the 
celebration - as expropriative of formal property law - of 
the object maligned as 'commodity'. The posited 
'secondariness' and substitutionality of the commodity can 
be generalized, moreover, as the proprietor, the person, 
comes to be recognised as substitutive and secondary - as 
'constituted' by 'his' property~ Thus, transcendentalised 
as the difference - the substance, the intuition - of 
propriety, this universal commodity which is the 
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substitute of all 'originals' (as the embodiment and 
realization of their value) will destroy the very 
possibility of a non-substitute for it is the means , 
medium, etc. of the further substitution of that 
qualitative, 'proper' thing, that "non-Ersatz". Beneath 
the formal universality of private property law is a 
general substitute - a substitute which not only alienates 
the proper but renders the rhetoric of 'foundation' void. 
The alienation of the proper - 'anteriorized' in 
accordance with transcendental difference - is the 
presupposition of universality as the condition of 
(im)possibility of that formal legality: civil society. 
Antigone - relocated as the catastrophe of the abstract 
state - is repositioned 'abyssally' in Marx's "sphere of 
difference". 
The "remain(s)" configured in Genet explicitly take up 
this site (which, as the realm of circulation and 
substitution, is 'siteless') when Glas quotes his 
assertion, "1 wrote to earn money"[64]. Enrolled as the 
"irony of the community", Genet thereby describes himself 
as such in describing the 'general' irony: the universal 
commodity that, if it is not itself the community, 
dissolves it. This affirms a participation in the 
substitutionality of personae and personification which 
marks out the text of Genet as one that embraces a general 
fetishism. The Genet column is the alienation of Hegel as 
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the totemic representation of all that th e Hegelian propre 
would suppress - theft, homosexuality, a fetishism and 
transvestism that would discohere the fixed oppositions of 
sexual difference and the masculine law of Creon and the 
state. It is dependent upon its twin pillar of a statist 
Hegel and it reflects the reading of 'general fetishism' 
that sees it dependent upon and perpetuating the 
antitheses of legal personality. 
Finally, with religion Glas siezes upon the refusal of 
sUbsumption beneath the universal law of state by the form 
of consciousness that would be configured as implicitly 
reducible to that law. Glas attends to religion as Vor-
stellung, and addresses the question as a matter of 
deferral - the maintenance in religion of an obstacle to 
complete ontotheological parousia. Thus, does 
deconstruction reinscribe the 'difference' of state and 
civil society. Religion is a remainder for it refuses the 
absolute self-propriety of the laws of the state - its 
status as supra-mundane locates it in an unpresentable 
'beyond' of those laws, a 'flight' with which differance 
finds little difficulty cooperating. Refusing the formal 
propriety of state, however, is as much the participation 
of religion in the division of state and civil society as 
it is the differance of the former as the realization of 
the Hegelian concept. In conclusion, therefore, the 
refusal of a metaphysics of the proper takes the course of 
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'religion' for it displaces Creon's law of the state: 
adhering to its preservation of Vorstellung, religion 
would perpetually defer the arrival of absolute position 
in parousia - the manifest, revealed light of God is never 
'present' only re-presented, substitutional; the Ersetzung 
of an unknowable, 'feminine', divine law. This is the 
passage of Christianity and its adherence to 
'manifestation' into Judaism and the hidden divinity. Yet 
this passage illuminates the contemporaneity of Glas and 
the "remain(s)" for it is the configuration of the 
difference of 'human' and 'divine' laws as the difference 
of state and religion in modernity's (unacknowledged) 
distinction of concrete difference and formal 
universality. Glas encrypts 'the Jewish Question' within 
its pages as the "remain(s)" of the aigle of the system 
but this Judaic figure emerges as more than the differance 
of ontotheological self-presence. The emancipated Jew 
arises as the embodiment of civil society, the achievement 
of the modern, abstract state and as the personification 
of capital in the eyes of a hostile 'statism'. In short, 
religion is conveyed from Christianity - the state-
religion, implicitly one with the concept - to Judaism -
the embodiment of the difference of state and civil 
society (the liberation of religion from the suppressive 
identity of the former and its 'displacement' into the 
latter - the very sphere of displacement and 
substitution)~ 
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The state is 'constituted' by civil society: 
deconstruction absorbs a certain reductive Marxism as its 
notion of a formal universality 'presupposing' concrete 
difference lends itself readily to the transcendental 
difference of Saussurean pedigree~ The sheer 
uncognizability of the "realm of difference" - its 
complete dehiscence from the concept - is rendered 
possible as the apotheosis of the state is grasped in a 
Hegel of the 'end of history'~ Pushed to the extreme of 
its law of light, the state's abstract identity displays a 
figurelessness that, in its indeterminability, explodes 
the concept and, in its 'meaninglessness', leads the way 
to its condition of possibility - equally 'unthinkable' 
but 'possible' by virtue of its effects; (provisional) 
identification, signification, positing. Thus is the 
'presupposition' unknowable: the 'difference' of state and 
civil society is located in the latter as the alienation 
and presupposition of the former, whence the 
'presupposition' is rendered transcendental - unknowable 
'as such'. Glas, in its criticism of Hegel by way of the 
"remain(s)", proceeds from a Hegel of positive law - a 
Hegel whose system is the validation and infinitization of 
private property law, the conclusive moment of the 
metaphysics of the proper - and excavates as buried, 
suppressed, those elements across the text that reflect 
the identitarian violence of that law of the proper. G1as 
is the embrace of intuition as 'abyssal' of the concept, 
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substance as the ruin of subject, and it maintains with 
great vigilance the uncognizability of this 'intuition' 
and 'substance' for to permit their being cognized would 
be to restore the jurisdiction of Ie propre, return to the 
positive law of Hegelian statism. This strategy 
misconstrues ethical life and absolute knowing as the 
imposition of the suppressive, legislating concept. It 
then takes the route of rendering the elements 
'suppressed' as suffering on account of their sheer 
inadmissability, their absolute alterity to the law. 
Deconstruction thereby dispenses with the concept as 
necessarily 'appropriative' and, thus, can have no way of 
re-cognizing the presupposition of the concept. This is 
to say that the residence of differance in/as civil 
society as the constitutive difference - the condition of 
(im)possibility - of formal identity as 'Ie propre', means 
that the 'difference' of state and civil society cannot be 
cognized., The fear of identitarian thought drives 
deconstruction to the point of assimilating all 'legality' 
to sheer domination whilst taking flight from the behemoth 
by way of a transcendental difference, the differance 
which both institutes 'propriety's (violent) desire of 
identity and renders it forever incomplete - which is to 
say, perpetual. 
The criticism of the metaphysics of the proper is the 
fixing, perpetuation and occlusion of the fragmented 
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ethical life of modernity. Setting out from the modern 
subject of private property, the subject of formal law 
, 
deconstruction effects a breach in this identity by way of 
suppressed difference - the difference that it conceives 
as constitutive-expropriative and 'radicalizes' as death , 
the oekesis, the tabernacle, in order to configure the 
blind spot of the concept of relever. Yet this is never 
to depart from private property. Whilst Derrida would 
construe a Hegel of property-law - constructing him within 
a rhetoric of economy, speculation and exchange - it is 
the fixing of writing and difference in the position of 
(formal) propriety's 'anterior' alienation which, 
mirroring prior, codified - written - property law, sends 
differance to market. The difference of concrete 
difference (civil society) and formal universality (state) 
is transcendentalised - it is elided with civil society 
and identified with the alienating power of the commodity, 
the (formally unacknowledged) principle of the community. 
The expropriation of Ie propre is announced in the 'glas'; 
the impossibility of appropriating-sublating the other. 
Derrida has said that "the non-subjectivable in the 
experience of mourning is what I tried to describe in 
Glas"[65] and this, under the impossible relation with 
alterity that is marked out in mourning, is the 
fundamental role of Antigone in the text. As this "irony 
of the community", then, does Glas embrace what it regards 
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as the law of Antigone. The mourning without nostalgia 
that the 'glas' would sound is the transformation of the 
compulsion to cognize the difference - negation and the 
loss - into the embrace of difference as the perpetual 
alienation of all conceptuality. It is the cancellation 
of the demand to think the difference - thought, fearful 
of its own ends, prefers now to be 'conditioned' by 
difference. For Derrida, to determine the difference is 
to salute the subsumptive concept, to enforce the law. To 
translate the difference to a transcendental structure, 
meanwhile, is to ruin the law. For the discourse of the 
"remain(s)", to (re)cognize the law can only be to confirm 
it, whilst to configure that law 'secondary' to its 
unthinkably anterior condition would be to confound it. 
This transcendental indeterminability - pursued in Glas as 
the anterior alienation of a general fetishism and 
registered in the legal-conceptual 'utopics' of the 
"remain(s)" of religion, Genet, the Jews, etc - is found 
to be represented most poignantly in Antigone's mourning. 
Yet the writing that seeks to preserve and shelter that 
'singularity' from the concept - snatch Antigone from the 
eagle's talons - has failed to recognize the very 
'singularity' that is borne by Hegel's account of a non-
posited law. Derrida has presupposed the oppositions of a 
positive law and from the alteration of the antitheses -
the ruse of dialectical universalization - 'singularity' 
has been rescued but at the price of its cognition, its 
- 318 -
determinability, its configuration of meaning and 
existence. 
G1as, for all its obsequial manner, yet fails to recognize 
the 'mourning of Antigone' in its double-nature - as a 
subjective and objective genitive. Antigone's mourning is 
carried through into the act whose error is acknowledged 
by virtue of the suffering it brings: an acknowledgement 
that is possible only for a society substantially free, 
only for a society in which singularity is not subsumed 
beneath an anterior, external law. As such, this is an 
acknowledgement impossible for the fixed antitheses of 
modern law and its 'absolute' subject and unrecognizable 
to a thought incapable of thinking otherwise than 
according to the law of expropriation. Equally, the 
mourning of Antigone takes place as the mourning of the 
loss of a freedom that never was. It is the cognition of 
the impossibility - and yet, necessity - of concrete 
recognition on account of its structuring by abstract 
universal law and the existence of private property. 
Thus, the mourning of the death of singularity is to be 
found not in its being rendered 'constitutive' - a 
'transcendental' difference; the law of the expropriation 
of law - but in the thought of the absolute that amounts 
to the agon of an ethical whole 'presentable' only in its 
self-falsification. The mourning of Antigone is the 
compulsion to re-think the fragments, it is the demand to 
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set in flux the fixed oppositions of modern law by way of 
thought's acknowledgement of its own participation in that 
conceptuality. To mourn the expulsion of 'singularity' 
from the world is to depart from the abstract 
conceptuality of a Kojeve, then, yet it is not to abandon 
cognition as 'domination per ~', embracing as 
constitutive the 'presupposition' of appropriation. The 
law of Antigone still glimmers in the comprehension of the 
mutuality of alienation and appropriation, concrete 
difference and abstract law: to keep faith with Antigone 
is to persist in the possibility of re-cognition - to 
refuse the subsumptive concept. Yet, equally, this is to 
refuse the consignment to the grave of that very refusal; 
it is to refuse the 'transcendentalizing' of the 
difference of formal identity. Antigone, in Glas, is 
interred a second time; now not by way of the tragedy of 
family and state but through the victory of positive law -
the law whose violence she would condition and whose 
determination she would preclude. As the personification 
of the constitutive difference of abstract identity, as 
the figuration of the oscillation of a 'condition of 
(im)possibility', Antigone would perpetuate the violence 
of Ie propre - a violence which would, moreover, persist 
with a greater frenzy by dint of the structural 'deferral' 
of its realization. The 'mourning' of Glas, therefore, is 
the preparation for the dissolution of the violence of 
abstract subjectivity by the intensification of that 
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violence through its being structured as uncognizable. 
The bitter irony of the "remain(s)" is such that the 
'law', which for Hegel had offered the perspective of the 
determination of the violent oppositions of conceptuality 
without their repositioning, now not only maintains them 
but forecloses on the possibility of their determination. 
In the "remain(s)" a spectral Antigone returns not as the 
shining in negation of an unpresentable whole, a 
lawfulness without law, but as the complement of the 
formal universal state - the violence of civil society 
rendered undeterminable. 
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